Updated App Security (markdown)
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@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ Does not protect against: memory dumps
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#### Why not char[] instead of String?
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* Passphrase is already a CharSequence when retrieved from EditText, thus it is already in memory as something different than char[] (String extends CharSequence)
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* Complicates the implementation (pass byte[] in Parcelables instead of Strings?)
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* Passphrase is already a ``CharSequence`` when retrieved from ``EditText``, thus it is already in memory as something different than ``char[]`` (String extends ``CharSequence``)
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* Complicates the implementation (pass ``byte[]`` in ``Parcelables`` instead of ``Strings``?)
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* No convincing attack scenario (see argument below)
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> Some people believe that you have to overwrite the memory used to store the password once you no longer > need it. This reduces the time window an attacker has to read the password from your system and > completely ignores the fact that the attacker already needs enough access to hijack the JVM memory to do > this. An attacker with that much access can catch your key events making this completely useless (AFAIK, so please correct me if I am wrong).
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