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/**
@file
@author from CrypoNote (see copyright below; Andrey N. Sabelnikov)
@monero rfree
@brief the connection templated-class for one peer connection
*/
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// Copyright (c) 2006-2013, Andrey N. Sabelnikov, www.sabelnikov.net
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// All rights reserved.
//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
// documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
// * Neither the name of the Andrey N. Sabelnikov nor the
// names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
// derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
// ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
// WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
// (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
// LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
// ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
// SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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//
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#include <boost/foreach.hpp>
#include <boost/uuid/random_generator.hpp>
#include <boost/chrono.hpp>
#include <boost/utility/value_init.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/deadline_timer.hpp>
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#include <boost/date_time/posix_time/posix_time.hpp> // TODO
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#include <boost/thread/condition_variable.hpp> // TODO
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#include <boost/make_shared.hpp>
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#include "warnings.h"
#include "string_tools.h"
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#include "misc_language.h"
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#include "net/local_ip.h"
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#include "pragma_comp_defs.h"
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#include <sstream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <algorithm>
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#include <functional>
#include <random>
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Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
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#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "net"
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#define AGGRESSIVE_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD 120 // sockets
#define NEW_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_LOCAL 1200000 // 2 minutes
#define NEW_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMOTE 10000 // 10 seconds
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#define DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS_LOCAL 1800000 // 30 minutes
#define DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS_REMOTE 300000 // 5 minutes
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#define TIMEOUT_EXTRA_MS_PER_BYTE 0.2
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PRAGMA_WARNING_PUSH
namespace epee
{
namespace net_utils
{
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template<typename T>
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T& check_and_get(std::shared_ptr<T>& ptr)
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{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(bool(ptr), "shared_state cannot be null");
return *ptr;
}
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/************************************************************************/
/* */
/************************************************************************/
PRAGMA_WARNING_DISABLE_VS(4355)
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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connection<t_protocol_handler>::connection( boost::asio::io_service& io_service,
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std::shared_ptr<shared_state> state,
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
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t_connection_type connection_type,
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ssl_support_t ssl_support
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)
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: connection(boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket{io_service}, std::move(state), connection_type, ssl_support)
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{
}
template<class t_protocol_handler>
connection<t_protocol_handler>::connection( boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket&& sock,
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std::shared_ptr<shared_state> state,
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
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t_connection_type connection_type,
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ssl_support_t ssl_support
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)
:
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connection_basic(std::move(sock), state, ssl_support),
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m_protocol_handler(this, check_and_get(state), context),
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buffer_ssl_init_fill(0),
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m_connection_type( connection_type ),
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m_throttle_speed_in("speed_in", "throttle_speed_in"),
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m_throttle_speed_out("speed_out", "throttle_speed_out"),
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m_timer(GET_IO_SERVICE(socket_)),
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m_local(false),
m_ready_to_close(false)
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{
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MDEBUG("test, connection constructor set m_connection_type="<<m_connection_type);
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}
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PRAGMA_WARNING_DISABLE_VS(4355)
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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connection<t_protocol_handler>::~connection() noexcept(false)
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{
if(!m_was_shutdown)
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Socket destroyed without shutdown.");
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shutdown();
}
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Socket destroyed");
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}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
boost::shared_ptr<connection<t_protocol_handler> > connection<t_protocol_handler>::safe_shared_from_this()
{
try
{
return connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_from_this();
}
catch (const boost::bad_weak_ptr&)
{
// It happens when the connection is being deleted
return boost::shared_ptr<connection<t_protocol_handler> >();
}
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::start(bool is_income, bool is_multithreaded)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
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boost::system::error_code ec;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
auto remote_ep = socket().remote_endpoint(ec);
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CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(!ec, false, "Failed to get remote endpoint: " << ec.message() << ':' << ec.value());
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CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(remote_ep.address().is_v4() || remote_ep.address().is_v6(), false, "only IPv4 and IPv6 supported here");
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if (remote_ep.address().is_v4())
{
const unsigned long ip_ = boost::asio::detail::socket_ops::host_to_network_long(remote_ep.address().to_v4().to_ulong());
return start(is_income, is_multithreaded, ipv4_network_address{uint32_t(ip_), remote_ep.port()});
}
else
{
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const auto ip_ = remote_ep.address().to_v6();
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return start(is_income, is_multithreaded, ipv6_network_address{ip_, remote_ep.port()});
}
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CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::start()", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::start(bool is_income, bool is_multithreaded, network_address real_remote)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
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// Use safe_shared_from_this, because of this is public method and it can be called on the object being deleted
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
return false;
m_is_multithreaded = is_multithreaded;
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m_local = real_remote.is_loopback() || real_remote.is_local();
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// create a random uuid, we don't need crypto strength here
const boost::uuids::uuid random_uuid = boost::uuids::random_generator()();
context = t_connection_context{};
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
bool ssl = m_ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled;
context.set_details(random_uuid, std::move(real_remote), is_income, ssl);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
boost::system::error_code ec;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
auto local_ep = socket().local_endpoint(ec);
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CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(!ec, false, "Failed to get local endpoint: " << ec.message() << ':' << ec.value());
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_dbg3("[sock " << socket_.native_handle() << "] new connection from " << print_connection_context_short(context) <<
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" to " << local_ep.address().to_string() << ':' << local_ep.port() <<
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", total sockets objects " << get_state().sock_count);
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if(static_cast<shared_state&>(get_state()).pfilter && !static_cast<shared_state&>(get_state()).pfilter->is_remote_host_allowed(context.m_remote_address))
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg2("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] host denied " << context.m_remote_address.host_str() << ", shutdowning connection");
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close();
return false;
}
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m_host = context.m_remote_address.host_str();
try { host_count(m_host, 1); } catch(...) { /* ignore */ }
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m_protocol_handler.after_init_connection();
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reset_timer(boost::posix_time::milliseconds(m_local ? NEW_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_LOCAL : NEW_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMOTE), false);
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
// first read on the raw socket to detect SSL for the server
buffer_ssl_init_fill = 0;
if (is_income && m_ssl_support != epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_disabled)
socket().async_receive(boost::asio::buffer(buffer_),
strand_.wrap(
2020-05-31 19:18:11 -06:00
std::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_receive, self,
std::placeholders::_1,
std::placeholders::_2)));
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
else
async_read_some(boost::asio::buffer(buffer_),
strand_.wrap(
2020-05-31 19:18:11 -06:00
std::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_read, self,
std::placeholders::_1,
std::placeholders::_2)));
2015-12-31 19:47:48 -07:00
#if !defined(_WIN32) || !defined(__i686)
// not supported before Windows7, too lazy for runtime check
// Just exclude for 32bit windows builds
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//set ToS flag
int tos = get_tos_flag();
boost::asio::detail::socket_option::integer< IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS >
optionTos( tos );
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
socket().set_option( optionTos );
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//_dbg1("Set ToS flag to " << tos);
2015-12-31 19:47:48 -07:00
#endif
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::no_delay noDelayOption(false);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
socket().set_option(noDelayOption);
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::start()", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::request_callback()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg2("[" << print_connection_context_short(context) << "] request_callback");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
// Use safe_shared_from_this, because of this is public method and it can be called on the object being deleted
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
return false;
strand_.post(boost::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::call_back_starter, self));
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::request_callback()", false);
return true;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
boost::asio::io_service& connection<t_protocol_handler>::get_io_service()
{
2019-03-21 05:01:15 -06:00
return GET_IO_SERVICE(socket());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::add_ref()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
// Use safe_shared_from_this, because of this is public method and it can be called on the object being deleted
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
return false;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] add_ref, m_peer_number=" << mI->m_peer_number);
2017-06-11 07:07:28 -06:00
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(self->m_self_refs_lock);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] add_ref 2, m_peer_number=" << mI->m_peer_number);
2018-11-07 01:24:50 -07:00
++m_reference_count;
m_self_ref = std::move(self);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::add_ref()", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::release()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
boost::shared_ptr<connection<t_protocol_handler> > back_connection_copy;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
LOG_TRACE_CC(context, "[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] release");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_self_refs_lock);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(m_reference_count, false, "[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] m_reference_count already at 0 at connection<t_protocol_handler>::release() call");
2018-11-07 01:24:50 -07:00
// is this the last reference?
