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synapse-old/synapse/handlers/auth.py

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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
# Copyright 2019 - 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import logging
import time
import unicodedata
import urllib.parse
from binascii import crc32
from typing import (
TYPE_CHECKING,
Any,
Awaitable,
Callable,
Dict,
Iterable,
List,
Mapping,
Optional,
Tuple,
Union,
cast,
)
import attr
import bcrypt
import pymacaroons
import unpaddedbase64
from twisted.web.server import Request
from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
from synapse.api.errors import (
AuthError,
Codes,
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError,
LoginError,
StoreError,
SynapseError,
UserDeactivatedError,
)
from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter
from synapse.handlers._base import BaseHandler
from synapse.handlers.ui_auth import (
INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS,
UIAuthSessionDataConstants,
)
from synapse.handlers.ui_auth.checkers import UserInteractiveAuthChecker
from synapse.http import get_request_user_agent
from synapse.http.server import finish_request, respond_with_html
from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread
from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process
from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
from synapse.storage.roommember import ProfileInfo
from synapse.types import JsonDict, Requester, UserID
from synapse.util import stringutils as stringutils
from synapse.util.async_helpers import maybe_awaitable
from synapse.util.macaroons import get_value_from_macaroon, satisfy_expiry
from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
from synapse.util.stringutils import base62_encode
from synapse.util.threepids import canonicalise_email
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from synapse.rest.client.login import LoginResponse
from synapse.server import HomeServer
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def convert_client_dict_legacy_fields_to_identifier(
submission: JsonDict,
) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""
Convert a legacy-formatted login submission to an identifier dict.
Legacy login submissions (used in both login and user-interactive authentication)
provide user-identifying information at the top-level instead.
These are now deprecated and replaced with identifiers:
https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#identifier-types
Args:
submission: The client dict to convert
Returns:
The matching identifier dict
Raises:
SynapseError: If the format of the client dict is invalid
"""
identifier = submission.get("identifier", {})
# Generate an m.id.user identifier if "user" parameter is present
user = submission.get("user")
if user:
identifier = {"type": "m.id.user", "user": user}
# Generate an m.id.thirdparty identifier if "medium" and "address" parameters are present
medium = submission.get("medium")
address = submission.get("address")
if medium and address:
identifier = {
"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
"medium": medium,
"address": address,
}
# We've converted valid, legacy login submissions to an identifier. If the
# submission still doesn't have an identifier, it's invalid
if not identifier:
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid login submission", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
# Ensure the identifier has a type
if "type" not in identifier:
raise SynapseError(
400,
"'identifier' dict has no key 'type'",
errcode=Codes.MISSING_PARAM,
)
return identifier
def login_id_phone_to_thirdparty(identifier: JsonDict) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""
Convert a phone login identifier type to a generic threepid identifier.
Args:
identifier: Login identifier dict of type 'm.id.phone'
Returns:
An equivalent m.id.thirdparty identifier dict
"""
if "country" not in identifier or (
# The specification requires a "phone" field, while Synapse used to require a "number"
# field. Accept both for backwards compatibility.
"phone" not in identifier
and "number" not in identifier
):
raise SynapseError(
400, "Invalid phone-type identifier", errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM
)
# Accept both "phone" and "number" as valid keys in m.id.phone
phone_number = identifier.get("phone", identifier["number"])
# Convert user-provided phone number to a consistent representation
msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(identifier["country"], phone_number)
return {
"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
"medium": "msisdn",
"address": msisdn,
}
@attr.s(slots=True)
class SsoLoginExtraAttributes:
"""Data we track about SAML2 sessions"""
# time the session was created, in milliseconds
creation_time = attr.ib(type=int)
extra_attributes = attr.ib(type=JsonDict)
@attr.s(slots=True, frozen=True)
class LoginTokenAttributes:
"""Data we store in a short-term login token"""
user_id = attr.ib(type=str)
# the SSO Identity Provider that the user authenticated with, to get this token
auth_provider_id = attr.ib(type=str)
class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"):
super().__init__(hs)
self.checkers: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker] = {}
for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS:
inst = auth_checker_class(hs)
if inst.is_enabled():
