From c59e0096b671528036563c1c30f31763a615aa75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeffrey Ryan Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 20:53:25 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached: fix fragility --- src/cryptonote_config.h | 1 + src/cryptonote_core/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +- src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp | 81 +--- src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.h | 22 +- src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.cpp | 167 +++++++ src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h | 78 ++++ src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp | 37 -- src/ringct/rctSigs.h | 1 - src/ringct/rctTypes.h | 8 + tests/data/txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin | Bin 0 -> 1539 bytes tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + .../ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp | 426 ++++++++++++++++++ 12 files changed, 715 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.cpp create mode 100644 src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h create mode 100644 tests/data/txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin create mode 100644 tests/unit_tests/ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp diff --git a/src/cryptonote_config.h b/src/cryptonote_config.h index 2ec194ef8..d37463af0 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_config.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_config.h @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ namespace config const unsigned char HASH_KEY_MM_SLOT = 'm'; const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS_SEED[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys_seed"; const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys"; + const constexpr char HASH_KEY_TXHASH_AND_MIXRING[] = "txhash_and_mixring"; // Multisig const uint32_t MULTISIG_MAX_SIGNERS{16}; diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/CMakeLists.txt b/src/cryptonote_core/CMakeLists.txt index 69411e379..beead6217 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/CMakeLists.txt @@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ set(cryptonote_core_sources cryptonote_core.cpp tx_pool.cpp tx_sanity_check.cpp - cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp) + cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp + tx_verification_utils.cpp +) set(cryptonote_core_headers) diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp index 8edb33b5a..28d52a2d1 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include "common/notify.h" #include "common/varint.h" #include "common/pruning.h" +#include "common/data_cache.h" #include "time_helper.h" #undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY @@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ Blockchain::Blockchain(tx_memory_pool& tx_pool) : m_difficulty_for_next_block(1), m_btc_valid(false), m_batch_success(true), - m_prepare_height(0) + m_prepare_height(0), + m_rct_ver_cache() { LOG_PRINT_L3("Blockchain::" << __func__); } @@ -3211,7 +3213,7 @@ bool Blockchain::have_tx_keyimges_as_spent(const transaction &tx) const } return false; } -bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector> &pubkeys) const +bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector> &pubkeys) { PERF_TIMER(expand_transaction_2); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.version == 2, false, "Transaction version is not 2"); @@ -3534,6 +3536,13 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, false, "Transaction spends at least one output which is too young"); } + // Warn that new RCT types are present, and thus the cache is not being used effectively + static constexpr const std::uint8_t RCT_CACHE_TYPE = rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus; + if (tx.rct_signatures.type > RCT_CACHE_TYPE) + { + MWARNING("RCT cache is not caching new verification results. Please update RCT_CACHE_TYPE!"); + } + if (tx.version == 1) { if (threads > 1) @@ -3555,12 +3564,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, } else { - if (!expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, pubkeys)) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to expand rct signatures!"); - return false; - } - // from version 2, check ringct signatures // obviously, the original and simple rct APIs use a mixRing that's indexes // in opposite orders, because it'd be too simple otherwise... @@ -3578,61 +3581,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, case rct::RCTTypeCLSAG: case rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus: { - // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not - { - if (pubkeys.size() != rv.mixRing.size()) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size"); - return false; - } - for (size_t i = 0; i < pubkeys.size(); ++i) - { - if (pubkeys[i].size() != rv.mixRing[i].size()) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size"); - return false; - } - } - - for (size_t n = 0; n < pubkeys.size(); ++n) - { - for (size_t m = 0; m < pubkeys[n].size(); ++m) - { - if (pubkeys[n][m].dest != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].dest)) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkey at vin " << n << ", index " << m); - return false; - } - if (pubkeys[n][m].mask != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].mask)) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched commitment at vin " << n << ", index " << m); - return false; - } - } - } - } - - const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size(); - if (n_sigs != tx.vin.size()) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MGs/vin sizes"); - return false; - } - for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) - { - bool error; - if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type)) - error = memcmp(&boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32); - else - error = rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty() || memcmp(&boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32); - if (error) - { - MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched key image"); - return false; - } - } - - if (!rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(rv)) + if (!ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, pubkeys, m_rct_ver_cache, RCT_CACHE_TYPE)) { MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures!"); return false; @@ -3641,6 +3590,12 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, } case rct::RCTTypeFull: { + if (!expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, pubkeys)) + { + MERROR_VER("Failed to expand rct signatures!"); + return false; + } + // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not { bool size_matches = true; diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.h b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.h index c61ce4466..42246fca2 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include "rpc/core_rpc_server_commands_defs.h" #include "cryptonote_basic/difficulty.h" #include "cryptonote_tx_utils.h" +#include "tx_verification_utils.h" #include "cryptonote_basic/verification_context.h" #include "crypto/hash.h" #include "checkpoints/checkpoints.h" @@ -596,6 +597,15 @@ namespace cryptonote */ bool store_blockchain(); + /** + * @brief expands v2 transaction data from blockchain + * + * RingCT transactions do not transmit some of their data if it + * can be reconstituted by the receiver. This function expands + * that implicit data. + */ + static bool expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector> &pubkeys); + /** * @brief validates a transaction's inputs * @@ -1222,6 +1232,9 @@ namespace cryptonote uint64_t m_prepare_nblocks; std::vector *m_prepare_blocks; + // cache for verifying transaction RCT non semantics + mutable rct_ver_cache_t m_rct_ver_cache; + /** * @brief collects the keys for all outputs being "spent" as an input * @@ -1574,15 +1587,6 @@ namespace cryptonote */ void load_compiled_in_block_hashes(const GetCheckpointsCallback& get_checkpoints); - /** - * @brief expands v2 transaction data from blockchain - * - * RingCT transactions do not transmit some of their data if it - * can be reconstituted by the receiver. This function expands - * that implicit data. - */ - bool expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector> &pubkeys) const; - /** * @brief invalidates any cached block template */ diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a93ef2f25 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +#include "cryptonote_core/blockchain.h" +#include "cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h" +#include "ringct/rctSigs.h" + +#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY +#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "blockchain" + +#define VER_ASSERT(cond, msgexpr) CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cond, false, msgexpr) + +using namespace cryptonote; + +// Do RCT expansion, then do post-expansion sanity checks, then do full non-semantics verification. +static bool expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring) +{ + // Pruned transactions can not be expanded and verified because they are missing RCT data + VER_ASSERT(!tx.pruned, "Pruned transaction will not pass verRctNonSemanticsSimple"); + + // Calculate prefix hash + const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx); + + // Expand mixring, tx inputs, tx key images, prefix hash message, etc into the RCT sig + const bool exp_res = Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, mix_ring); + VER_ASSERT(exp_res, "Failed to expand rct signatures!"); + + const rct::rctSig& rv = tx.rct_signatures; + + // Check that expanded RCT mixring == input mixring + VER_ASSERT(rv.mixRing == mix_ring, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing"); + + // Check CLSAG/MLSAG size against transaction input + const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size(); + VER_ASSERT(n_sigs == tx.vin.size(), "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched input sigs/vin sizes"); + + // For each input, check that the key images were copied into the expanded RCT sig correctly + for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sigs; ++n) + { + const crypto::key_image& nth_vin_image = boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image; + + if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type)) + { + const bool ki_match = 0 == memcmp(&nth_vin_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32); + VER_ASSERT(ki_match, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched CLSAG key image"); + } + else + { + const bool mg_nonempty = !rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty(); + VER_ASSERT(mg_nonempty, "Failed to check ringct signatures: missing MLSAG key image"); + const bool ki_match = 0 == memcmp(&nth_vin_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32); + VER_ASSERT(ki_match, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MLSAG key image"); + } + } + + // Mix ring data is now known to be correctly incorporated into the RCT sig inside tx. + return rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); +} + +// Create a unique identifier for pair of tx blob + mix ring +static crypto::hash calc_tx_mixring_hash(const transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring) +{ + std::stringstream ss; + + // Start with domain seperation + ss << config::HASH_KEY_TXHASH_AND_MIXRING; + + // Then add TX hash + const crypto::hash tx_hash = get_transaction_hash(tx); + ss.write(tx_hash.data, sizeof(crypto::hash)); + + // Then serialize mix ring + binary_archive ar(ss); + ::do_serialize(ar, const_cast(mix_ring)); + + // Calculate hash of TX hash and mix ring blob + crypto::hash tx_and_mixring_hash; + get_blob_hash(ss.str(), tx_and_mixring_hash); + + return tx_and_mixring_hash; +} + +//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + +namespace cryptonote +{ + +bool ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached +( + transaction& tx, + const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring, + rct_ver_cache_t& cache, + const std::uint8_t rct_type_to_cache +) +{ + // Hello future Monero dev! If you got this assert, read the following carefully: + // + // For this version of RCT, the way we guaranteed that verification caches do not generate false + // positives (and thus possibly enabling double spends) is we take a hash of two things. One, + // we use get_transaction_hash() which gives us a (cryptographically secure) unique + // representation of all "knobs" controlled by the possibly malicious constructor of the + // transaction. Two, we take a hash of all *previously validated* blockchain data referenced by + // this transaction which is required to validate the ring signature. In our case, this is the + // mixring. Future versions of the protocol may differ in this regard, but if this assumptions + // holds true in the future, enable the verification hash by modifying the `untested_tx` + // condition below. + const bool untested_tx = tx.version > 2 || tx.rct_signatures.type > rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus; + VER_ASSERT(!untested_tx, "Unknown TX type. Make sure RCT cache works correctly with this type and then enable it in the code here."); + + // Don't cache older (or newer) rctSig types + // This cache only makes sense when it caches data from mempool first, + // so only "current fork version-enabled" RCT types need to be cached + if (tx.rct_signatures.type != rct_type_to_cache) + { + MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " skipped"); + return expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(tx, mix_ring); + } + + // Generate unique hash for tx+mix_ring pair + const crypto::hash tx_mixring_hash = calc_tx_mixring_hash(tx, mix_ring); + + // Search cache for successful verification of same TX + mix ring combination + if (cache.has(tx_mixring_hash)) + { + MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " hit"); + return true; + } + + // We had a cache miss, so now we must expand the mix ring and do full verification + MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " missed"); + if (!expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(tx, mix_ring)) + { + return false; + } + + // At this point, the TX RCT verified successfully, so add it to the cache and return true + cache.add(tx_mixring_hash); + + return true; +} + +} // namespace cryptonote diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h b/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ccd401d2a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +#pragma once + +#include "common/data_cache.h" +#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_basic.h" + +namespace