if (--m_reference_count == 0) {
// move the held reference to a local variable, keeping the object alive until the function terminates
std::swap(back_connection_copy, m_self_ref);
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::release()", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::call_back_starter()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg2("[" << print_connection_context_short(context) << "] fired_callback");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
m_protocol_handler.handle_qued_callback();
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::call_back_starter()", void());
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::save_dbg_log()
{
2016-03-27 05:53:20 -06:00
std::string address, port;
boost::system::error_code e;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint endpoint = socket().remote_endpoint(e);
2016-03-27 05:53:20 -06:00
if (e)
{
address = "<not connected>";
port = "<not connected>";
}
else
{
address = endpoint.address().to_string();
port = boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(endpoint.port());
}
2017-10-07 11:50:28 -06:00
MDEBUG(" connection type " << to_string( m_connection_type ) << " "
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
<< socket().local_endpoint().address().to_string() << ":" << socket().local_endpoint().port()
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
<< " <--> " << context.m_remote_address.str() << " (via " << address << ":" << port << ")");
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_read(const boost::system::error_code& e,
std::size_t bytes_transferred)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Async read calledback.");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
if (m_was_shutdown)
return;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if (!e)
{
2019-05-10 08:07:32 -06:00
double current_speed_down;
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
{
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_throttle_speed_in_mutex);
m_throttle_speed_in.handle_trafic_exact(bytes_transferred);
2019-05-10 08:07:32 -06:00
current_speed_down = m_throttle_speed_in.get_current_speed();
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
}
2019-05-10 08:07:32 -06:00
context.m_current_speed_down = current_speed_down;
context.m_max_speed_down = std::max(context.m_max_speed_down, current_speed_down);
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
{
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL( epee::net_utils::network_throttle_manager::network_throttle_manager::m_lock_get_global_throttle_in );
2017-11-26 07:26:17 -07:00
epee::net_utils::network_throttle_manager::network_throttle_manager::get_global_throttle_in().handle_trafic_exact(bytes_transferred);
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
}
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
double delay=0; // will be calculated - how much we should sleep to obey speed limit etc
if (speed_limit_is_enabled()) {
do // keep sleeping if we should sleep
{
{ //_scope_dbg1("CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL");
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL( epee::net_utils::network_throttle_manager::m_lock_get_global_throttle_in );
2017-11-26 07:26:17 -07:00
delay = epee::net_utils::network_throttle_manager::get_global_throttle_in().get_sleep_time_after_tick( bytes_transferred );
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
}
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
if (m_was_shutdown)
return;
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
delay *= 0.5;
2019-12-16 11:24:29 -07:00
long int ms = (long int)(delay * 100);
if (ms > 0) {
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
reset_timer(boost::posix_time::milliseconds(ms + 1), true);
2016-03-11 05:25:28 -07:00
boost::this_thread::sleep_for(boost::chrono::milliseconds(ms));
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
}
} while(delay > 0);
} // any form of sleeping
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] RECV " << bytes_transferred);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
logger_handle_net_read(bytes_transferred);
2014-03-20 05:46:11 -06:00
context.m_last_recv = time(NULL);
context.m_recv_cnt += bytes_transferred;
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
m_ready_to_close = false;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
bool recv_res = m_protocol_handler.handle_recv(buffer_.data(), bytes_transferred);
if(!recv_res)
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] protocol_want_close");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
//some error in protocol, protocol handler ask to close connection
boost::interprocess::ipcdetail::atomic_write32(&m_want_close_connection, 1);
bool do_shutdown = false;
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_send_que_lock);
if(!m_send_que.size())
do_shutdown = true;
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
if(do_shutdown)
shutdown();
}else
{
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
reset_timer(get_timeout_from_bytes_read(bytes_transferred), false);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
async_read_some(boost::asio::buffer(buffer_),
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
strand_.wrap(
boost::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_read, connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_from_this(),
boost::asio::placeholders::error,
boost::asio::placeholders::bytes_transferred)));
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "]Async read requested.");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
}else
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Some not success at read: " << e.message() << ':' << e.value());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if(e.value() != 2)
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Some problems at read: " << e.message() << ':' << e.value());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
shutdown();
}
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
else
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg3("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] peer closed connection");
2019-11-11 13:05:00 -07:00
bool do_shutdown = false;
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_send_que_lock);
if(!m_send_que.size())
do_shutdown = true;
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
if (m_ready_to_close || do_shutdown)
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
shutdown();
}
m_ready_to_close = true;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
// If an error occurs then no new asynchronous operations are started. This
// means that all shared_ptr references to the connection object will
// disappear and the object will be destroyed automatically after this
// handler returns. The connection class's destructor closes the socket.
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_read", void());
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_receive(const boost::system::error_code& e,
std::size_t bytes_transferred)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
if (m_was_shutdown) return;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
if (e)
{
// offload the error case
handle_read(e, bytes_transferred);
return;
}
2020-12-26 18:55:12 -07:00
buffer_ssl_init_fill += bytes_transferred;
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
MTRACE("we now have " << buffer_ssl_init_fill << "/" << get_ssl_magic_size() << " bytes needed to detect SSL");
if (buffer_ssl_init_fill < get_ssl_magic_size())
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
{
2020-12-26 18:55:12 -07:00
socket().async_receive(boost::asio::buffer(buffer_.data() + buffer_ssl_init_fill, buffer_.size() - buffer_ssl_init_fill),
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
strand_.wrap(
boost::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_receive, connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_from_this(),
boost::asio::placeholders::error,
boost::asio::placeholders::bytes_transferred)));
return;
}
// detect SSL
if (m_ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_autodetect)
{
if (is_ssl((const unsigned char*)buffer_.data(), buffer_ssl_init_fill))
{
MDEBUG("That looks like SSL");
m_ssl_support = epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled; // read/write to the SSL socket
}
else
{
MDEBUG("That does not look like SSL");
m_ssl_support = epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_disabled; // read/write to the raw socket
}
}
if (m_ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled)
{
// Handshake
2020-12-26 18:55:12 -07:00
if (!handshake(boost::asio::ssl::stream_base::server, boost::asio::const_buffer(buffer_.data(), buffer_ssl_init_fill)))
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
{
MERROR("SSL handshake failed");
boost::interprocess::ipcdetail::atomic_write32(&m_want_close_connection, 1);
2019-11-11 13:05:00 -07:00
m_ready_to_close = true;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
bool do_shutdown = false;
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_send_que_lock);
if(!m_send_que.size())
do_shutdown = true;
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
if(do_shutdown)
shutdown();
return;
}
}
2020-12-26 18:55:12 -07:00
else
{
handle_read(e, buffer_ssl_init_fill);
return;
}
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
async_read_some(boost::asio::buffer(buffer_),
strand_.wrap(
boost::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_read, connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_from_this(),
boost::asio::placeholders::error,
boost::asio::placeholders::bytes_transferred)));
// If an error occurs then no new asynchronous operations are started. This
// means that all shared_ptr references to the connection object will
// disappear and the object will be destroyed automatically after this
// handler returns. The connection class's destructor closes the socket.