self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore
self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
# we can't use hs.get_module_api() here, because to do so will create an
# import loop.
#
# TODO: refactor this class to separate the lower-level stuff that
# ModuleApi can use from the higher-level stuff that uses ModuleApi, as
# better way to break the loop
account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self)
self.password_providers = [
PasswordProvider.load(module, config, account_handler)
for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
]
logger.info("Extra password_providers: %s", self.password_providers)
self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled
self._password_localdb_enabled = hs.config.password_localdb_enabled
# start out by assuming PASSWORD is enabled; we will remove it later if not.
login_types = set()
if self._password_localdb_enabled:
login_types.add(LoginType.PASSWORD)
for provider in self.password_providers:
login_types.update(provider.get_supported_login_types().keys())
if not self._password_enabled:
login_types.discard(LoginType.PASSWORD)
# Some clients just pick the first type in the list. In this case, we want
# them to use PASSWORD (rather than token or whatever), so we want to make sure
# that comes first, where it's present.
self._supported_login_types = []
if LoginType.PASSWORD in login_types:
self._supported_login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD)
login_types.remove(LoginType.PASSWORD)
self._supported_login_types.extend(login_types)
# Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config
# as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`.
self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter(
store=self.store,
clock=self.clock,
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
)
# The number of seconds to keep a UI auth session active.
self._ui_auth_session_timeout = hs.config.ui_auth_session_timeout
# Ratelimitier for failed /login attempts
self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter(
store=self.store,
clock=hs.get_clock(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
)
self._clock = self.hs.get_clock()
# Expire old UI auth sessions after a period of time.
if hs.config.run_background_tasks:
self._clock.looping_call(
run_as_background_process,
5 * 60 * 1000,
"expire_old_sessions",
self._expire_old_sessions,
)
# Load the SSO HTML templates.
# The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO,
# after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client.
# It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account
# to the client.
self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_redirect_confirm_template
# The following template is shown during user interactive authentication
# in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are
# authenticating for an operation to occur on their account.
self._sso_auth_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_auth_confirm_template
# The following template is shown during the SSO authentication process if
# the account is deactivated.
self._sso_account_deactivated_template = (
hs.config.sso_account_deactivated_template
)
self._server_name = hs.config.server_name
# cast to tuple for use with str.startswith
self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist)
# A mapping of user ID to extra attributes to include in the login
# response.
self._extra_attributes: Dict[str, SsoLoginExtraAttributes] = {}
async def validate_user_via_ui_auth(
self,
requester: Requester,
request: SynapseRequest,
request_body: Dict[str, Any],
description: str,
can_skip_ui_auth: bool = False,
) -> Tuple[dict, Optional[str]]:
"""
Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where
the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check
that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
Args:
requester: The user, as given by the access token
request: The request sent by the client.
request_body: The body of the request sent by the client
description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
describes the operation happening on their account.
can_skip_ui_auth: True if the UI auth session timeout applies this
action. Should be set to False for any "dangerous"
actions (e.g. deactivating an account).
Returns:
A tuple of (params, session_id).
'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
client or assigned by this call. This is None if UI auth was
skipped (by re-using a previous validation).
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
any of the permitted login flows
AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives
a different user to `requester`
LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this
user is too high to proceed
"""
if not requester.access_token_id:
raise ValueError("Cannot validate a user without an access token")
if can_skip_ui_auth and self._ui_auth_session_timeout:
last_validated = await self.store.get_access_token_last_validated(
requester.access_token_id
)
if self.clock.time_msec() - last_validated < self._ui_auth_session_timeout:
# Return the input parameters, minus the auth key, which matches
# the logic in check_ui_auth.
request_body.pop("auth", None)
return request_body, None
requester_user_id = requester.user.to_string()
# Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts
await self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(requester, update=False)
# build a list of supported flows
supported_ui_auth_types = await self._get_available_ui_auth_types(
requester.user
)
flows = [[login_type] for login_type in supported_ui_auth_types]
def get_new_session_data() -> JsonDict:
return {UIAuthSessionDataConstants.REQUEST_USER_ID: requester_user_id}
try:
result, params, session_id = await self.check_ui_auth(
flows,
request,
request_body,
description,
get_new_session_data,
)
except LoginError:
# Update the ratelimiter to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise).
await self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
requester,
)
raise
# find the completed login type
for login_type in supported_ui_auth_types:
if login_type not in result:
continue
validated_user_id = result[login_type]
break
else:
# this can't happen
raise Exception("check_auth returned True but no successful login type")
# check that the UI auth matched the access token
if validated_user_id != requester_user_id:
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth")
# Note that the access token has been validated.
await self.store.update_access_token_last_validated(requester.access_token_id)
return params, session_id
async def _get_available_ui_auth_types(self, user: UserID) -> Iterable[str]:
"""Get a list of the authentication types this user can use"""
ui_auth_types = set()
# if the HS supports password auth, and the user has a non-null password, we
# support password auth
if self._password_localdb_enabled and self._password_enabled:
lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user.to_string())
if lookupres:
_, password_hash = lookupres
if password_hash:
ui_auth_types.add(LoginType.PASSWORD)
# also allow auth from password providers
for provider in self.password_providers:
for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
if t == LoginType.PASSWORD and not self._password_enabled:
continue
ui_auth_types.add(t)
# if sso is enabled, allow the user to log in via SSO iff they have a mapping
# from sso to mxid.
if await self.hs.get_sso_handler().get_identity_providers_for_user(
user.to_string()
):
ui_auth_types.add(LoginType.SSO)
return ui_auth_types
def get_enabled_auth_types(self):
"""Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types
Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current
config.