cryptonote +{ + +// Modifying this value should not affect consensus. You can adjust it for performance needs +static constexpr const size_t RCT_VER_CACHE_SIZE = 8192; + +using rct_ver_cache_t = ::tools::data_cache<::crypto::hash, RCT_VER_CACHE_SIZE>; + +/** + * @brief Cached version of rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple + * + * This function will not affect how the transaction is serialized and it will never modify the + * transaction prefix. + * + * The reference to tx is mutable since the transaction's ring signatures may be expanded by + * Blockchain::expand_transaction_2. However, on cache hits, the transaction will not be + * expanded. This means that the caller does not need to call expand_transaction_2 on this + * transaction before passing it; the transaction will not successfully verify with "old" RCT data + * if the transaction has been otherwise modified since the last verification. + * + * But, if cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx) returns a "stale" hash, this function is not + * guaranteed to work. So make sure that the cryptonote::transaction passed has not had + * modifications to it since the last time its hash was fetched without properly invalidating the + * hashes. + * + * rct_type_to_cache can be any RCT version value as long as rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple works for + * this RCT version, but for most applications, it doesn't make sense to not make this version + * the "current" RCT version (i.e. the version that transactions in the mempool are). + * + * @param tx transaction which contains RCT signature to verify + * @param mix_ring mixring referenced by this tx. THIS DATA MUST BE PREVIOUSLY VALIDATED + * @param cache saves tx+mixring hashes used to cache calls + * @param rct_type_to_cache Only RCT sigs with version (e.g. RCTTypeBulletproofPlus) will be cached + * @return true when verRctNonSemanticsSimple() w/ expanded tx.rct_signatures would return true + * @return false when verRctNonSemanticsSimple() w/ expanded tx.rct_signatures would return false + */ +bool ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached +( + transaction& tx, + const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring, + rct_ver_cache_t& cache, + std::uint8_t rct_type_to_cache +); + +} // namespace cryptonote diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp index 7b16f017b..477a7907d 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ #include "misc_log_ex.h" #include "misc_language.h" -#include "common/data_cache.h" #include "common/perf_timer.h" #include "common/threadpool.h" #include "common/util.h" @@ -1579,42 +1578,6 @@ namespace rct { } } - bool verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(const rctSig & rv) - { - // Hello future Monero dev! If you got this assert, read the following carefully: - // - // RCT cache assumes that this function will serialize and hash all rv's fields used for RingCT verification - // If you're about to add a new RCTType here, first you must check that binary_archive serialization writes all rv's fields to the binary blob - // If it's not the case, rewrite this function to serialize everything, even some "temporary" fields which are not serialized normally - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(rv.type <= RCTTypeBulletproofPlus, false, "Unknown RCT type. Make sure RCT cache works correctly with this type and then enable it in the code here."); - - // Don't cache older (or newer) rctSig types - // This cache only makes sense when it caches data from mempool first, - // so only "current fork version-enabled" RCT types need to be cached - if (rv.type != RCTTypeBulletproofPlus) - return verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); - - // Get the hash of rv - std::stringstream ss; - binary_archive ar(ss); - - ::do_serialize(ar, const_cast(rv)); - - crypto::hash h; - cryptonote::get_blob_hash(ss.str(), h); - - static tools::data_cache cache; - - if (cache.has(h)) - return true; - - const bool res = verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); - if (res) - cache.add(h); - - return res; - } - //RingCT protocol //genRct: // creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h index 18c7e5fe6..17cfd77b9 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h @@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ namespace rct { bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv); bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector & rv); bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv); - bool verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(const rctSig & rv); static inline bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv) { return verRctSemanticsSimple(rv) && verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); } xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev); xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, hw::device &hwdev); diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h index 59ed4d6a6..ab1a26b26 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h @@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ namespace rct { struct ctkey { key dest; key mask; //C here if public + + bool operator==(const ctkey &other) const { + return (dest == other.dest) && (mask == other.mask); + } + + bool operator!