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# This is the nebula example configuration file. You must edit, at a minimum, the static_host_map, lighthouse, and firewall sections
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# Some options in this file are HUPable, including the pki section. (A HUP will reload credentials from disk without affecting existing tunnels)
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# PKI defines the location of credentials for this node. Each of these can also be inlined by using the yaml ": |" syntax.
pki :
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# The CAs that are accepted by this node. Must contain one or more certificates created by 'nebula-cert ca'
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ca : /etc/nebula/ca.crt
cert : /etc/nebula/host.crt
key : /etc/nebula/host.key
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# blocklist is a list of certificate fingerprints that we will refuse to talk to
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#blocklist:
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# - c99d4e650533b92061b09918e838a5a0a6aaee21eed1d12fd937682865936c72
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# disconnect_invalid is a toggle to force a client to be disconnected if the certificate is expired or invalid.
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#disconnect_invalid: true
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# The static host map defines a set of hosts with fixed IP addresses on the internet (or any network).
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# A host can have multiple fixed IP addresses defined here, and nebula will try each when establishing a tunnel.
# The syntax is:
# "{nebula ip}": ["{routable ip/dns name}:{routable port}"]
# Example, if your lighthouse has the nebula IP of 192.168.100.1 and has the real ip address of 100.64.22.11 and runs on port 4242:
static_host_map :
"192.168.100.1": [ "100.64.22.11:4242" ]
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# The static_map config stanza can be used to configure how the static_host_map behaves.
#static_map:
# cadence determines how frequently DNS is re-queried for updated IP addresses when a static_host_map entry contains
# a DNS name.
#cadence: 30s
# network determines the type of IP addresses to ask the DNS server for. The default is "ip4" because nodes typically
# do not know their public IPv4 address. Connecting to the Lighthouse via IPv4 allows the Lighthouse to detect the
# public address. Other valid options are "ip6" and "ip" (returns both.)
#network: ip4
# lookup_timeout is the DNS query timeout.
#lookup_timeout: 250ms
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lighthouse :
# am_lighthouse is used to enable lighthouse functionality for a node. This should ONLY be true on nodes
# you have configured to be lighthouses in your network
am_lighthouse : false
# serve_dns optionally starts a dns listener that responds to various queries and can even be
# delegated to for resolution
#serve_dns: false
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#dns:
# The DNS host defines the IP to bind the dns listener to. This also allows binding to the nebula node IP.
#host: 0.0.0.0
#port: 53
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# interval is the number of seconds between updates from this node to a lighthouse.
# during updates, a node sends information about its current IP addresses to each node.
interval : 60
# hosts is a list of lighthouse hosts this node should report to and query from
# IMPORTANT: THIS SHOULD BE EMPTY ON LIGHTHOUSE NODES
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# IMPORTANT2: THIS SHOULD BE LIGHTHOUSES' NEBULA IPs, NOT LIGHTHOUSES' REAL ROUTABLE IPs
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hosts :
- "192.168.100.1"
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# remote_allow_list allows you to control ip ranges that this node will
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
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# consider when handshaking to another node. By default, any remote IPs are
# allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
# deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules are
# "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow" and
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# "deny" IPv4 rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0" as
# the default. Similarly if both "allow" and "deny" IPv6 rules are present,
# then you MUST set a rule for "::/0" as the default.
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#remote_allow_list:
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
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# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
#"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
#"0.0.0.0/0": true
#"10.0.0.0/8": false
#"10.42.42.0/24": true
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# EXPERIMENTAL: This option may change or disappear in the future.
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# Optionally allows the definition of remote_allow_list blocks
# specific to an inside VPN IP CIDR.
#remote_allow_ranges:
# This rule would only allow only private IPs for this VPN range
#"10.42.42.0/24":
#"192.168.0.0/16": true
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# local_allow_list allows you to filter which local IP addresses we advertise
# to the lighthouses. This uses the same logic as `remote_allow_list`, but
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
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# additionally, you can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions
# to match against interface names. The regexp must match the entire name.
# All interface rules must be either true or false (and the default will be
# the inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
# Default is all local IP addresses.
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#local_allow_list:
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# Example to block tun0 and all docker interfaces.