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_receive", void());
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::call_run_once_service_io()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
if(!m_is_multithreaded)
{
//single thread model, we can wait in blocked call
2019-03-21 05:01:15 -06:00
size_t cnt = GET_IO_SERVICE(socket()).run_one();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if(!cnt)//service is going to quit
return false;
}else
{
//multi thread model, we can't(!) wait in blocked call
//so we make non blocking call and releasing CPU by calling sleep(0);
//if no handlers were called
//TODO: Maybe we need to have have critical section + event + callback to upper protocol to
//ask it inside(!) critical region if we still able to go in event wait...
2019-03-21 05:01:15 -06:00
size_t cnt = GET_IO_SERVICE(socket()).poll_one();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if(!cnt)
2018-06-09 05:37:15 -06:00
misc_utils::sleep_no_w(1);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::call_run_once_service_io", false);
}
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::do_send(byte_slice message) {
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
TRY_ENTRY();
// Use safe_shared_from_this, because of this is public method and it can be called on the object being deleted
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if (!self) return false;
if (m_was_shutdown) return false;
// TODO avoid copy
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
std::uint8_t const* const message_data = message.data();
const std::size_t message_size = message.size();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
const double factor = 32; // TODO config
typedef long long signed int t_safe; // my t_size to avoid any overunderflow in arithmetic
const t_safe chunksize_good = (t_safe)( 1024 * std::max(1.0,factor) );
const t_safe chunksize_max = chunksize_good * 2 ;
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
const bool allow_split = (m_connection_type == e_connection_type_RPC) ? false : true; // do not split RPC data
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(! (chunksize_max<0), false, "Negative chunksize_max" ); // make sure it is unsigned before removin sign with cast:
2015-02-12 13:53:52 -07:00
long long unsigned int chunksize_max_unsigned = static_cast<long long unsigned int>( chunksize_max ) ;
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
if (allow_split && (message_size > chunksize_max_unsigned)) {
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
{ // LOCK: chunking
epee::critical_region_t<decltype(m_chunking_lock)> send_guard(m_chunking_lock); // *** critical ***
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
MDEBUG("do_send() will SPLIT into small chunks, from packet="<<message_size<<" B for ptr="<<message_data);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
// 01234567890
// ^^^^ (pos=0, len=4) ; pos:=pos+len, pos=4
// ^^^^ (pos=4, len=4) ; pos:=pos+len, pos=8
// ^^^ (pos=8, len=4) ;
// const size_t bufsize = chunksize_good; // TODO safecast
// char* buf = new char[ bufsize ];
bool all_ok = true;
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
while (!message.empty()) {
byte_slice chunk = message.take_slice(chunksize_good);
2019-09-27 09:15:32 -06:00
MDEBUG("chunk_start="<<(void*)chunk.data()<<" ptr="<<message_data<<" pos="<<(chunk.data() - message_data));
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
MDEBUG("part of " << message.size() << ": pos="<<(chunk.data() - message_data) << " len="<<chunk.size());
bool ok = do_send_chunk(std::move(chunk)); // <====== ***
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
all_ok = all_ok && ok;
if (!all_ok) {
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
MDEBUG("do_send() DONE ***FAILED*** from packet="<<message_size<<" B for ptr="<<message_data);
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("do_send() SEND was aborted in middle of big package - this is mostly harmless "
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
<< " (e.g. peer closed connection) but if it causes trouble tell us at #monero-dev. " << message_size);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
return false; // partial failure in sending
}
// (in catch block, or uniq pointer) delete buf;
} // each chunk
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
MDEBUG("do_send() DONE SPLIT from packet="<<message_size<<" B for ptr="<<message_data);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("do_send() m_connection_type = " << m_connection_type);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
return all_ok; // done - e.g. queued - all the chunks of current do_send call
} // LOCK: chunking
} // a big block (to be chunked) - all chunks
else { // small block
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
return do_send_chunk(std::move(message)); // just send as 1 big chunk
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
}
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::do_send", false);
} // do_send()
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::do_send_chunk(byte_slice chunk)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
TRY_ENTRY();
// Use safe_shared_from_this, because of this is public method and it can be called on the object being deleted
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
return false;
if(m_was_shutdown)
return false;
2019-05-10 08:07:32 -06:00
double current_speed_up;
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{
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_throttle_speed_out_mutex);
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m_throttle_speed_out.handle_trafic_exact(chunk.size());
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current_speed_up = m_throttle_speed_out.get_current_speed();
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
}
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context.m_current_speed_up = current_speed_up;
context.m_max_speed_up = std::max(context.m_max_speed_up, current_speed_up);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] SEND " << cb);
2014-03-20 05:46:11 -06:00
context.m_last_send = time(NULL);
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
context.m_send_cnt += chunk.size();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
//some data should be wrote to stream
//request complete
2017-11-26 07:26:17 -07:00
// No sleeping here; sleeping is done once and for all in "handle_write"
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
2016-04-17 04:45:38 -06:00
m_send_que_lock.lock(); // *** critical ***
epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller scope_exit_handler = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&](){m_send_que_lock.unlock();});
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
long int retry=0;
const long int retry_limit = 5*4;
while (m_send_que.size() > ABSTRACT_SERVER_SEND_QUE_MAX_COUNT)
{
retry++;
/* if ( ::cryptonote::core::get_is_stopping() ) { // TODO re-add fast stop
_fact("ABORT queue wait due to stopping");
return false; // aborted
}*/
2019-09-06 19:35:47 -06:00
using engine = std::mt19937;
engine rng;
std::random_device dev;
std::seed_seq::result_type rand[engine::state_size]{}; // Use complete bit space
std::generate_n(rand, engine::state_size, std::ref(dev));
std::seed_seq seed(rand, rand + engine::state_size);
rng.seed(seed);
long int ms = 250 + (rng() % 50);
