2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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package nebula
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import (
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"os"
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"os/signal"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/sshd"
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2019-11-23 09:50:36 -07:00
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"gopkg.in/yaml.v2"
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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)
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var l = logrus.New()
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type m map[string]interface{}
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func Main(configPath string, configTest bool, buildVersion string) {
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l.Out = os.Stdout
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l.Formatter = &logrus.TextFormatter{
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FullTimestamp: true,
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}
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config := NewConfig()
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err := config.Load(configPath)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to load config")
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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// Print the config if in test, the exit comes later
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if configTest {
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b, err := yaml.Marshal(config.Settings)
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if err != nil {
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l.Println(err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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l.Println(string(b))
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}
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err = configLogger(config)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to configure the logger")
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}
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config.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *Config) {
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err := configLogger(c)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to configure the logger")
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}
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})
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// trustedCAs is currently a global, so loadCA operates on that global directly
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trustedCAs, err = loadCAFromConfig(config)
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if err != nil {
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//The errors coming out of loadCA are already nicely formatted
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2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to load ca from config")
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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l.WithField("fingerprints", trustedCAs.GetFingerprints()).Debug("Trusted CA fingerprints")
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cs, err := NewCertStateFromConfig(config)
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if err != nil {
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//The errors coming out of NewCertStateFromConfig are already nicely formatted
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2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to load certificate from config")
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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l.WithField("cert", cs.certificate).Debug("Client nebula certificate")
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fw, err := NewFirewallFromConfig(cs.certificate, config)
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if err != nil {
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2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Error while loading firewall rules")
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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l.WithField("firewallHash", fw.GetRuleHash()).Info("Firewall started")
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// TODO: make sure mask is 4 bytes
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tunCidr := cs.certificate.Details.Ips[0]
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routes, err := parseRoutes(config, tunCidr)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Could not parse tun.routes")
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}
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2019-12-12 10:31:22 -07:00
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unsafeRoutes, err := parseUnsafeRoutes(config, tunCidr)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Could not parse tun.unsafe_routes")
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}
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(l.WithField("subsystem", "sshd"))
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wireSSHReload(ssh, config)
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if config.GetBool("sshd.enabled", false) {
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err = configSSH(ssh, config)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Error while configuring the sshd")
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}
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}
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// All non system modifying configuration consumption should live above this line
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// tun config, listeners, anything modifying the computer should be below
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
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var tun *Tun
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if !configTest {
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config.CatchHUP()
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// set up our tun dev
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tun, err = newTun(
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config.GetString("tun.dev", ""),
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tunCidr,
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config.GetInt("tun.mtu", DEFAULT_MTU),
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routes,
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unsafeRoutes,
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config.GetInt("tun.tx_queue", 500),
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)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to get a tun/tap device")
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}
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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// set up our UDP listener
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udpQueues := config.GetInt("listen.routines", 1)
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2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
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var udpServer *udpConn
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if !configTest {
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udpServer, err = NewListener(config.GetString("listen.host", "0.0.0.0"), config.GetInt("listen.port", 0), udpQueues > 1)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to open udp listener")
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}
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udpServer.reloadConfig(config)
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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// Set up my internal host map
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var preferredRanges []*net.IPNet
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rawPreferredRanges := config.GetStringSlice("preferred_ranges", []string{})
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// First, check if 'preferred_ranges' is set and fallback to 'local_range'
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if len(rawPreferredRanges) > 0 {
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for _, rawPreferredRange := range rawPreferredRanges {
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_, preferredRange, err := net.ParseCIDR(rawPreferredRange)
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if err != nil {
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2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to parse preferred ranges")
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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preferredRanges = append(preferredRanges, preferredRange)
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}
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}
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// local_range was superseded by preferred_ranges. If it is still present,
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// merge the local_range setting into preferred_ranges. We will probably
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// deprecate local_range and remove in the future.
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rawLocalRange := config.GetString("local_range", "")
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if rawLocalRange != "" {
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_, localRange, err := net.ParseCIDR(rawLocalRange)
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if err != nil {
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2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to parse local range")
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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}
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// Check if the entry for local_range was already specified in
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// preferred_ranges. Don't put it into the slice twice if so.
