cryptonote_protocol_handler: prevent potential DoS

Essentially, one can send such a large amount of IDs that core exhausts
all free memory. This issue can theoretically be exploited using very
large CN blockchains, such as Monero.

This is a partial fix. Thanks and credit given to CryptoNote author
'cryptozoidberg' for collaboration and the fix. Also thanks to
'moneromooo'. Referencing HackerOne report #506595.
This commit is contained in:
anonimal 2019-03-09 09:11:44 +00:00 committed by wowario
parent 307bd8f5ae
commit 2f402f9a45
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GPG Key ID: 24DCBE762DE9C111
2 changed files with 12 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ PUSH_WARNINGS
DISABLE_VS_WARNINGS(4355)
#define LOCALHOST_INT 2130706433
#define CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT 500
namespace cryptonote
{

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@ -914,6 +914,17 @@ namespace cryptonote
int t_cryptonote_protocol_handler<t_core>::handle_request_get_objects(int command, NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS::request& arg, cryptonote_connection_context& context)
{
MLOG_P2P_MESSAGE("Received NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS (" << arg.blocks.size() << " blocks, " << arg.txs.size() << " txes)");
if (arg.blocks.size() > CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT)
{
LOG_ERROR_CCONTEXT(
"Requested objects count is too big ("
<< arg.blocks.size() << ") expected not more then "
<< CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT);
drop_connection(context, false, false);
return 1;
}
NOTIFY_RESPONSE_GET_OBJECTS::request rsp;
if(!m_core.handle_get_objects(arg, rsp, context))
{