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MDEBUG("Sleeping because QUEUE is FULL, in " << __FUNCTION__ << " for " << ms << " ms before packet_size="<<chunk.size()); // XXX debug sleep
2016-04-17 04:45:38 -06:00
m_send_que_lock.unlock();
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boost::this_thread::sleep(boost::posix_time::milliseconds( ms ) );
2016-04-17 04:45:38 -06:00
m_send_que_lock.lock();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg1("sleep for queue: " << ms);
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
if (m_was_shutdown)
return false;
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
if (retry > retry_limit) {
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MWARNING("send que size is more than ABSTRACT_SERVER_SEND_QUE_MAX_COUNT(" << ABSTRACT_SERVER_SEND_QUE_MAX_COUNT << "), shutting down connection");
2016-04-17 04:47:22 -06:00
shutdown();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
return false;
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
m_send_que.push_back(std::move(chunk));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if(m_send_que.size() > 1)
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
{ // active operation should be in progress, nothing to do, just wait last operation callback
2019-05-11 09:38:35 -06:00
auto size_now = m_send_que.back().size();
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
MDEBUG("do_send_chunk() NOW just queues: packet="<<size_now<<" B, is added to queue-size="<<m_send_que.size());
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
//do_send_handler_delayed( ptr , size_now ); // (((H))) // empty function
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
LOG_TRACE_CC(context, "[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Async send requested " << m_send_que.front().size());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
else
{ // no active operation
if(m_send_que.size()!=1)
{
_erro("Looks like no active operations, but send que size != 1!!");
return false;
}
auto size_now = m_send_que.front().size();
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
MDEBUG("do_send_chunk() NOW SENSD: packet="<<size_now<<" B");
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
if (speed_limit_is_enabled())
2019-05-16 14:34:22 -06:00
do_send_handler_write( m_send_que.back().data(), m_send_que.back().size() ); // (((H)))
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES( size_now == m_send_que.front().size(), false, "Unexpected queue size");
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
reset_timer(get_default_timeout(), false);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
async_write(boost::asio::buffer(m_send_que.front().data(), size_now ) ,
2019-03-13 08:37:42 -06:00
strand_.wrap(
2020-05-31 19:18:11 -06:00
std::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_write, self, std::placeholders::_1, std::placeholders::_2)
2019-03-13 08:37:42 -06:00
)
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
);
//_dbg3("(chunk): " << size_now);
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
//logger_handle_net_write(size_now);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Async send requested " << m_send_que.front().size());
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
}
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
//do_send_handler_stop( ptr , cb ); // empty function
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::do_send_chunk", false);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
} // do_send_chunk
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
boost::posix_time::milliseconds connection<t_protocol_handler>::get_default_timeout()
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
{
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
unsigned count;
try { count = host_count(m_host); } catch (...) { count = 0; }
2019-04-20 06:24:29 -06:00
const unsigned shift = get_state().sock_count > AGGRESSIVE_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD ? std::min(std::max(count, 1u) - 1, 8u) : 0;
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
boost::posix_time::milliseconds timeout(0);
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
if (m_local)
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
timeout = boost::posix_time::milliseconds(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS_LOCAL >> shift);
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
else
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
timeout = boost::posix_time::milliseconds(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS_REMOTE >> shift);
return timeout;
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
boost::posix_time::milliseconds connection<t_protocol_handler>::get_timeout_from_bytes_read(size_t bytes)
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
{
boost::posix_time::milliseconds ms = (boost::posix_time::milliseconds)(unsigned)(bytes * TIMEOUT_EXTRA_MS_PER_BYTE);
2019-12-16 11:24:29 -07:00
const auto cur = m_timer.expires_from_now().total_milliseconds();
if (cur > 0)
ms += (boost::posix_time::milliseconds)cur;
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
if (ms > get_default_timeout())
ms = get_default_timeout();
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
return ms;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
unsigned int connection<t_protocol_handler>::host_count(const std::string &host, int delta)
{
static boost::mutex hosts_mutex;
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(hosts_mutex);
static std::map<std::string, unsigned int> hosts;
unsigned int &val = hosts[host];
if (delta > 0)
MTRACE("New connection from host " << host << ": " << val);
else if (delta < 0)
MTRACE("Closed connection from host " << host << ": " << val);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(delta >= 0 || val >= (unsigned)-delta, "Count would go negative");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(delta <= 0 || val <= std::numeric_limits<unsigned int>::max() - (unsigned)delta, "Count would wrap");
val += delta;
return val;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::reset_timer(boost::posix_time::milliseconds ms, bool add)
{
2020-12-26 07:14:09 -07:00
const auto tms = ms.total_milliseconds();
if (tms < 0 || (add && tms == 0))
2019-12-16 11:24:29 -07:00
{
MWARNING("Ignoring negative timeout " << ms);
return;
}
MTRACE((add ? "Adding" : "Setting") << " " << ms << " expiry");
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
{
MERROR("Resetting timer on a dead object");
return;
}
2019-09-12 05:27:47 -06:00
if (m_was_shutdown)
{
MERROR("Setting timer on a shut down object");
return;
}
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
if (add)
2019-12-16 11:24:29 -07:00
{
const auto cur = m_timer.expires_from_now().total_milliseconds();
if (cur > 0)
ms += (boost::posix_time::milliseconds)cur;
}
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
m_timer.expires_from_now(ms);
m_timer.async_wait([=](const boost::system::error_code& ec)
{
if(ec == boost::asio::error::operation_aborted)
return;
2018-05-26 13:17:15 -06:00
MDEBUG(context << "connection timeout, closing");
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
self->close();
});
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::shutdown()
{
2018-07-11 15:02:28 -06:00
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_shutdown_lock);
if (m_was_shutdown)
return true;
m_was_shutdown = true;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
// Initiate graceful connection closure.