"""
return self.checkers.keys()
async def check_ui_auth(
self,
flows: List[List[str]],
request: SynapseRequest,
clientdict: Dict[str, Any],
description: str,
get_new_session_data: Optional[Callable[[], JsonDict]] = None,
) -> Tuple[dict, dict, str]:
"""
Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use
synapse.rest.client._base.interactive_auth_handler as a
decorator.
Args:
flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
strings representing auth-types. At least one full
flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
request: The request sent by the client.
clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
describes the operation happening on their account.
get_new_session_data:
an optional callback which will be called when starting a new session.
it should return data to be stored as part of the session.
The keys of the returned data should be entries in
UIAuthSessionDataConstants.
Returns:
A tuple of (creds, params, session_id).
'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
client or assigned by this call
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
all the stages in any of the permitted flows.
"""
sid: Optional[str] = None
authdict = clientdict.pop("auth", {})
if "session" in authdict:
sid = authdict["session"]
# Convert the URI and method to strings.
uri = request.uri.decode("utf-8") # type: ignore
method = request.method.decode("utf-8")
# If there's no session ID, create a new session.
if not sid:
new_session_data = get_new_session_data() if get_new_session_data else {}
session = await self.store.create_ui_auth_session(
clientdict, uri, method, description
)
for k, v in new_session_data.items():
await self.set_session_data(session.session_id, k, v)
else:
try:
session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(sid)
except StoreError:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (sid,))
# If the client provides parameters, update what is persisted,
# otherwise use whatever was last provided.
#
# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
# on a homeserver.
#
# Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
# isn't arbitrary.
#
# Note that the registration endpoint explicitly removes the
# "initial_device_display_name" parameter if it is provided
# without a "password" parameter. See the changes to
# synapse.rest.client.register.RegisterRestServlet.on_POST
# in commit 544722bad23fc31056b9240189c3cbbbf0ffd3f9.
if not clientdict:
clientdict = session.clientdict
# Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of
# the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable
# comparator and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent
# queries ensure that this comparator has not changed.
#
# The comparator is based on the requested URI and HTTP method. The
# client dict (minus the auth dict) should also be checked, but some
# clients are not spec compliant, just warn for now if the client
# dict changes.
if (session.uri, session.method) != (uri, method):
raise SynapseError(
403,
"Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.",
)
if session.clientdict != clientdict:
logger.warning(
"Requested operation has changed during the UI "
"authentication session. A future version of Synapse "
"will remove this capability."
)
# For backwards compatibility, changes to the client dict are
# persisted as clients modify them throughout their user interactive
# authentication flow.
await self.store.set_ui_auth_clientdict(sid, clientdict)
user_agent = get_request_user_agent(request)
clientip = request.getClientIP()
await self.store.add_user_agent_ip_to_ui_auth_session(
session.session_id, user_agent, clientip
)
if not authdict:
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
session.session_id, self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
)
# check auth type currently being presented
errordict: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if "type" in authdict:
login_type: str = authdict["type"]
try:
result = await self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
if result:
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
session.session_id, login_type, result
)
except LoginError as e:
# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
# so that the client can have another go.
errordict = e.error_dict()
creds = await self.store.get_completed_ui_auth_stages(session.session_id)
for f in flows:
# If all the required credentials have been supplied, the user has
# successfully completed the UI auth process!
if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0:
# it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can
# include the password in the case of registering, so only log
# the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password
# param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth
# and is not sensitive).
logger.info(
"Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r",
creds,
list(clientdict),
)
return creds, clientdict, session.session_id
ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
ret["completed"] = list(creds)
ret.update(errordict)
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(session.session_id, ret)
async def add_oob_auth(
self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
) -> bool:
"""
Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
"""
if stagetype not in self.checkers:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
if "session" not in authdict:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
result = await self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip)
if result:
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
authdict["session"], stagetype, result
)
return True
return False
def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
Args:
clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
Returns:
The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
not send a session ID, returns None.
"""
sid = None
if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
authdict = clientdict["auth"]
if "session" in authdict:
sid = authdict["session"]
return sid
async def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None:
"""
Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
the client.
Args:
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key: The key to store the data under. An entry from
UIAuthSessionDataConstants.
value: The data to store
"""
try:
await self.store.set_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, value)
except StoreError:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
async def get_session_data(
self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None
) -> Any:
"""
Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
Args:
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key: The key the data was stored under. An entry from
UIAuthSessionDataConstants.
default: Value to return if the key has not been set
"""
try:
return await self.store.get_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, default)
except StoreError:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
async def _expire_old_sessions(self):
"""
Invalidate any user interactive authentication sessions that have expired.
