diff --git a/App-Security.md b/App-Security.md
index 85134a7..32756a7 100644
--- a/App-Security.md
+++ b/App-Security.md
@@ -58,11 +58,12 @@ Does not protect against: memory dumps
 
 #### Why not char[] instead of String?
 
-* Passphrase is already a ``CharSequence`` when retrieved from ``EditText``, thus it is already in memory as something different than ``char[]`` (String extends ``CharSequence``)
+* Passphrase is already a ``CharSequence`` when retrieved from ``EditText``, thus it is already in memory as something different than ``char[]`` (``String extends CharSequence``)
 * Complicates the implementation (pass ``byte[]`` in ``Parcelables`` instead of ``Strings``?)
 * No convincing attack scenario (see argument below)
 
 > Some people believe that you have to overwrite the memory used to store the password once you no longer > need it. This reduces the time window an attacker has to read the password from your system and > completely ignores the fact that the attacker already needs enough access to hijack the JVM memory to do > this. An attacker with that much access can catch your key events making this completely useless (AFAIK, so please correct me if I am wrong).
+
 (from http://stackoverflow.com/a/8881461)
 
 ### Links