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
m_timer.cancel();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
2019-03-13 08:37:42 -06:00
if (m_ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled)
2019-04-12 12:12:04 -06:00
{
const shared_state &state = static_cast<const shared_state&>(get_state());
if (!state.stop_signal_sent)
socket_.shutdown(ignored_ec);
}
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
socket().shutdown(boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket::shutdown_both, ignored_ec);
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
if (!m_host.empty())
{
try { host_count(m_host, -1); } catch (...) { /* ignore */ }
m_host = "";
}
2018-07-11 15:02:28 -06:00
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
2018-06-29 08:40:19 -06:00
m_protocol_handler.release_protocol();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::close()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2018-07-11 15:02:28 -06:00
auto self = safe_shared_from_this();
if(!self)
return false;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//_info("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Que Shutdown called.");
2018-05-26 12:34:13 -06:00
m_timer.cancel();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
size_t send_que_size = 0;
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_send_que_lock);
send_que_size = m_send_que.size();
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
boost::interprocess::ipcdetail::atomic_write32(&m_want_close_connection, 1);
if(!send_que_size)
{
shutdown();
}
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::close", false);
}
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::send_done()
{
if (m_ready_to_close)
return close();
m_ready_to_close = true;
return true;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::cancel()
{
return close();
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_write(const boost::system::error_code& e, size_t cb)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
LOG_TRACE_CC(context, "[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Async send calledback " << cb);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if (e)
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_dbg1("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] Some problems at write: " << e.message() << ':' << e.value());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
shutdown();
return;
}
2015-02-12 12:59:39 -07:00
logger_handle_net_write(cb);
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
2017-11-26 07:26:17 -07:00
// The single sleeping that is needed for correctly handling "out" speed throttling
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
if (speed_limit_is_enabled()) {
sleep_before_packet(cb, 1, 1);
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
bool do_shutdown = false;
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_send_que_lock);
if(m_send_que.empty())
{
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
_erro("[sock " << socket().native_handle() << "] m_send_que.size() == 0 at handle_write!");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return;
}
m_send_que.pop_front();
if(m_send_que.empty())
{
if(boost::interprocess::ipcdetail::atomic_read32(&m_want_close_connection))
{
do_shutdown = true;
}
}else
{
//have more data to send
2018-06-07 05:43:10 -06:00
reset_timer(get_default_timeout(), false);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
auto size_now = m_send_que.front().size();
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("handle_write() NOW SENDS: packet="<<size_now<<" B" <<", from queue size="<<m_send_que.size());
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
if (speed_limit_is_enabled())
do_send_handler_write_from_queue(e, m_send_que.front().size() , m_send_que.size()); // (((H)))
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES( size_now == m_send_que.front().size(), void(), "Unexpected queue size");
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
async_write(boost::asio::buffer(m_send_que.front().data(), size_now) ,
2019-03-13 08:37:42 -06:00
strand_.wrap(
2020-05-31 19:18:11 -06:00
std::bind(&connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_write, connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_from_this(), std::placeholders::_1, std::placeholders::_2)
2019-03-13 08:37:42 -06:00
)
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//_dbg3("(normal)" << size_now);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
if(do_shutdown)
{
shutdown();
}
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("connection<t_protocol_handler>::handle_write", void());
}
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
void connection<t_protocol_handler>::setRpcStation()
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
{
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
m_connection_type = e_connection_type_RPC;
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("set m_connection_type = RPC ");
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
}
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool connection<t_protocol_handler>::speed_limit_is_enabled() const {
return m_connection_type != e_connection_type_RPC ;
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
/************************************************************************/
/* */
/************************************************************************/
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::boosted_tcp_server( t_connection_type connection_type ) :
2019-05-16 14:34:22 -06:00
m_state(std::make_shared<typename connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_state>()),
2019-02-10 11:40:32 -07:00
m_io_service_local_instance(new worker()),
io_service_(m_io_service_local_instance->io_service),
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
acceptor_(io_service_),
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
acceptor_ipv6(io_service_),
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
default_remote(),
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m_stop_signal_sent(false), m_port(0),
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
m_threads_count(0),
m_thread_index(0),
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m_connection_type( connection_type ),
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
new_connection_(),
new_connection_ipv6()
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{
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create_server_type_map();
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m_thread_name_prefix = "NET";
}
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::boosted_tcp_server(boost::asio::io_service& extarnal_io_service, t_connection_type connection_type) :
2019-05-16 14:34:22 -06:00
m_state(std::make_shared<typename connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_state>()),
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io_service_(extarnal_io_service),
acceptor_(io_service_),
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
acceptor_ipv6(io_service_),
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
default_remote(),
m_stop_signal_sent(false), m_port(0),
m_threads_count(0),
m_thread_index(0),
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
m_connection_type(connection_type),
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
new_connection_(),
new_connection_ipv6()
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
create_server_type_map();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
m_thread_name_prefix = "NET";
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::~boosted_tcp_server()
{
this->send_stop_signal();
timed_wait_server_stop(10000);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::create_server_type_map()
{
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server_type_map["NET"] = e_connection_type_NET;
server_type_map["RPC"] = e_connection_type_RPC;
server_type_map["P2P"] = e_connection_type_P2P;
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::init_server(uint32_t port, const std::string& address,
uint32_t port_ipv6, const std::string& address_ipv6, bool use_ipv6, bool require_ipv4,
ssl_options_t ssl_options)
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{
TRY_ENTRY();
m_stop_signal_sent = false;
m_port = port;
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
m_port_ipv6 = port_ipv6;
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m_address = address;
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m_address_ipv6 = address_ipv6;
m_use_ipv6 = use_ipv6;
m_require_ipv4 = require_ipv4;
2019-03-14 22:03:32 -06:00
if (ssl_options)
m_state->configure_ssl(std::move(ssl_options));
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
std::string ipv4_failed = "";
std::string ipv6_failed = "";
try
{
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver resolver(io_service_);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query(address, boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(port), boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint endpoint = *resolver.resolve(query);
acceptor_.open(endpoint.protocol());
2019-10-22 06:27:41 -06:00
#if !defined(_WIN32)
acceptor_.set_option(boost::asio::ip::tcp::acceptor::reuse_address(true));
#endif
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acceptor_.bind(endpoint);
acceptor_.listen();
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint binded_endpoint = acceptor_.local_endpoint();
m_port = binded_endpoint.port();
MDEBUG("start accept (IPv4)");
new_connection_.reset(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, m_state->ssl_options().support));
acceptor_.async_accept(new_connection_->socket(),
boost::bind(&boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv4, this,
boost::asio::placeholders::error));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
ipv4_failed = e.what();
}
if (ipv4_failed != "")
{
MERROR("Failed to bind IPv4: " << ipv4_failed);
if (require_ipv4)
{
throw std::runtime_error("Failed to bind IPv4 (set to required)");
}
}
if (use_ipv6)
{
try
{
if (port_ipv6 == 0) port_ipv6 = port; // default arg means bind to same port as ipv4
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver resolver(io_service_);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query(address_ipv6, boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(port_ipv6), boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint endpoint = *resolver.resolve(query);
acceptor_ipv6.open(endpoint.protocol());
2019-10-22 06:27:41 -06:00
#if !defined(_WIN32)
acceptor_ipv6.set_option(boost::asio::ip::tcp::acceptor::reuse_address(true));
#endif
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
acceptor_ipv6.set_option(boost::asio::ip::v6_only(true));
acceptor_ipv6.bind(endpoint);
acceptor_ipv6.listen();
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint binded_endpoint = acceptor_ipv6.local_endpoint();
m_port_ipv6 = binded_endpoint.port();
MDEBUG("start accept (IPv6)");
new_connection_ipv6.reset(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, m_state->ssl_options().support));
acceptor_ipv6.async_accept(new_connection_ipv6->socket(),
boost::bind(&boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv6, this,
boost::asio::placeholders::error));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
ipv6_failed = e.what();
}
}
if (use_ipv6 && ipv6_failed != "")
{
MERROR("Failed to bind IPv6: " << ipv6_failed);
if (ipv4_failed != "")
{
throw std::runtime_error("Failed to bind IPv4 and IPv6");
}
}
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return true;
2017-12-13 07:03:46 -07:00
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MFATAL("Error starting server: " << e.what());
return false;
}
catch (...)
