This should fix a class of bug where we forget to check if e.g. the appservice shouldn't be ratelimited.
We also check the `ratelimit_override` table to check if the user has ratelimiting disabled. That table is really only meant to override the event sender ratelimiting, so we don't use any values from it (as they might not make sense for different rate limits), but we do infer that if ratelimiting is disabled for the user we should disabled all ratelimits.
Fixes#9663
- Update black version to the latest
- Run black auto formatting over the codebase
- Run autoformatting according to [`docs/code_style.md
`](80d6dc9783/docs/code_style.md)
- Update `code_style.md` docs around installing black to use the correct version
If we have integrations with multiple identity providers, when the user does a UI Auth, we need to redirect them to the right one.
There are a few steps to this. First of all we actually need to store the userid of the user we are trying to validate in the UIA session, since the /auth/sso/fallback/web request is unauthenticated.
Then, once we get the /auth/sso/fallback/web request, we can fish the user id out of the session, and use it to look up the external id mappings, and hence pick an SSO provider for them.
The main use case is to see how many requests are being made, and how
many are second/third/etc attempts. If there are large number of retries
then that likely indicates a delivery problem.
Broken in https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/pull/8275 and has yet to be put in a release. Fixes https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/8418.
`next_link` is an optional parameter. However, we were checking whether the `next_link` param was valid, even if it wasn't provided. In that case, `next_link` was `None`, which would clearly not be a valid URL.
This would prevent password reset and other operations if `next_link` was not provided, and the `next_link_domain_whitelist` config option was set.
This endpoint should only deal with emails that have already been approved, and
are attached with user's account. There's no need to re-check them here.
This PR adds a confirmation step to resetting your user password between clicking the link in your email and your password actually being reset.
This is to better align our password reset flow with the industry standard of requiring a confirmation from the user after email validation.
This is a config option ported over from DINUM's Sydent: https://github.com/matrix-org/sydent/pull/285
They've switched to validating 3PIDs via Synapse rather than Sydent, and would like to retain this functionality.
This original purpose for this change is phishing prevention. This solution could also potentially be replaced by a similar one to https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/pull/8004, but across all `*/submit_token` endpoint.
This option may still be useful to enterprise even with that safeguard in place though, if they want to be absolutely sure that their employees don't follow links to other domains.
* Don't raise session_id errors on submit_token if request_token_inhibit_3pid_errors is set
* Changelog
* Also wait some time before responding to /requestToken
* Incorporate review
* Update synapse/storage/databases/main/registration.py
Co-authored-by: Andrew Morgan <1342360+anoadragon453@users.noreply.github.com>
* Incorporate review
Co-authored-by: Andrew Morgan <1342360+anoadragon453@users.noreply.github.com>
Doing a password reset via SMS has never worked, and in any case is a silly
idea because msisdn recycling is a thing.
See also matrix-org/matrix-doc#2303.
Implements MSC2290. This PR adds two new endpoints, /unstable/account/3pid/add and /unstable/account/3pid/bind. Depending on the progress of that MSC the unstable prefix may go away.
This PR also removes the blacklist on some 3PID tests which occurs in #6042, as the corresponding Sytest PR changes them to use the new endpoints.
Finally, it also modifies the account deactivation code such that it doesn't just try to deactivate 3PIDs that were bound to the user's account, but any 3PIDs that were bound through the homeserver on that user's account.
Remove trailing slash ability from the password reset submit_token endpoint. Since we provide the link in an email, and have never sent it with a trailing slash, there's no point for us to accept them on the endpoint.
Removes the POST method from `/password_reset/<medium>/submit_token/` as it's only used by phone number verification which Synapse does not support yet.
Erik Johnston