"""
now = self._clock.time_msec()
expiration_time = now - self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS
await self.store.delete_old_ui_auth_sessions(expiration_time)
async def _check_auth_dict(
self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]:
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
Args:
authdict: auth dict provided by the client
clientip: IP address of the client
Returns:
Result of the stage verification.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
login_type = authdict["type"]
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
if checker is not None:
res = await checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip)
return res
# fall back to the v1 login flow
canonical_id, _ = await self.validate_login(authdict)
return canonical_id
def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict:
return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict:
return {
"policies": {
"privacy_policy": {
"version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
"en": {
"name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name,
"url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s"
% (
self.hs.config.public_baseurl,
self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
),
},
}
}
}
def _auth_dict_for_flows(
self,
flows: List[List[str]],
session_id: str,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
public_flows = []
for f in flows:
public_flows.append(f)
get_params = {
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
}
params: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for f in public_flows:
for stage in f:
if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
return {
"session": session_id,
"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
"params": params,
}
async def refresh_token(
self,
refresh_token: str,
valid_until_ms: Optional[int],
) -> Tuple[str, str]:
"""
Consumes a refresh token and generate both a new access token and a new refresh token from it.
The consumed refresh token is considered invalid after the first use of the new access token or the new refresh token.
Args:
refresh_token: The token to consume.
valid_until_ms: The expiration timestamp of the new access token.
Returns:
A tuple containing the new access token and refresh token
"""
# Verify the token signature first before looking up the token
if not self._verify_refresh_token(refresh_token):
raise SynapseError(401, "invalid refresh token", Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN)
existing_token = await self.store.lookup_refresh_token(refresh_token)
if existing_token is None:
raise SynapseError(401, "refresh token does not exist", Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN)
if (
existing_token.has_next_access_token_been_used
or existing_token.has_next_refresh_token_been_refreshed
):
raise SynapseError(
403, "refresh token isn't valid anymore", Codes.FORBIDDEN
)
(
new_refresh_token,
new_refresh_token_id,
) = await self.get_refresh_token_for_user_id(
user_id=existing_token.user_id, device_id=existing_token.device_id
)
access_token = await self.get_access_token_for_user_id(
user_id=existing_token.user_id,
device_id=existing_token.device_id,
valid_until_ms=valid_until_ms,
refresh_token_id=new_refresh_token_id,
)
await self.store.replace_refresh_token(
existing_token.token_id, new_refresh_token_id
)
return access_token, new_refresh_token
def _verify_refresh_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
"""
Verifies the shape of a refresh token.
Args:
token: The refresh token to verify
Returns:
Whether the token has the right shape
"""
parts = token.split("_", maxsplit=4)
if len(parts) != 4:
return False
type, localpart, rand, crc = parts
# Refresh tokens are prefixed by "syr_", let's check that
if type != "syr":
return False
# Check the CRC
base = f"{type}_{localpart}_{rand}"
expected_crc = base62_encode(crc32(base.encode("ascii")), minwidth=6)
if crc != expected_crc:
return False
return True
async def get_refresh_token_for_user_id(
self,
user_id: str,
device_id: str,
) -> Tuple[str, int]:
"""
Creates a new refresh token for the user with the given user ID.
Args:
user_id: canonical user ID
device_id: the device ID to associate with the token.
Returns:
The newly created refresh token and its ID in the database
"""
refresh_token = self.generate_refresh_token(UserID.from_string(user_id))
refresh_token_id = await self.store.add_refresh_token_to_user(
user_id=user_id,
token=refresh_token,
device_id=device_id,
)
return refresh_token, refresh_token_id
async def get_access_token_for_user_id(
self,
user_id: str,
device_id: Optional[str],
valid_until_ms: Optional[int],
puppets_user_id: Optional[str] = None,
is_appservice_ghost: bool = False,
refresh_token_id: Optional[int] = None,
) -> str:
"""
Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
mechanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
Args:
user_id: canonical User ID
device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens.
None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
we should always have a device ID)
valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for
no expiry.
is_appservice_ghost: Whether the user is an application ghost user
refresh_token_id: the refresh token ID that will be associated with
this access token.
Returns:
The access token for the user's session.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
"""
fmt_expiry = ""
if valid_until_ms is not None:
fmt_expiry = time.strftime(
" until %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(valid_until_ms / 1000.0)
)
if puppets_user_id:
logger.info(
"Logging in user %s as %s%s", user_id, puppets_user_id, fmt_expiry
)
target_user_id_obj = UserID.from_string(puppets_user_id)
else:
logger.info(
"Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry
)
target_user_id_obj = UserID.from_string(user_id)
if (
not is_appservice_ghost
or self.hs.config.appservice.track_appservice_user_ips
):
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
access_token = self.generate_access_token(target_user_id_obj)
await self.store.add_access_token_to_user(
user_id=user_id,
token=access_token,
device_id=device_id,
valid_until_ms=valid_until_ms,
puppets_user_id=puppets_user_id,
refresh_token_id=refresh_token_id,
)
# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
# device, so we double-check it here.
if device_id is not None:
try:
await self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id)
except StoreError:
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion")
return access_token
async def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
Args:
user_id: complete @user:id
Returns:
The canonical_user_id, or None if zero or multiple matches
"""
res = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if res is not None:
return res[0]
return None
async def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(
self, user_id: str
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]:
"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
matches.