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var found bool
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for _, r := range preferredRanges {
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if r.String() == localRange.String() {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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preferredRanges = append(preferredRanges, localRange)
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}
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}
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hostMap := NewHostMap("main", tunCidr, preferredRanges)
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hostMap.SetDefaultRoute(ip2int(net.ParseIP(config.GetString("default_route", "0.0.0.0"))))
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2019-12-12 09:34:17 -07:00
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hostMap.addUnsafeRoutes(&unsafeRoutes)
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2020-06-26 11:45:48 -06:00
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hostMap.metricsEnabled = config.GetBool("stats.message_metrics", false)
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2019-12-12 09:34:17 -07:00
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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l.WithField("network", hostMap.vpnCIDR).WithField("preferredRanges", hostMap.preferredRanges).Info("Main HostMap created")
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/*
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config.SetDefault("promoter.interval", 10)
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go hostMap.Promoter(config.GetInt("promoter.interval"))
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*/
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2020-03-27 12:26:39 -06:00
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punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(config)
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2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
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if punchy.Punch && !configTest {
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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l.Info("UDP hole punching enabled")
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go hostMap.Punchy(udpServer)
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}
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port := config.GetInt("listen.port", 0)
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// If port is dynamic, discover it
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2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
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if port == 0 && !configTest {
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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uPort, err := udpServer.LocalAddr()
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to get listening port")
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}
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port = int(uPort.Port)
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}
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amLighthouse := config.GetBool("lighthouse.am_lighthouse", false)
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2019-11-24 10:32:08 -07:00
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// warn if am_lighthouse is enabled but upstream lighthouses exists
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2019-12-09 17:53:56 -07:00
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rawLighthouseHosts := config.GetStringSlice("lighthouse.hosts", []string{})
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if amLighthouse && len(rawLighthouseHosts) != 0 {
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2019-11-24 10:32:08 -07:00
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l.Warn("lighthouse.am_lighthouse enabled on node but upstream lighthouses exist in config")
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}
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2019-12-09 17:53:56 -07:00
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lighthouseHosts := make([]uint32, len(rawLighthouseHosts))
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for i, host := range rawLighthouseHosts {
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ip := net.ParseIP(host)
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if ip == nil {
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l.WithField("host", host).Fatalf("Unable to parse lighthouse host entry %v", i+1)
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}
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2020-01-20 13:52:55 -07:00
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if !tunCidr.Contains(ip) {
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l.WithField("vpnIp", ip).WithField("network", tunCidr.String()).Fatalf("lighthouse host is not in our subnet, invalid")
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}
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2019-12-09 17:53:56 -07:00
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lighthouseHosts[i] = ip2int(ip)
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}
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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lightHouse := NewLightHouse(
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amLighthouse,
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ip2int(tunCidr.IP),
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2019-12-09 17:53:56 -07:00
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lighthouseHosts,
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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//TODO: change to a duration
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config.GetInt("lighthouse.interval", 10),
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port,
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udpServer,
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2020-03-27 12:26:39 -06:00
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punchy.Respond,
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punchy.Delay,
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2020-06-26 11:45:48 -06:00
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config.GetBool("stats.lighthouse_metrics", false),
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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)
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2020-04-08 14:20:12 -06:00
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remoteAllowList, err := config.GetAllowList("lighthouse.remote_allow_list", false)
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 13:36:43 -06:00
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if err != nil {
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2020-04-08 14:20:12 -06:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Invalid lighthouse.remote_allow_list")
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 13:36:43 -06:00
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}
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lightHouse.SetRemoteAllowList(remoteAllowList)
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2020-04-08 14:20:12 -06:00
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localAllowList, err := config.GetAllowList("lighthouse.local_allow_list", true)
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 13:36:43 -06:00
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if err != nil {
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2020-04-08 14:20:12 -06:00
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l.WithError(err).Fatal("Invalid lighthouse.local_allow_list")
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 13:36:43 -06:00
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}
