Updated OpenPGP Security (markdown)
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@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ This is a privacy feature and prevents incidents like http://www.zeit.de/digital
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## No expiry for keys created by OpenKeychain
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We don't see any advantages in setting an expiry date for OpenPGP keys.
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* If set, the user is required to extend the key before it reaches the expiry date (-> more interaction needed, less usable).
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* It does not prevent any attack scenario (if set to e.g. 2 years in the future):
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If a secret key is lost, the public key is still valid for 1 year in average and might be used by others to encrypt stuff.
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* It does not prevent attack scenarios: If someone steals your secret key, he can extend the expiry date.
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* Some argue that expiry dates help keeping the keyservers clean from valid but unused keys:
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If a secret key is lost with an expiry date of 2 years in the future, the public key is still valid for 1 year in average and might be used by others to encrypt stuff.
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Anyone can upload keys with User IDs containing the email and names of other persons, thus it is easy to flood keyservers with valid keys without the consent of the entity who controls the email address.
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Thus, expiry dates are no valid fix for a much bigger problem that lies in the way OpenPGP keyservers operate currently.
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* In general, OpenPGP keys need to be validated through other channels than keyservers to rely on them.
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