Returns:
A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` or `None`
if there is not exactly one match
"""
user_infos = await self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
result = None
if not user_infos:
logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
elif len(user_infos) == 1:
# a single match (possibly not exact)
result = user_infos.popitem()
elif user_id in user_infos:
# multiple matches, but one is exact
result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
else:
# multiple matches, none of them exact
logger.warning(
"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
"inexactly: %r",
user_id,
user_infos.keys(),
)
return result
def can_change_password(self) -> bool:
"""Get whether users on this server are allowed to change or set a password.
Both `config.password_enabled` and `config.password_localdb_enabled` must be true.
Note that any account (even SSO accounts) are allowed to add passwords if the above
is true.
Returns:
Whether users on this server are allowed to change or set a password
"""
return self._password_enabled and self._password_localdb_enabled
def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]:
"""Get a the login types supported for the /login API
By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide
other login types.
Returns:
login types
"""
return self._supported_login_types
async def validate_login(
self,
login_submission: Dict[str, Any],
ratelimit: bool = False,
) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[["LoginResponse"], Awaitable[None]]]]:
"""Authenticates the user for the /login API
Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate auth types which don't
have an explicit UIA handler, including m.password.auth.
Args:
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
ratelimit: whether to apply the failed_login_attempt ratelimiter
Returns:
A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
if not isinstance(login_type, str):
raise SynapseError(400, "Bad parameter: type", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
# ideally, we wouldn't be checking the identifier unless we know we have a login
# method which uses it (https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/8836)
#
# But the auth providers' check_auth interface requires a username, so in
# practice we can only support login methods which we can map to a username
# anyway.
# special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface
# for the auth providers
password = login_submission.get("password")
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
if not self._password_enabled:
raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.")
if not isinstance(password, str):
raise SynapseError(400, "Bad parameter: password", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
# map old-school login fields into new-school "identifier" fields.
identifier_dict = convert_client_dict_legacy_fields_to_identifier(
login_submission
)
# convert phone type identifiers to generic threepids
if identifier_dict["type"] == "m.id.phone":
identifier_dict = login_id_phone_to_thirdparty(identifier_dict)
# convert threepid identifiers to user IDs
if identifier_dict["type"] == "m.id.thirdparty":
address = identifier_dict.get("address")
medium = identifier_dict.get("medium")
if medium is None or address is None:
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid thirdparty identifier")
# For emails, canonicalise the address.
# We store all email addresses canonicalised in the DB.
# (See add_threepid in synapse/handlers/auth.py)
if medium == "email":
try:
address = canonicalise_email(address)
except ValueError as e:
raise SynapseError(400, str(e))
# We also apply account rate limiting using the 3PID as a key, as
# otherwise using 3PID bypasses the ratelimiting based on user ID.
if ratelimit:
await self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
None, (medium, address), update=False
)
# Check for login providers that support 3pid login types
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
# we've already checked that there is a (valid) password field
assert isinstance(password, str)
(
canonical_user_id,
callback_3pid,
) = await self.check_password_provider_3pid(medium, address, password)
if canonical_user_id:
# Authentication through password provider and 3pid succeeded
return canonical_user_id, callback_3pid
# No password providers were able to handle this 3pid
# Check local store
user_id = await self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
medium, address
)
if not user_id:
logger.warning(
"unknown 3pid identifier medium %s, address %r", medium, address
)
# We mark that we've failed to log in here, as
# `check_password_provider_3pid` might have returned `None` due
# to an incorrect password, rather than the account not
# existing.
#
# If it returned None but the 3PID was bound then we won't hit
# this code path, which is fine as then the per-user ratelimit
# will kick in below.
if ratelimit:
await self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
None, (medium, address)
)
raise LoginError(403, "", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
identifier_dict = {"type": "m.id.user", "user": user_id}
# by this point, the identifier should be an m.id.user: if it's anything
# else, we haven't understood it.
if identifier_dict["type"] != "m.id.user":
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login identifier type")
username = identifier_dict.get("user")
if not username:
raise SynapseError(400, "User identifier is missing 'user' key")
if username.startswith("@"):
qualified_user_id = username
else:
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
# Check if we've hit the failed ratelimit (but don't update it)
if ratelimit:
await self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
None, qualified_user_id.lower(), update=False
)
try:
return await self._validate_userid_login(username, login_submission)
except LoginError:
# The user has failed to log in, so we need to update the rate
# limiter. Using `can_do_action` avoids us raising a ratelimit
# exception and masking the LoginError. The actual ratelimiting
# should have happened above.
if ratelimit:
await self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
None, qualified_user_id.lower()
)
raise
async def _validate_userid_login(
self,
username: str,
login_submission: Dict[str, Any],
) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[["LoginResponse"], Awaitable[None]]]]:
"""Helper for validate_login
Handles login, once we've mapped 3pids onto userids
Args:
username: the username, from the identifier dict
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
Returns:
A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
if username.startswith("@"):
qualified_user_id = username
else:
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
# we already checked that we have a valid login type
assert isinstance(login_type, str)
known_login_type = False
for provider in self.password_providers:
supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types()
if login_type not in supported_login_types:
# this password provider doesn't understand this login type
continue
known_login_type = True
login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type]
missing_fields = []
login_dict = {}
for f in login_fields:
if f not in login_submission:
missing_fields.append(f)
else:
login_dict[f] = login_submission[f]
if missing_fields:
raise SynapseError(
400,
"Missing parameters for login type %s: %s"
% (login_type, missing_fields),
)
result = await provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict)
if result:
return result
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self._password_localdb_enabled:
known_login_type = True
# we've already checked that there is a (valid) password field
password = login_submission["password"]
assert isinstance(password, str)
canonical_user_id = await self._check_local_password(
qualified_user_id, password
)
if canonical_user_id:
return canonical_user_id, None
if not known_login_type:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type)
# We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive
# login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway.
raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
async def check_password_provider_3pid(
self, medium: str, address: str, password: str
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[Callable[["LoginResponse"], Awaitable[None]]]]:
"""Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
Args:
medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
password: The password of the user.
Returns:
A tuple of `(user_id, callback)`. If authentication is successful,
`user_id`is the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is
then either a function to be later run after the server has
completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was
unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`.
"""
for provider in self.password_providers:
result = await provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password)
if result:
return result
return None, None
async def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
multiple inexact matches.
Args:
user_id: complete @user:id
password: the provided password
Returns:
The canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user/bad password
"""
lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if not lookupres:
return None
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
# If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated
if not password_hash:
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id)
if deactivated:
raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated")
result = await self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
if not result:
logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
return None
return user_id
def generate_access_token(self, for_user: UserID) -> str:
"""Generates an opaque string, for use as an access token"""
# we use the following format for access tokens:
# syt_<base64 local part>_<random string>_<base62 crc check>
b64local = unpaddedbase64.encode_base64(for_user.localpart.encode("utf-8"))
random_string = stringutils.random_string(20)
base = f"syt_{b64local}_{random_string}"
crc = base62_encode(crc32(base.encode("ascii")), minwidth=6)
return f"{base}_{crc}"
def generate_refresh_token(self, for_user: UserID) -> str:
"""Generates an opaque string, for use as a refresh token"""
# we use the following format for refresh tokens:
# syr_<base64 local part>_<random string>_<base62 crc check>
b64local = unpaddedbase64.encode_base64(for_user.localpart.encode("utf-8"))
random_string = stringutils.random_string(20)
base = f"syr_{b64local}_{random_string}"
crc = base62_encode(crc32(base.encode("ascii")), minwidth=6)
return f"{base}_{crc}"
async def validate_short_term_login_token(
self, login_token: str
) -> LoginTokenAttributes:
try:
res = self.macaroon_gen.verify_short_term_login_token(login_token)
except Exception:
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(res.user_id)
return res
async def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str):
"""Invalidate a single access token
Args:
access_token: access token to be deleted
"""
user_info = await self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token)
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
await provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=user_info.user_id,
device_id=user_info.device_id,
access_token=access_token,
)
# delete pushers associated with this access token
if user_info.token_id is not None:
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
user_info.user_id, (user_info.token_id,)
)
async def delete_access_tokens_for_user(
self,
user_id: str,
except_token_id: Optional[int] = None,
device_id: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
Args:
user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to
except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted
device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with.
If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
be deleted
"""
tokens_and_devices = await self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id
)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
for token, _, device_id in tokens_and_devices:
await provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token
)
# delete pushers associated with the access tokens
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices)
)
async def add_threepid(
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int
):
# check if medium has a valid value
if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]:
raise SynapseError(
code=400,
msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)),
errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM,
)
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
# We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
# for the presence of an email address during password reset was
# case sensitive).
if medium == "email":
address = canonicalise_email(address)
await self.store.user_add_threepid(
user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
)
async def delete_threepid(
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None
) -> bool:
"""Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
from the local database.
Args:
user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from.
medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn".
address: The 3pid address to remove.
id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding
any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
identity server specified when binding (if known).
Returns:
Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
unbind API.
"""
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above
if medium == "email":
address = canonicalise_email(address)
identity_handler = self.hs.get_identity_handler()
result = await identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid(
user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server}
)
await self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address)
return result
async def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
Args:
password: Password to hash.
Returns:
Hashed password.
"""
def _do_hash():
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.hashpw(
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds),
).decode("ascii")
return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
async def validate_hash(
self, password: str, stored_hash: Union[bytes, str]
) -> bool:
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
Args:
password: Password to hash.
stored_hash: Expected hash value.
