1. move "internal-lfs" route mock to "common-lfs"
2. fine tune tests
3. fix "realm" strings, according to RFC:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2617:
* realm = "realm" "=" realm-value
* realm-value = quoted-string
4. clarify some names of the middlewares, rename `ignXxx` to `optXxx` to
match `reqXxx`, and rename ambiguous `requireSignIn` to `reqGitSignIn`
PR for issue #31968
Replaces PR #31983 to comply with gitea's error definition
Failed authentications are now logged to level `Warning` instead of
`Info`.
This will allow instance admins to view signup pattern patterns for
public instances. It is modelled after discourse, mastodon, and
MediaWiki's approaches.
Note: This has privacy implications, but as the above-stated open-source
projects take this approach, especially MediaWiki, which I have no doubt
looked into this thoroughly, it is likely okay for us, too. However, I
would be appreciative of any feedback on how this could be improved.
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Part of #27700
Removes all URLs from translation strings to easy up changing them in
the future and to exclude people injecting malicious URLs through
translations. First measure as long as #24402 is out of scope.
In the OpenID flows, the "CfTurnstileSitekey" wasn't populated, which
caused those flows to fail if using Turnstile as the Captcha
implementation.
This adds the missing context variables, allowing Turnstile to be used
in the OpenID flows.
See discussion on #31561 for some background.
The introspect endpoint was using the OIDC token itself for
authentication. This fixes it to use basic authentication with the
client ID and secret instead:
* Applications with a valid client ID and secret should be able to
successfully introspect an invalid token, receiving a 200 response
with JSON data that indicates the token is invalid
* Requests with an invalid client ID and secret should not be able
to introspect, even if the token itself is valid
Unlike #31561 (which just future-proofed the current behavior against
future changes to `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN`), this is a potential
compatibility break (some introspection requests without valid client
IDs that would previously succeed will now fail). Affected deployments
must begin sending a valid HTTP basic authentication header with their
introspection requests, with the username set to a valid client ID and
the password set to the corresponding client secret.
This leverages the existing `sync_external_users` cron job to
synchronize the `IsActive` flag on users who use an OAuth2 provider set
to synchronize. This synchronization is done by checking for expired
access tokens, and using the stored refresh token to request a new
access token. If the response back from the OAuth2 provider is the
`invalid_grant` error code, the user is marked as inactive. However, the
user is able to reactivate their account by logging in the web browser
through their OAuth2 flow.
Also changed to support this is that a linked `ExternalLoginUser` is
always created upon a login or signup via OAuth2.
### Notes on updating permissions
Ideally, we would also refresh permissions from the configured OAuth
provider (e.g., admin, restricted and group mappings) to match the
implementation of LDAP. However, the OAuth library used for this `goth`,
doesn't seem to support issuing a session via refresh tokens. The
interface provides a [`RefreshToken`
method](https://github.com/markbates/goth/blob/master/provider.go#L20),
but the returned `oauth.Token` doesn't implement the `goth.Session` we
would need to call `FetchUser`. Due to specific implementations, we
would need to build a compatibility function for every provider, since
they cast to concrete types (e.g.
[Azure](https://github.com/markbates/goth/blob/master/providers/azureadv2/azureadv2.go#L132))
---------
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
closes#22015
After adding a passkey, you can now simply login with it directly by
clicking `Sign in with a passkey`.
Note for testing. You need to run gitea using `https` to get the full
passkeys experience.
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
This PR only does "renaming":
* `Route` should be `Router` (and chi router is also called "router")
* `Params` should be `PathParam` (to distingush it from URL query param, and to match `FormString`)
* Use lower case for private functions to avoid exposing or abusing
This commit forces the resource owner (user) to always approve OAuth 2.0
authorization requests if the client is public (e.g. native
applications).
As detailed in [RFC 6749 Section 10.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749.html#section-10.2),
> The authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization
requests automatically (without active resource owner interaction)
without authenticating the client or relying on other measures to ensure
that the repeated request comes from the original client and not an
impersonator.
With the implementation prior to this patch, attackers with access to
the redirect URI (e.g., the loopback interface for
`git-credential-oauth`) can get access to the user account without any
user interaction if they can redirect the user to the
`/login/oauth/authorize` endpoint somehow (e.g., with `xdg-open` on
Linux).
Fixes#25061.
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Follow #30454
And fix#24957
When using "preferred_username", if no such field,
`extractUserNameFromOAuth2` (old `getUserName`) shouldn't return an
error. All other USERNAME options do not return such error.
And fine tune some logic and error messages, make code more stable and
more friendly to end users.
Since `modules/context` has to depend on `models` and many other
packages, it should be moved from `modules/context` to
`services/context` according to design principles. There is no logic
code change on this PR, only move packages.
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context`
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/contexttest` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/contexttest` because of depending on
context
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/upload` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload` because of depending on
context
Follow #29165.
* Introduce JSONTemplate to help to render JSON templates
* Introduce JSEscapeSafe for templates. Now only use `{{ ... |
JSEscape}}` instead of `{{ ... | JSEscape | Safe}}`
* Simplify "UserLocationMapURL" useage
Clarify when "string" should be used (and be escaped), and when
"template.HTML" should be used (no need to escape)
And help PRs like #29059 , to render the error messages correctly.
Fixes#28660
Fixes an admin api bug related to `user.LoginSource`
Fixed `/user/emails` response not identical to GitHub api
This PR unifies the user update methods. The goal is to keep the logic
only at one place (having audit logs in mind). For example, do the
password checks only in one method not everywhere a password is updated.
After that PR is merged, the user creation should be next.
Nowadays, cache will be used on almost everywhere of Gitea and it cannot
be disabled, otherwise some features will become unaviable.
Then I think we can just remove the option for cache enable. That means
cache cannot be disabled.
But of course, we can still use cache configuration to set how should
Gitea use the cache.
The steps to reproduce it.
First, create a new oauth2 source.
Then, a user login with this oauth2 source.
Disable the oauth2 source.
Visit users -> settings -> security, 500 will be displayed.
This is because this page only load active Oauth2 sources but not all
Oauth2 sources.
Closes#27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
This PR removed `unittest.MainTest` the second parameter
`TestOptions.GiteaRoot`. Now it detects the root directory by current
working directory.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Baltazár Radics