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lightHouse.SetLocalAllowList(localAllowList)
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2019-11-23 16:55:23 -07:00
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//TODO: Move all of this inside functions in lighthouse.go
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2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
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for k, v := range config.GetMap("static_host_map", map[interface{}]interface{}{}) {
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|
|
vpnIp := net.ParseIP(fmt.Sprintf("%v", k))
|
2020-01-20 13:52:55 -07:00
|
|
|
if !tunCidr.Contains(vpnIp) {
|
|
|
|
l.WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).WithField("network", tunCidr.String()).Fatalf("static_host_map key is not in our subnet, invalid")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
vals, ok := v.([]interface{})
|
|
|
|
if ok {
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range vals {
|
|
|
|
parts := strings.Split(fmt.Sprintf("%v", v), ":")
|
|
|
|
addr, err := net.ResolveIPAddr("ip", parts[0])
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
|
|
ip := addr.IP
|
|
|
|
port, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1])
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
l.Fatalf("Static host address for %s could not be parsed: %s", vpnIp, v)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lightHouse.AddRemote(ip2int(vpnIp), NewUDPAddr(ip2int(ip), uint16(port)), true)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
//TODO: make this all a helper
|
|
|
|
parts := strings.Split(fmt.Sprintf("%v", v), ":")
|
|
|
|
addr, err := net.ResolveIPAddr("ip", parts[0])
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
|
|
ip := addr.IP
|
|
|
|
port, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1])
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
l.Fatalf("Static host address for %s could not be parsed: %s", vpnIp, v)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lightHouse.AddRemote(ip2int(vpnIp), NewUDPAddr(ip2int(ip), uint16(port)), true)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-23 16:55:23 -07:00
|
|
|
err = lightHouse.ValidateLHStaticEntries()
|
2019-11-23 14:46:45 -07:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2019-11-23 16:55:23 -07:00
|
|
|
l.WithError(err).Error("Lighthouse unreachable")
|
2019-11-23 14:46:45 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-26 11:45:48 -06:00
|
|
|
var messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
|
|
|
if config.GetBool("stats.message_metrics", false) {
|
|
|
|
messageMetrics = newMessageMetrics()
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
messageMetrics = newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError()
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-21 14:25:11 -07:00
|
|
|
handshakeConfig := HandshakeConfig{
|
|
|
|
tryInterval: config.GetDuration("handshakes.try_interval", DefaultHandshakeTryInterval),
|
|
|
|
retries: config.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries),
|
|
|
|
waitRotation: config.GetInt("handshakes.wait_rotation", DefaultHandshakeWaitRotation),
|
2020-06-26 11:45:48 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
2020-02-21 14:25:11 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
handshakeManager := NewHandshakeManager(tunCidr, preferredRanges, hostMap, lightHouse, udpServer, handshakeConfig)
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-23 09:50:36 -07:00
|
|
|
//TODO: These will be reused for psk
|
|
|
|
//handshakeMACKey := config.GetString("handshake_mac.key", "")
|
|
|
|
//handshakeAcceptedMACKeys := config.GetStringSlice("handshake_mac.accepted_keys", []string{})
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 18:42:55 -07:00
|
|
|
serveDns := config.GetBool("lighthouse.serve_dns", false)
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
checkInterval := config.GetInt("timers.connection_alive_interval", 5)
|
|
|
|
pendingDeletionInterval := config.GetInt("timers.pending_deletion_interval", 10)
|
|
|
|
ifConfig := &InterfaceConfig{
|
2019-11-23 09:50:36 -07:00
|
|
|
HostMap: hostMap,
|
|
|
|
Inside: tun,
|
|
|
|
Outside: udpServer,
|
|
|
|
certState: cs,
|
|
|
|
Cipher: config.GetString("cipher", "aes"),
|
|
|
|
Firewall: fw,
|
|
|
|
ServeDns: serveDns,
|
|
|
|
HandshakeManager: handshakeManager,
|
|
|
|
lightHouse: lightHouse,
|
|
|
|
checkInterval: checkInterval,
|
|
|
|
pendingDeletionInterval: pendingDeletionInterval,
|
|
|
|
DropLocalBroadcast: config.GetBool("tun.drop_local_broadcast", false),
|
|
|
|
DropMulticast: config.GetBool("tun.drop_multicast", false),
|
|
|
|
UDPBatchSize: config.GetInt("listen.batch", 64),
|
2020-06-26 11:45:48 -06:00
|
|
|
MessageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch ifConfig.Cipher {
|
|
|
|
case "aes":
|
2020-03-30 12:23:55 -06:00
|
|
|
noiseEndianness = binary.BigEndian
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
case "chachapoly":
|
2020-03-30 12:23:55 -06:00
|
|
|
noiseEndianness = binary.LittleEndian
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
l.Fatalf("Unknown cipher: %v", ifConfig.Cipher)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
|
|
|
var ifce *Interface
|
|
|
|
if !configTest {
|
|
|
|
ifce, err = NewInterface(ifConfig)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to initialize interface")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
|
|
|
ifce.RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(config)
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
|
|
|
go handshakeManager.Run(ifce)
|
|
|
|
go lightHouse.LhUpdateWorker(ifce)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
|
|
|
err = startStats(config, configTest)
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2019-11-23 12:28:40 -07:00
|
|
|
l.WithError(err).Fatal("Failed to start stats emitter")
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-06 12:35:32 -06:00
|
|
|
if configTest {
|
|
|
|
os.Exit(0)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
//TODO: check if we _should_ be emitting stats
|
|
|
|
go ifce.emitStats(config.GetDuration("stats.interval", time.Second*10))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
attachCommands(ssh, hostMap, handshakeManager.pendingHostMap, lightHouse, ifce)
|
|
|
|
ifce.Run(config.GetInt("tun.routines", 1), udpQueues, buildVersion)
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 18:42:55 -07:00
|
|
|
// Start DNS server last to allow using the nebula IP as lighthouse.dns.host
|
|
|
|
if amLighthouse && serveDns {
|
|
|
|
l.Debugln("Starting dns server")
|
|
|
|
go dnsMain(hostMap, config)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-19 10:00:20 -07:00
|
|
|
// Just sit here and be friendly, main thread.
|
|
|
|
shutdownBlock(ifce)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func shutdownBlock(ifce *Interface) {
|
|
|
|
var sigChan = make(chan os.Signal)
|
|
|
|
signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGTERM)
|
|
|
|
signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGINT)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sig := <-sigChan
|
|
|
|
l.WithField("signal", sig).Info("Caught signal, shutting down")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//TODO: stop tun and udp routines, the lock on hostMap does effectively does that though
|
|
|
|
//TODO: this is probably better as a function in ConnectionManager or HostMap directly
|
|
|
|
ifce.hostMap.Lock()
|
|
|
|
for _, h := range ifce.hostMap.Hosts {
|
|
|
|
if h.ConnectionState.ready {
|
|
|
|
ifce.send(closeTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, h.remote, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
|
|
|
|
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(h.hostId)).WithField("udpAddr", h.remote).
|
|
|
|
Debug("Sending close tunnel message")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ifce.hostMap.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l.WithField("signal", sig).Info("Goodbye")
|
|
|
|
os.Exit(0)
|
|
|
|
}
|