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
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#interfaces:
#tun0: false
#'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise this subnet to the lighthouse.
#"10.0.0.0/8": true
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# advertise_addrs are routable addresses that will be included along with discovered addresses to report to the
# lighthouse, the format is "ip:port". `port` can be `0`, in which case the actual listening port will be used in its
# place, useful if `listen.port` is set to 0.
# This option is mainly useful when there are static ip addresses the host can be reached at that nebula can not
# typically discover on its own. Examples being port forwarding or multiple paths to the internet.
#advertise_addrs:
#- "1.1.1.1:4242"
#- "1.2.3.4:0" # port will be replaced with the real listening port
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# EXPERIMENTAL: This option may change or disappear in the future.
# This setting allows us to "guess" what the remote might be for a host
# while we wait for the lighthouse response.
#calculated_remotes:
# For any Nebula IPs in 10.0.10.0/24, this will apply the mask and add
# the calculated IP as an initial remote (while we wait for the response
# from the lighthouse). Both CIDRs must have the same mask size.
# For example, Nebula IP 10.0.10.123 will have a calculated remote of
# 192.168.1.123
#10.0.10.0/24:
#- mask: 192.168.1.0/24
# port: 4242
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# Port Nebula will be listening on. The default here is 4242. For a lighthouse node, the port should be defined,
# however using port 0 will dynamically assign a port and is recommended for roaming nodes.
listen :
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# To listen on both any ipv4 and ipv6 use "::"
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host : 0.0 .0 .0
port : 4242
# Sets the max number of packets to pull from the kernel for each syscall (under systems that support recvmmsg)
# default is 64, does not support reload
#batch: 64
# Configure socket buffers for the udp side (outside), leave unset to use the system defaults. Values will be doubled by the kernel
# Default is net.core.rmem_default and net.core.wmem_default (/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default and /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default)
# Maximum is limited by memory in the system, SO_RCVBUFFORCE and SO_SNDBUFFORCE is used to avoid having to raise the system wide
# max, net.core.rmem_max and net.core.wmem_max
#read_buffer: 10485760
#write_buffer: 10485760
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# By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
# in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
# on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
# valid values: always, never, private
# This setting is reloadable.
#send_recv_error: always
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# Routines is the number of thread pairs to run that consume from the tun and UDP queues.
# Currently, this defaults to 1 which means we have 1 tun queue reader and 1
# UDP queue reader. Setting this above one will set IFF_MULTI_QUEUE on the tun
# device and SO_REUSEPORT on the UDP socket to allow multiple queues.
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# This option is only supported on Linux.
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#routines: 1
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punchy :
# Continues to punch inbound/outbound at a regular interval to avoid expiration of firewall nat mappings
punch : true
# respond means that a node you are trying to reach will connect back out to you if your hole punching fails
# this is extremely useful if one node is behind a difficult nat, such as a symmetric NAT
# Default is false
#respond: true
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# delays a punch response for misbehaving NATs, default is 1 second.
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#delay: 1s
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# set the delay before attempting punchy.respond. Default is 5 seconds. respond must be true to take effect.
#respond_delay: 5s
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# Cipher allows you to choose between the available ciphers for your network. Options are chachapoly or aes
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# IMPORTANT: this value must be identical on ALL NODES/LIGHTHOUSES. We do not/will not support use of different ciphers simultaneously!
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#cipher: aes
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# Preferred ranges is used to define a hint about the local network ranges, which speeds up discovering the fastest
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# path to a network adjacent nebula node.
