From a7ec2d86872c3cffeeb10acf3be7afa675cbbd40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dominik=20Sch=C3=BCrmann?= <dominik@dominikschuermann.de>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 11:15:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Updated OpenPGP Security (markdown)

---
 OpenPGP-Security.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OpenPGP-Security.md b/OpenPGP-Security.md
index d74ae16..8bbf890 100644
--- a/OpenPGP-Security.md
+++ b/OpenPGP-Security.md
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Anyone can upload keys with User IDs containing the email and names of other per
 Thus, expiry dates are no valid fix for a much bigger problem that lies in the way OpenPGP keyservers operate currently.
 * In general, OpenPGP keys need to be validated through other channels than keyservers to rely on them.
 
-#### Arguments for expiry
+#### Arguments in favor of expiry
 from http://blog.josefsson.org/2014/08/26/the-case-for-short-openpgp-key-validity-periods/ (detailed arguments in the blog)
 >  1. I don’t trust myself to keep track of a private key (or revocation cert) for 50 years.
 >  2. I want people to notice my revocation certificate as quickly as possible.