{
MFATAL("Error starting server");
return false;
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
PUSH_WARNINGS
DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(maybe-uninitialized)
template<class t_protocol_handler>
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bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::init_server(const std::string port, const std::string& address,
const std::string port_ipv6, const std::string address_ipv6, bool use_ipv6, bool require_ipv4,
ssl_options_t ssl_options)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
uint32_t p = 0;
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
uint32_t p_ipv6 = 0;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if (port.size() && !string_tools::get_xtype_from_string(p, port)) {
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MERROR("Failed to convert port no = " << port);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return false;
}
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (port_ipv6.size() && !string_tools::get_xtype_from_string(p_ipv6, port_ipv6)) {
MERROR("Failed to convert port no = " << port_ipv6);
return false;
}
return this->init_server(p, address, p_ipv6, address_ipv6, use_ipv6, require_ipv4, std::move(ssl_options));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
POP_WARNINGS
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::worker_thread()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
uint32_t local_thr_index = boost::interprocess::ipcdetail::atomic_inc32(&m_thread_index);
std::string thread_name = std::string("[") + m_thread_name_prefix;
thread_name += boost::to_string(local_thr_index) + "]";
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MLOG_SET_THREAD_NAME(thread_name);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
// _fact("Thread name: " << m_thread_name_prefix);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
while(!m_stop_signal_sent)
{
try
{
2019-02-10 11:40:32 -07:00
io_service_.run();
return true;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
catch(const std::exception& ex)
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_erro("Exception at server worker thread, what=" << ex.what());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
catch(...)
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_erro("Exception at server worker thread, unknown execption");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
}
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//_info("Worker thread finished");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::worker_thread", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::set_threads_prefix(const std::string& prefix_name)
{
m_thread_name_prefix = prefix_name;
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
auto it = server_type_map.find(m_thread_name_prefix);
2016-03-21 04:12:12 -06:00
if (it==server_type_map.end()) throw std::runtime_error("Unknown prefix/server type:" + std::string(prefix_name));
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
auto connection_type = it->second; // the value of type
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MINFO("Set server type to: " << connection_type << " from name: " << m_thread_name_prefix << ", prefix_name = " << prefix_name);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::set_connection_filter(i_connection_filter* pfilter)
{
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
assert(m_state != nullptr); // always set in constructor
m_state->pfilter = pfilter;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2014-04-30 14:50:06 -06:00
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::run_server(size_t threads_count, bool wait, const boost::thread::attributes& attrs)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
TRY_ENTRY();
m_threads_count = threads_count;
m_main_thread_id = boost::this_thread::get_id();
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MLOG_SET_THREAD_NAME("[SRV_MAIN]");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
while(!m_stop_signal_sent)
{
// Create a pool of threads to run all of the io_services.
CRITICAL_REGION_BEGIN(m_threads_lock);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < threads_count; ++i)
{
boost::shared_ptr<boost::thread> thread(new boost::thread(
2014-04-30 14:50:06 -06:00
attrs, boost::bind(&boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::worker_thread, this)));
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_note("Run server thread name: " << m_thread_name_prefix);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
m_threads.push_back(thread);
}
CRITICAL_REGION_END();
// Wait for all threads in the pool to exit.
2016-10-02 19:06:55 -06:00
if (wait)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_fact("JOINING all threads");
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < m_threads.size(); ++i) {
m_threads[i]->join();
}
_fact("JOINING all threads - almost");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
m_threads.clear();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_fact("JOINING all threads - DONE");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
}
else {
_dbg1("Reiniting OK.");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return true;
}
if(wait && !m_stop_signal_sent)
{
//some problems with the listening socket ?..
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg1("Net service stopped without stop request, restarting...");
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if(!this->init_server(m_port, m_address, m_port_ipv6, m_address_ipv6, m_use_ipv6, m_require_ipv4))
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg1("Reiniting service failed, exit.");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return false;
}else
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg1("Reiniting OK.");
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
}
}
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::run_server", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::is_thread_worker()
{
TRY_ENTRY();
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_threads_lock);
BOOST_FOREACH(boost::shared_ptr<boost::thread>& thp, m_threads)
{
if(thp->get_id() == boost::this_thread::get_id())
return true;
}
if(m_threads_count == 1 && boost::this_thread::get_id() == m_main_thread_id)
return true;
return false;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::is_thread_worker", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2014-03-20 05:46:11 -06:00
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::timed_wait_server_stop(uint64_t wait_mseconds)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
TRY_ENTRY();
boost::chrono::milliseconds ms(wait_mseconds);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < m_threads.size(); ++i)
{
if(m_threads[i]->joinable() && !m_threads[i]->try_join_for(ms))
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg1("Interrupting thread " << m_threads[i]->native_handle());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
m_threads[i]->interrupt();
}
}
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::timed_wait_server_stop", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::send_stop_signal()
{
m_stop_signal_sent = true;
2019-04-12 12:12:04 -06:00
typename connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_state *state = static_cast<typename connection<t_protocol_handler>::shared_state*>(m_state.get());
state->stop_signal_sent = true;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
TRY_ENTRY();
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
connections_mutex.lock();
for (auto &c: connections_)
{
2017-08-16 08:41:34 -06:00
c->cancel();
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
}
2015-12-23 04:19:16 -07:00
connections_.clear();
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
connections_mutex.unlock();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
io_service_.stop();
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::send_stop_signal()", void());
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv4(const boost::system::error_code& e)
{
this->handle_accept(e, false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv6(const boost::system::error_code& e)
{
this->handle_accept(e, true);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
void boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept(const boost::system::error_code& e, bool ipv6)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("handle_accept");
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::acceptor* current_acceptor = &acceptor_;
connection_ptr* current_new_connection = &new_connection_;
auto accept_function_pointer = &boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv4;
if (ipv6)
{
current_acceptor = &acceptor_ipv6;
current_new_connection = &new_connection_ipv6;
accept_function_pointer = &boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept_ipv6;
}
2018-06-12 00:25:01 -06:00
try
{
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if (!e)
{
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (m_connection_type == e_connection_type_RPC) {
const char *ssl_message = "unknown";
switch ((*current_new_connection)->get_ssl_support())
{
case epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_disabled: ssl_message = "disabled"; break;
case epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled: ssl_message = "enabled"; break;
case epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_autodetect: ssl_message = "autodetection"; break;
}