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# NOTE: the previous option "local_range" only allowed definition of a single range
# and has been deprecated for "preferred_ranges"
#preferred_ranges: ["172.16.0.0/24"]
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# sshd can expose informational and administrative functions via ssh. This can expose informational and administrative
# functions, and allows manual tweaking of various network settings when debugging or testing.
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#sshd:
# Toggles the feature
#enabled: true
# Host and port to listen on, port 22 is not allowed for your safety
#listen: 127.0.0.1:2222
# A file containing the ssh host private key to use
# A decent way to generate one: ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" < /dev/null
#host_key: ./ssh_host_ed25519_key
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# Authorized users and their public keys
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#authorized_users:
#- user: steeeeve
# keys can be an array of strings or single string
#keys:
#- "ssh public key string"
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# Trusted SSH CA public keys. These are the public keys of the CAs that are allowed to sign SSH keys for access.
#trusted_cas:
#- "ssh public key string"
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# EXPERIMENTAL: relay support for networks that can't establish direct connections.
relay :
# Relays are a list of Nebula IP's that peers can use to relay packets to me.
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# IPs in this list must have am_relay set to true in their configs, otherwise
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# they will reject relay requests.
#relays:
#- 192.168.100.1
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#- <other Nebula VPN IPs of hosts used as relays to access me>
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# Set am_relay to true to permit other hosts to list my IP in their relays config. Default false.
am_relay : false
# Set use_relays to false to prevent this instance from attempting to establish connections through relays.
# default true
use_relays : true
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# Configure the private interface. Note: addr is baked into the nebula certificate
tun :
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# When tun is disabled, a lighthouse can be started without a local tun interface (and therefore without root)
disabled : false
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# Name of the device. If not set, a default will be chosen by the OS.
# For macOS: if set, must be in the form `utun[0-9]+`.
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# For NetBSD: Required to be set, must be in the form `tun[0-9]+`
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dev : nebula1
# Toggles forwarding of local broadcast packets, the address of which depends on the ip/mask encoded in pki.cert
drop_local_broadcast : false
# Toggles forwarding of multicast packets
drop_multicast : false
# Sets the transmit queue length, if you notice lots of transmit drops on the tun it may help to raise this number. Default is 500
tx_queue : 500
# Default MTU for every packet, safe setting is (and the default) 1300 for internet based traffic
mtu : 1300
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# Route based MTU overrides, you have known vpn ip paths that can support larger MTUs you can increase/decrease them here
routes :
#- mtu: 8800
# route: 10.0.0.0/16
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# Unsafe routes allows you to route traffic over nebula to non-nebula nodes
# Unsafe routes should be avoided unless you have hosts/services that cannot run nebula
# NOTE: The nebula certificate of the "via" node *MUST* have the "route" defined as a subnet in its certificate
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# `mtu`: will default to tun mtu if this option is not specified
# `metric`: will default to 0 if this option is not specified
# `install`: will default to true, controls whether this route is installed in the systems routing table.
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unsafe_routes :
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#- route: 172.16.1.0/24
# via: 192.168.100.99
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# mtu: 1300
# metric: 100
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# install: true
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# On linux only, set to true to manage unsafe routes directly on the system route table with gateway routes instead of
# in nebula configuration files. Default false, not reloadable.
#use_system_route_table: false
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# TODO
# Configure logging level
logging :
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# panic, fatal, error, warning, info, or debug. Default is info and is reloadable.
#NOTE: Debug mode can log remotely controlled/untrusted data which can quickly fill a disk in some