Returns:
Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
"""
def _do_validate_hash(checked_hash: bytes):
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.checkpw(
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
checked_hash,
)
if stored_hash:
if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes):
stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii")
return await defer_to_thread(
self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash, stored_hash
)
else:
return False
async def start_sso_ui_auth(self, request: SynapseRequest, session_id: str) -> str:
"""
Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page.
Args:
request: The incoming HTTP request
session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID.
Returns:
The HTML to render.
"""
try:
session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(session_id)
except StoreError:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
user_id_to_verify: str = await self.get_session_data(
session_id, UIAuthSessionDataConstants.REQUEST_USER_ID
)
idps = await self.hs.get_sso_handler().get_identity_providers_for_user(
user_id_to_verify
)
if not idps:
# we checked that the user had some remote identities before offering an SSO
# flow, so either it's been deleted or the client has requested SSO despite
# it not being offered.
raise SynapseError(400, "User has no SSO identities")
# for now, just pick one
idp_id, sso_auth_provider = next(iter(idps.items()))
if len(idps) > 0:
logger.warning(
"User %r has previously logged in with multiple SSO IdPs; arbitrarily "
"picking %r",
user_id_to_verify,
idp_id,
)
redirect_url = await sso_auth_provider.handle_redirect_request(
request, None, session_id
)
return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render(
description=session.description,
redirect_url=redirect_url,
idp=sso_auth_provider,
)
async def complete_sso_login(
self,
registered_user_id: str,
auth_provider_id: str,
request: Request,
client_redirect_url: str,
extra_attributes: Optional[JsonDict] = None,
new_user: bool = False,
):
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
Args:
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
auth_provider_id: The id of the SSO Identity provider that was used for
login. This will be stored in the login token for future tracking in
prometheus metrics.
request: The request to complete.
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
process.
extra_attributes: Extra attributes which will be passed to the client
during successful login. Must be JSON serializable.
new_user: True if we should use wording appropriate to a user who has just
registered.
"""
# If the account has been deactivated, do not proceed with the login
# flow.
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(registered_user_id)
if deactivated:
respond_with_html(request, 403, self._sso_account_deactivated_template)
return
profile = await self.store.get_profileinfo(
UserID.from_string(registered_user_id).localpart
)
self._complete_sso_login(
registered_user_id,
auth_provider_id,
request,
client_redirect_url,
extra_attributes,
new_user=new_user,
user_profile_data=profile,
)
def _complete_sso_login(
self,
registered_user_id: str,
auth_provider_id: str,
request: Request,
client_redirect_url: str,
extra_attributes: Optional[JsonDict] = None,
new_user: bool = False,
user_profile_data: Optional[ProfileInfo] = None,
):
"""
The synchronous portion of complete_sso_login.
This exists purely for backwards compatibility of synapse.module_api.ModuleApi.
"""
if user_profile_data is None:
user_profile_data = ProfileInfo(None, None)
# Store any extra attributes which will be passed in the login response.
# Note that this is per-user so it may overwrite a previous value, this
# is considered OK since the newest SSO attributes should be most valid.
if extra_attributes:
self._extra_attributes[registered_user_id] = SsoLoginExtraAttributes(
self._clock.time_msec(),
extra_attributes,
)
# Create a login token
login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token(
registered_user_id, auth_provider_id=auth_provider_id
)
# Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query
# parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to
# redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link.
redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url(
client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token
)
# if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it
if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients):
request.redirect(redirect_url)
finish_request(request)
return
# Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page.
# Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of
# it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the
# URL we redirect users to.
url_parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(client_redirect_url)
if url_parts.scheme == "https":
# for an https uri, just show the netloc (ie, the hostname. Specifically,
# the bit between "//" and "/"; this includes any potential
# "username:password@" prefix.)
display_url = url_parts.netloc
else:
# for other uris, strip the query-params (including the login token) and
# fragment.
display_url = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
(url_parts.scheme, url_parts.netloc, url_parts.path, "", "")
)
html = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render(
display_url=display_url,
redirect_url=redirect_url,
server_name=self._server_name,
new_user=new_user,
user_id=registered_user_id,
user_profile=user_profile_data,
)
respond_with_html(request, 200, html)
async def _sso_login_callback(self, login_result: "LoginResponse") -> None:
"""
A login callback which might add additional attributes to the login response.
Args:
login_result: The data to be sent to the client. Includes the user
ID and access token.
"""
# Expire attributes before processing. Note that there shouldn't be any
# valid logins that still have extra attributes.
self._expire_sso_extra_attributes()
extra_attributes = self._extra_attributes.get(login_result["user_id"])
if extra_attributes:
login_result_dict = cast(Dict[str, Any], login_result)
login_result_dict.update(extra_attributes.extra_attributes)
def _expire_sso_extra_attributes(self) -> None:
"""
Iterate through the mapping of user IDs to extra attributes and remove any that are no longer valid.