MDEBUG("New server for RPC connections, SSL " << ssl_message);
(*current_new_connection)->setRpcStation(); // hopefully this is not needed actually
}
connection_ptr conn(std::move((*current_new_connection)));
(*current_new_connection).reset(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, conn->get_ssl_support()));
current_acceptor->async_accept((*current_new_connection)->socket(),
boost::bind(accept_function_pointer, this,
boost::asio::placeholders::error));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
2018-02-11 16:20:24 -07:00
boost::asio::socket_base::keep_alive opt(true);
conn->socket().set_option(opt);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
bool res;
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
if (default_remote.get_type_id() == net_utils::address_type::invalid)
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
res = conn->start(true, 1 < m_threads_count);
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
else
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
res = conn->start(true, 1 < m_threads_count, default_remote);
if (!res)
{
conn->cancel();
return;
}
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
conn->save_dbg_log();
2018-06-12 00:25:01 -06:00
return;
}
else
{
MERROR("Error in boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept: " << e);
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
2018-06-12 00:25:01 -06:00
MERROR("Exception in boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::handle_accept: " << e.what());
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2018-06-12 00:25:01 -06:00
// error path, if e or exception
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
assert(m_state != nullptr); // always set in constructor
_erro("Some problems at accept: " << e.message() << ", connections_count = " << m_state->sock_count);
2018-06-12 00:25:01 -06:00
misc_utils::sleep_no_w(100);
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
(*current_new_connection).reset(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, (*current_new_connection)->get_ssl_support()));
current_acceptor->async_accept((*current_new_connection)->socket(),
boost::bind(accept_function_pointer, this,
boost::asio::placeholders::error));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::add_connection(t_connection_context& out, boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket&& sock, network_address real_remote, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support)
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
{
2019-03-21 05:01:15 -06:00
if(std::addressof(get_io_service()) == std::addressof(GET_IO_SERVICE(sock)))
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
{
2019-03-14 22:03:32 -06:00
connection_ptr conn(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(std::move(sock), m_state, m_connection_type, ssl_support));
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
if(conn->start(false, 1 < m_threads_count, std::move(real_remote)))
{
conn->get_context(out);
conn->save_dbg_log();
return true;
}
}
else
{
MWARNING(out << " was not added, socket/io_service mismatch");
}
return false;
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
typename boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::try_connect_result_t boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::try_connect(connection_ptr new_connection_l, const std::string& adr, const std::string& port, boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket &sock_, const boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint &remote_endpoint, const std::string &bind_ip, uint32_t conn_timeout, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
TRY_ENTRY();
sock_.open(remote_endpoint.protocol());
if(bind_ip != "0.0.0.0" && bind_ip != "0" && bind_ip != "" )
{
2018-09-09 04:46:58 -06:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint local_endpoint(boost::asio::ip::address::from_string(bind_ip.c_str()), 0);
2018-08-27 10:29:29 -06:00
boost::system::error_code ec;
sock_.bind(local_endpoint, ec);
if (ec)
{
2018-09-09 04:46:58 -06:00
MERROR("Error binding to " << bind_ip << ": " << ec.message());
2018-08-27 10:29:29 -06:00
if (sock_.is_open())
sock_.close();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
return CONNECT_FAILURE;
2018-08-27 10:29:29 -06:00
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
/*
NOTICE: be careful to make sync connection from event handler: in case if all threads suddenly do sync connect, there will be no thread to dispatch events from io service.
*/
boost::system::error_code ec = boost::asio::error::would_block;
//have another free thread(s), work in wait mode, without event handling
struct local_async_context
{
boost::system::error_code ec;
boost::mutex connect_mut;
boost::condition_variable cond;
};
boost::shared_ptr<local_async_context> local_shared_context(new local_async_context());
local_shared_context->ec = boost::asio::error::would_block;
boost::unique_lock<boost::mutex> lock(local_shared_context->connect_mut);
auto connect_callback = [](boost::system::error_code ec_, boost::shared_ptr<local_async_context> shared_context)
{
2016-11-28 02:52:49 -07:00
shared_context->connect_mut.lock(); shared_context->ec = ec_; shared_context->cond.notify_one(); shared_context->connect_mut.unlock();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
};
2020-05-31 19:18:11 -06:00
sock_.async_connect(remote_endpoint, std::bind<void>(connect_callback, std::placeholders::_1, local_shared_context));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
while(local_shared_context->ec == boost::asio::error::would_block)
{
bool r = local_shared_context->cond.timed_wait(lock, boost::get_system_time() + boost::posix_time::milliseconds(conn_timeout));
2016-03-20 06:05:55 -06:00
if (m_stop_signal_sent)
{
if (sock_.is_open())
sock_.close();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
return CONNECT_FAILURE;
2016-03-20 06:05:55 -06:00
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
if(local_shared_context->ec == boost::asio::error::would_block && !r)
{
//timeout
sock_.close();
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg3("Failed to connect to " << adr << ":" << port << ", because of timeout (" << conn_timeout << ")");
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
return CONNECT_FAILURE;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
}
ec = local_shared_context->ec;
if (ec || !sock_.is_open())
{
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg3("Some problems at connect, message: " << ec.message());
2016-03-20 06:05:55 -06:00
if (sock_.is_open())
sock_.close();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
return CONNECT_FAILURE;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
_dbg3("Connected success to " << adr << ':' << port);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
2019-03-14 22:03:32 -06:00
const ssl_support_t ssl_support = new_connection_l->get_ssl_support();
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
if (ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_enabled || ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_autodetect)
{
// Handshake
MDEBUG("Handshaking SSL...");
if (!new_connection_l->handshake(boost::asio::ssl::stream_base::client))
{
if (ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_autodetect)
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
sock_.shutdown(boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket::shutdown_both, ignored_ec);
sock_.close();
return CONNECT_NO_SSL;
}
MERROR("SSL handshake failed");
if (sock_.is_open())
sock_.close();
return CONNECT_FAILURE;
}
}
return CONNECT_SUCCESS;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::try_connect", CONNECT_FAILURE);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler>
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::connect(const std::string& adr, const std::string& port, uint32_t conn_timeout, t_connection_context& conn_context, const std::string& bind_ip, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support)
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2019-03-14 22:03:32 -06:00
connection_ptr new_connection_l(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, ssl_support) );
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
connections_mutex.lock();
connections_.insert(new_connection_l);
MDEBUG("connections_ size now " << connections_.size());
connections_mutex.unlock();
epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller scope_exit_handler = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&](){ CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(connections_mutex); connections_.erase(new_connection_l); });
boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket& sock_ = new_connection_l->socket();
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
bool try_ipv6 = false;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver resolver(io_service_);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query(boost::asio::ip::tcp::v4(), adr, port, boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
boost::system::error_code resolve_error;
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::iterator iterator;
try
{
//resolving ipv4 address as ipv6 throws, catch here and move on
iterator = resolver.resolve(query, resolve_error);
}
catch (const boost::system::system_error& e)
{
if (!m_use_ipv6 || (resolve_error != boost::asio::error::host_not_found &&
resolve_error != boost::asio::error::host_not_found_try_again))
{
throw;
}
try_ipv6 = true;
}
catch (...)