# scenarios. Debug logging is also CPU intensive and will decrease performance overall.
# Only enable debug logging while actively investigating an issue.
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level : info
# json or text formats currently available. Default is text
format : text
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# Disable timestamp logging. useful when output is redirected to logging system that already adds timestamps. Default is false
#disable_timestamp: true
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# timestamp format is specified in Go time format, see:
# https://golang.org/pkg/time/#pkg-constants
# default when `format: json`: "2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00" (RFC3339)
# default when `format: text`:
# when TTY attached: seconds since beginning of execution
# otherwise: "2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00" (RFC3339)
# As an example, to log as RFC3339 with millisecond precision, set to:
#timestamp_format: "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
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#stats:
#type: graphite
#prefix: nebula
#protocol: tcp
#host: 127.0.0.1:9999
#interval: 10s
#type: prometheus
#listen: 127.0.0.1:8080
#path: /metrics
#namespace: prometheusns
#subsystem: nebula
#interval: 10s
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# enables counter metrics for meta packets
# e.g.: `messages.tx.handshake`
# NOTE: `message.{tx,rx}.recv_error` is always emitted
#message_metrics: false
# enables detailed counter metrics for lighthouse packets
# e.g.: `lighthouse.rx.HostQuery`
#lighthouse_metrics: false
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# Handshake Manager Settings
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#handshakes:
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# Handshakes are sent to all known addresses at each interval with a linear backoff,
# Wait try_interval after the 1st attempt, 2 * try_interval after the 2nd, etc, until the handshake is older than timeout
# A 100ms interval with the default 10 retries will give a handshake 5.5 seconds to resolve before timing out
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#try_interval: 100ms
#retries: 20
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# query_buffer is the size of the buffer channel for querying lighthouses
#query_buffer: 64
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# trigger_buffer is the size of the buffer channel for quickly sending handshakes
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
#trigger_buffer: 64
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# Nebula security group configuration
firewall :
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# Action to take when a packet is not allowed by the firewall rules.
# Can be one of:
# `drop` (default): silently drop the packet.
# `reject`: send a reject reply.
# - For TCP, this will be a RST "Connection Reset" packet.
# - For other protocols, this will be an ICMP port unreachable packet.
outbound_action : drop
inbound_action : drop
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# Controls the default value for local_cidr. Default is true, will be deprecated after v1.9 and defaulted to false.
# This setting only affects nebula hosts with subnets encoded in their certificate. A nebula host acting as an
# unsafe router with `default_local_cidr_any: true` will expose their unsafe routes to every inbound rule regardless
# of the actual destination for the packet. Setting this to false requires each inbound rule to contain a `local_cidr`
# if the intention is to allow traffic to flow to an unsafe route.
#default_local_cidr_any: false
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conntrack :
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tcp_timeout : 12m
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udp_timeout : 3m
default_timeout : 10m
# The firewall is default deny. There is no way to write a deny rule.
# Rules are comprised of a protocol, port, and one or more of host, group, or CIDR
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# Logical evaluation is roughly: port AND proto AND (ca_sha OR ca_name) AND (host OR group OR groups OR cidr) AND (local cidr)
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# - port: Takes `0` or `any` as any, a single number `80`, a range `200-901`, or `fragment` to match second and further fragments of fragmented packets (since there is no port available).
# code: same as port but makes more sense when talking about ICMP, TODO: this is not currently implemented in a way that works, use `any`
# proto: `any`, `tcp`, `udp`, or `icmp`
# host: `any` or a literal hostname, ie `test-host`
# group: `any` or a literal group name, ie `default-group`
# groups: Same as group but accepts a list of values. Multiple values are AND'd together and a certificate would have to contain all groups to pass
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# cidr: a remote CIDR, `0.0.0.0/0` is any.
# local_cidr: a local CIDR, `0.0.0.0/0` is any. This could be used to filter destinations when using unsafe_routes.
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# Default is `any` unless the certificate contains subnets and then the default is the ip issued in the certificate
# if `default_local_cidr_any` is false, otherwise its `any`.
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# ca_name: An issuing CA name
# ca_sha: An issuing CA shasum
outbound :
# Allow all outbound traffic from this node
- port : any
proto : any
host : any
inbound :
# Allow icmp between any nebula hosts
- port : any
proto : icmp
host : any
# Allow tcp/443 from any host with BOTH laptop and home group
- port : 443
proto : tcp
groups :
- laptop
- home
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# Expose a subnet (unsafe route) to hosts with the group remote_client
# This example assume you have a subnet of 192.168.100.1/24 or larger encoded in the certificate
- port : 8080
proto : tcp
group : remote_client
local_cidr : 192.168 .100 .1 /24