"""
# TODO This should match the amount of time the macaroon is valid for.
LOGIN_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_TIME = 2 * 60 * 1000
expire_before = self._clock.time_msec() - LOGIN_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_TIME
to_expire = set()
for user_id, data in self._extra_attributes.items():
if data.creation_time < expire_before:
to_expire.add(user_id)
for user_id in to_expire:
logger.debug("Expiring extra attributes for user %s", user_id)
del self._extra_attributes[user_id]
@staticmethod
def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any):
url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url))
query = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4], keep_blank_values=True)
query.append((param_name, param))
url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts)
@attr.s(slots=True)
class MacaroonGenerator:
hs = attr.ib()
def generate_guest_access_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
# Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different
# access token.
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(
"nonce = %s" % (stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),)
)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("guest = true")
return macaroon.serialize()
def generate_short_term_login_token(
self,
user_id: str,
auth_provider_id: str,
duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000),
) -> str:
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("auth_provider_id = %s" % (auth_provider_id,))
return macaroon.serialize()
def verify_short_term_login_token(self, token: str) -> LoginTokenAttributes:
"""Verify a short-term-login macaroon
Checks that the given token is a valid, unexpired short-term-login token
minted by this server.
Args:
token: the login token to verify
Returns:
the user_id that this token is valid for
Raises:
MacaroonVerificationFailedException if the verification failed
"""
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(token)
user_id = get_value_from_macaroon(macaroon, "user_id")
auth_provider_id = get_value_from_macaroon(macaroon, "auth_provider_id")
v = pymacaroons.Verifier()
v.satisfy_exact("gen = 1")
v.satisfy_exact("type = login")
v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("user_id = "))
v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("auth_provider_id = "))
satisfy_expiry(v, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec)
v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.key.macaroon_secret_key)
return LoginTokenAttributes(user_id=user_id, auth_provider_id=auth_provider_id)
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
return macaroon.serialize()
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon:
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
identifier="key",
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key,
)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
return macaroon
class PasswordProvider:
"""Wrapper for a password auth provider module
This class abstracts out all of the backwards-compatibility hacks for
password providers, to provide a consistent interface.
"""
@classmethod
def load(cls, module, config, module_api: ModuleApi) -> "PasswordProvider":
try:
pp = module(config=config, account_handler=module_api)
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Error while initializing %r: %s", module, e)
raise
return cls(pp, module_api)
def __init__(self, pp, module_api: ModuleApi):
self._pp = pp
self._module_api = module_api
self._supported_login_types = {}
# grandfather in check_password support
if hasattr(self._pp, "check_password"):
self._supported_login_types[LoginType.PASSWORD] = ("password",)
g = getattr(self._pp, "get_supported_login_types", None)
if g:
self._supported_login_types.update(g())
def __str__(self):
return str(self._pp)
def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Mapping[str, Iterable[str]]:
"""Get the login types supported by this password provider
Returns a map from a login type identifier (such as m.login.password) to an
iterable giving the fields which must be provided by the user in the submission
to the /login API.
This wrapper adds m.login.password to the list if the underlying password
provider supports the check_password() api.
"""
return self._supported_login_types
async def check_auth(
self, username: str, login_type: str, login_dict: JsonDict
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, Optional[Callable]]]:
"""Check if the user has presented valid login credentials
This wrapper also calls check_password() if the underlying password provider
supports the check_password() api and the login type is m.login.password.
Args:
username: user id presented by the client. Either an MXID or an unqualified
username.
login_type: the login type being attempted - one of the types returned by
get_supported_login_types()
login_dict: the dictionary of login secrets passed by the client.
Returns: (user_id, callback) where `user_id` is the fully-qualified mxid of the
user, and `callback` is an optional callback which will be called with the
result from the /login call (including access_token, device_id, etc.)
"""
# first grandfather in a call to check_password
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_password", None)
if g:
qualified_user_id = self._module_api.get_qualified_user_id(username)
is_valid = await self._pp.check_password(
qualified_user_id, login_dict["password"]
)
if is_valid:
return qualified_user_id, None
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_auth", None)
if not g:
return None
result = await g(username, login_type, login_dict)
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
if isinstance(result, str):
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
return result, None
return result
async def check_3pid_auth(
self, medium: str, address: str, password: str
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, Optional[Callable]]]:
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_3pid_auth", None)
if not g:
return None
# This function is able to return a deferred that either
# resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon
# success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of
# (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run
# after we've finished everything else
result = await g(medium, address, password)
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
if isinstance(result, str):
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
return result, None
return result
async def on_logged_out(
self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], access_token: str
) -> None:
g = getattr(self._pp, "on_logged_out", None)
if not g:
return
# This might return an awaitable, if it does block the log out
# until it completes.
await maybe_awaitable(
g(
user_id=user_id,
device_id=device_id,
access_token=access_token,
)
)
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