{
throw;
}
std::string bind_ip_to_use;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::iterator end;
if(iterator == end)
{
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (!m_use_ipv6)
{
_erro("Failed to resolve " << adr);
return false;
}
else
{
try_ipv6 = true;
MINFO("Resolving address as IPv4 failed, trying IPv6");
}
}
else
{
bind_ip_to_use = bind_ip;
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
}
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (try_ipv6)
{
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query6(boost::asio::ip::tcp::v6(), adr, port, boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
iterator = resolver.resolve(query6, resolve_error);
if(iterator == end)
{
_erro("Failed to resolve " << adr);
return false;
}
else
{
if (bind_ip == "0.0.0.0")
{
bind_ip_to_use = "::";
}
else
{
bind_ip_to_use = "";
}
}
}
2019-10-14 08:12:18 -06:00
MDEBUG("Trying to connect to " << adr << ":" << port << ", bind_ip = " << bind_ip_to_use);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
//boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint remote_endpoint(boost::asio::ip::address::from_string(addr.c_str()), port);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint remote_endpoint(*iterator);
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
auto try_connect_result = try_connect(new_connection_l, adr, port, sock_, remote_endpoint, bind_ip_to_use, conn_timeout, ssl_support);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
if (try_connect_result == CONNECT_FAILURE)
return false;
if (ssl_support == epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_autodetect && try_connect_result == CONNECT_NO_SSL)
{
// we connected, but could not connect with SSL, try without
MERROR("SSL handshake failed on an autodetect connection, reconnecting without SSL");
new_connection_l->disable_ssl();
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
try_connect_result = try_connect(new_connection_l, adr, port, sock_, remote_endpoint, bind_ip_to_use, conn_timeout, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t::e_ssl_support_disabled);
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
if (try_connect_result != CONNECT_SUCCESS)
return false;
}
2017-08-16 08:41:34 -06:00
// start adds the connection to the config object's list, so we don't need to have it locally anymore
connections_mutex.lock();
connections_.erase(new_connection_l);
connections_mutex.unlock();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
bool r = new_connection_l->start(false, 1 < m_threads_count);
if (r)
{
new_connection_l->get_context(conn_context);
2015-01-05 12:30:17 -07:00
//new_connection_l.reset(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_config, m_sock_count, m_pfilter));
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
else
{
2018-12-16 10:57:44 -07:00
assert(m_state != nullptr); // always set in constructor
_erro("[sock " << new_connection_l->socket().native_handle() << "] Failed to start connection, connections_count = " << m_state->sock_count);
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2015-04-08 11:54:07 -06:00
new_connection_l->save_dbg_log();
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
return r;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::connect", false);
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<class t_protocol_handler> template<class t_callback>
epee: add SSL support
RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL.
An optional private key and certificate file can be passed,
using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and
--{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as
argument a path to a PEM format private private key and
certificate, respectively.
If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used.
SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which
accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled.
Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the
--rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of
paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to
connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to,
by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good
certificates.
To generate long term certificates:
openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096
openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ
openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT
/tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate,
both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last
command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers
will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway.
SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the
existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start
using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or
nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-14 16:44:48 -06:00
bool boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::connect_async(const std::string& adr, const std::string& port, uint32_t conn_timeout, const t_callback &cb, const std::string& bind_ip, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support)
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
{
TRY_ENTRY();
2019-03-14 22:03:32 -06:00
connection_ptr new_connection_l(new connection<t_protocol_handler>(io_service_, m_state, m_connection_type, ssl_support) );
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
connections_mutex.lock();
2017-08-16 08:41:34 -06:00
connections_.insert(new_connection_l);
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.
To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:
This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:
MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL
This one is very verbose:
MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE
This one is totally silent (logwise):
MONERO_LOGS=""
This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):
MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL
Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:
MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE
Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.
Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.
The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 09:34:23 -07:00
MDEBUG("connections_ size now " << connections_.size());
2015-12-22 05:31:22 -07:00
connections_mutex.unlock();
2017-08-16 08:41:34 -06:00
epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller scope_exit_handler = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&](){ CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(connections_mutex); connections_.erase(new_connection_l); });
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket& sock_ = new_connection_l->socket();
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
bool try_ipv6 = false;
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver resolver(io_service_);
2016-11-23 16:08:53 -07:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query(boost::asio::ip::tcp::v4(), adr, port, boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
boost::system::error_code resolve_error;
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::iterator iterator;
try
{
//resolving ipv4 address as ipv6 throws, catch here and move on
iterator = resolver.resolve(query, resolve_error);
}
catch (const boost::system::system_error& e)
{
if (!m_use_ipv6 || (resolve_error != boost::asio::error::host_not_found &&
resolve_error != boost::asio::error::host_not_found_try_again))
{
throw;
}
try_ipv6 = true;
}
catch (...)
{
throw;
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::iterator end;
if(iterator == end)
{
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (!try_ipv6)
{
_erro("Failed to resolve " << adr);
return false;
}
else
{
MINFO("Resolving address as IPv4 failed, trying IPv6");
}
2014-03-03 15:07:58 -07:00
}
2019-04-10 16:34:30 -06:00
if (try_ipv6)
{
boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query query6(boost::asio::ip::tcp::v6(), adr, port, boost::asio::ip::tcp::resolver::query::canonical_name);
iterator = resolver.resolve(query6, resolve_error);
if(iterator == end)
{
_erro("Failed to resolve " << adr);
return false;
}
}
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boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint remote_endpoint(*iterator);
sock_.open(remote_endpoint.protocol());
if(bind_ip != "0.0.0.0" && bind_ip != "0" && bind_ip != "" )
{
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boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint local_endpoint(boost::asio::ip::address::from_string(bind_ip.c_str()), 0);
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boost::system::error_code ec;
sock_.bind(local_endpoint, ec);
if (ec)
{
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MERROR("Error binding to " << bind_ip << ": " << ec.message());
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if (sock_.is_open())
sock_.close();
return false;
}
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}
boost::shared_ptr<boost::asio::deadline_timer> sh_deadline(new boost::asio::deadline_timer(io_service_));
//start deadline
sh_deadline->expires_from_now(boost::posix_time::milliseconds(conn_timeout));
sh_deadline->async_wait([=](const boost::system::error_code& error)
{
if(error != boost::asio::error::operation_aborted)
{
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_dbg3("Failed to connect to " << adr << ':' << port << ", because of timeout (" << conn_timeout << ")");
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new_connection_l->socket().close();
}
});
//start async connect
sock_.async_connect(remote_endpoint, [=](const boost::system::error_code& ec_)
{
t_connection_context conn_context = AUTO_VAL_INIT(conn_context);
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
boost::asio::ip::tcp::socket::endpoint_type lep = new_connection_l->socket().local_endpoint(ignored_ec);
if(!ec_)
{//success
if(!sh_deadline->cancel())
{
cb(conn_context, boost::asio::error::operation_aborted);//this mean that deadline timer already queued callback with cancel operation, rare situation
}else
{
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_dbg3("[sock " << new_connection_l->socket().native_handle() << "] Connected success to " << adr << ':' << port <<
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" from " << lep.address().to_string() << ':' << lep.port());
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// start adds the connection to the config object's list, so we don't need to have it locally anymore
connections_mutex.lock();
connections_.erase(new_connection_l);
connections_mutex.unlock();
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bool r = new_connection_l->start(false, 1 < m_threads_count);
if (r)
{
new_connection_l->get_context(conn_context);
cb(conn_context, ec_);
}
else
{
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_dbg3("[sock " << new_connection_l->socket().native_handle() << "] Failed to start connection to " << adr << ':' << port);
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cb(conn_context, boost::asio::error::fault);
}
}
}else
{
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_dbg3("[sock " << new_connection_l->socket().native_handle() << "] Failed to connect to " << adr << ':' << port <<
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" from " << lep.address().to_string() << ':' << lep.port() << ": " << ec_.message() << ':' << ec_.value());
cb(conn_context, ec_);
}
});
return true;
CATCH_ENTRY_L0("boosted_tcp_server<t_protocol_handler>::connect_async", false);
}
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} // namespace
} // namespace
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PRAGMA_WARNING_POP