=(const ctkey &other) const { + return !(*this == other); + } }; typedef std::vector ctkeyV; typedef std::vector ctkeyM; diff --git a/tests/data/txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin b/tests/data/txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38f596397b50ec27d53c58dd6234ec393eb3301e GIT binary patch literal 1539 zcmV+e2K@N~009C35SFBh8nL;(0npv90-x&}k=`+!u^rvg8|LaL^05cjVW6u8tI-7F zlmV7g_X+fd00w# z1#HUTcm|~iECH>1A-#6Max)+RdZ1hzOrCV4zO)d}a~8IUf2pPdh@LRJiHVkN#C-;9ZOXz9nRq&d5TVpfAZ( z%V=0S9bC0m0C2SSV36K+K;UQ$2gx=2A0P5#H>G2Bc!^a>#GwueQa}X%3BNhONI36N zag|ehL|HF(tNhq73pS^w_34s`^<0|A(~Klv9piUPIh-GI2J>kI;yqX(;I|cC1iFdZ z;-)WtGDEwo-BY36x9h|5Y^9lvNC*T! zeqk6~V00wVMJY*-sJO}xV1mrpN}bY_3`G?kl5C-EekOGdit*3x#i3>!eG4Z4+YoLw zribYwI?o3sakJAJgUxQOTuZ9JuN+<8m>{}y3W+FaBTJt8N(X$xd}}nUu5jk0eShKj zY0+sK7)NN3ua}*Gm9HpoT-DYNTp}ih34HTVhKF5aY)$!Bg-y|P&KeiP;NLq)$)Q10 zS2QHmxNL-XC<~{uqF=_YlAACFtZy%?6`;4RT@O5%;(h67*u!abho<({j2uAGxIB9~ zBYNpgBYsDMj)=6K_uleVPPn8_pEU>ghSax=SW^?u^N6!&YZ{AlYf0M?O4kEPJV&Q6 zA&9E>cb9#Blu1IKc{X>U_%uL5>t1xY0?<;9THS$s6E9=U=oQH#s_h5I^Ob|60`CzU zDTs7$!=WK5@!S7SAB@;(@1>Vezw6gkiwwyev=FihJ`A_qdk~4k9+S71EOjU}Xz^ny zF9FXnT4^of^V|VT^a%>7{NDmg(A(iMzD1s%=7pv|e5@0y5Hg{w`l%VGH~@sF@nt|9 zI6?;}=$}OMRSl%g{ROWR?=I>k>16;2sm)WmhNs)z^!Qp3 zXBFUZstu1QuBV6H=Y~nWYvUdVkuIsr)7zIveF-R#6M{5>fb*;#hkekmN8a;(UjCGH(X%S_bPP<^$p@VfES-Jf}0>mFgW~%X)dB4C?A$ ze6>}jR*qt7?E`l2+%bvf@H)zU93$D^ZtQGFScBI{{aAspo*XGRE1i4 zwPd>4io@V{93u$!7@kmVhz2k<}xwVioPoV_eS5|x-I{w-<5;xIG?jvni~`W zIStk}YK$Yyaaxy>&O?#gn+?zVvdQ!_njlTX%c&z8yA1ZlR!UsRznJHc9+?6qHIzhT z|A1eAIQ}^674IA2Pz`eC-=F1?v|KW3_2x#)e538dx@*{lEGGS8Ls1jx!~pGR>{=@~ zeQ$1GBBIN$-%wLoO;lqWh&dp)l^0R{%y9})UlnF+3#a6 pC6o+feSYhM{p8yy&%2Jmr-i)srzJ3%r^!M=VXg$hFH6D{WC$9A@qz#V literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt index 55818dc93..2efa931bc 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ set(unit_tests_sources unbound.cpp uri.cpp varint.cpp + ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp ringct.cpp output_selection.cpp vercmp.cpp diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..118fb7c48 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/unit_tests/ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +#include + +#define IN_UNIT_TESTS // To access Blockchain::{expand_transaction_2, verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached} + +#include "gtest/gtest.h" +#include "unit_tests_utils.h" + +#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h" +#include "cryptonote_core/blockchain.h" +#include "file_io_utils.h" +#include "misc_log_ex.h" +#include "ringct/rctSigs.h" + +namespace cryptonote +{ +// declaration not provided in cryptonote_format_utils.h, but definition is not static ;) +bool expand_transaction_1(transaction &tx, bool base_only); +} + +namespace +{ +/** + * @brief Make rct::ctkey from hex string representation of destionation and mask + * + * @param dest_hex + * @param mask_hex + * @return rct::ctkey + */ +static rct::ctkey make_ctkey(const char* dest_hex, const char* mask_hex) +{ + rct::key dest; + rct::key mask; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(dest), dest_hex), "dest bad hex: " << dest_hex); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(mask), mask_hex), "mask bad hex: " << mask_hex); + return {dest, mask}; +} + +template +static std::string stringify_with_do_serialize(const T& t) +{ + std::stringstream ss; + binary_archive ar(ss); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ar.good(), "Archiver is not in a good state. This shouldn't happen!"); + ::do_serialize(ar, const_cast(t)); + return ss.str(); +} + +static bool check_tx_is_expanded(const cryptonote::transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& pubkeys) +{ + // Ripped from cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp + + const rct::rctSig& rv = tx.rct_signatures; + + if (pubkeys.size() != rv.mixRing.size()) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size"); + return false; + } + for (size_t i = 0; i < pubkeys.size(); ++i) + { + if (pubkeys[i].size() != rv.mixRing[i].size()) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size"); + return false; + } + } + + for (size_t n = 0; n < pubkeys.size(); ++n) + { + for (size_t m = 0; m < pubkeys[n].size(); ++m) + { + if (pubkeys[n][m].dest != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].dest)) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkey at vin " << n << ", index " << m); + return false; + } + if (pubkeys[n][m].mask != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].mask)) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched commitment at vin " << n << ", index " << m); + return false; + } + } + } + + const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size(); + if (n_sigs != tx.vin.size()) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MGs/vin sizes"); + return false; + } + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) + { + bool error; + if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type)) + error = memcmp(&boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32); + else + error = rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty() || memcmp(&boost::get(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32); + if (error) + { + MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched key image"); + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +/** + * @brief Perform expand_transaction_1 and Blockchain::expand_transaction_2 on a certain transaction + */ +static void expand_transaction_fully(cryptonote::transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& input_pubkeys) +{ + const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(cryptonote::expand_transaction_1(tx, false), "expand 1 failed"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES + ( + cryptonote::Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, input_pubkeys), + "expand 2 failed" + ); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!memcmp(&tx_prefix_hash, &tx.rct_signatures.message, 32), "message check failed"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(input_pubkeys == tx.rct_signatures.mixRing, "mixring check failed"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(check_tx_is_expanded(tx, input_pubkeys), "tx expansion check 2 failed"); +} + +/** + * @brief Mostly construct transaction from binary file and provided mix ring pubkeys + * + * Most important to us, this should populate the .rct_signatures.message and + * .rct_signatures.mixRings fields of the transaction. + * + * @param file_name relative file path in unit test data directory + * @param input_pubkeys manually retrived input pubkey destination / masks for each ring + * @return cryptonote::transaction the expanded transaction + */ +static cryptonote::transaction expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys +( + const char* file_name, + const rct::ctkeyM& input_pubkeys +) +{ + cryptonote::transaction transaction; + + const boost::filesystem::path tx_json_path = unit_test::data_dir / file_name; + std::string tx_blob; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES + ( + epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(tx_json_path.string(), tx_blob), + "loading file to string failed" + ); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES + ( + cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_blob, transaction), + "TX blob could not be parsed" + ); + + expand_transaction_fully(transaction, input_pubkeys); + + return transaction; +} + +/** + * @brief Return whether a modification changes blob resulting from do_serialize() + */ +template +static bool modification_changes_do_serialize +( + const T& og_obj, + TModifier& obj_modifier_func, + bool expected_change +) +{ + T modded_obj = og_obj; + obj_modifier_func(modded_obj); + const std::string og_blob = stringify_with_do_serialize(og_obj); + const std::string modded_blob = stringify_with_do_serialize(modded_obj); + const bool did_change = modded_blob != og_blob; + if (did_change != expected_change) + { + const std::string og_hex = epee::to_hex::string(epee::strspan(og_blob)); + const std::string modded_hex = epee::to_hex::string(epee::strspan(modded_blob)); + MERROR("unexpected: modded_blob '" << modded_hex << "' vs og_blob ' << " << og_hex << "'"); + } + return did_change; +} + +// Contains binary representation of mainnet transaction (height 2777777): +// e89415b95564aa7e3587c91422756ba5303e727996e19c677630309a0d52a7ca +static constexpr const char* tx1_file_name = "txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin"; + +// This contains destination key / mask pairs for each output in the input ring of the above tx +static const rct::ctkeyM tx1_input_pubkeys = +{{ + make_ctkey("e50f476129d40af31e0938743f7f2d60e867aab31294f7acaf6e38f0976f0228", "51e788ddf5c95c124a7314d45a91b52d60db25a0572de9c2b4ec515aca3d4481"), + make_ctkey("804245d067fcfe6cd66376db0571869989bc68b3e22a0f902109c7530df47a59", "c3cc65d3b3a05defaa05213dc3b0496f9b86dbeeefbff28db34b134b6ee3230b"), + make_ctkey("527563a03b498e47732b815f5f0c5875a70e0fb71a37c88123f0f8686349fae4", "04417c03b397cd11e403275ec89cb0ab5b8476bb88470e9ae7208ea63dacf073"), + make_ctkey("bffca8b5c7fe4235ba7136d6b5325f63df343dc147940b677f50217f8953bca6", "5cd8c5e54e07275422c9c5a9f4a7268d26c494ffba419e878b7e873a02ae2e76"), + make_ctkey("1f73385ea74308aa78b5abf585faac14a5e78a6e23f0f68c9c14681108b28ef0", "5c02b3156daaa8ec476d3244439d90efa266f3e51cb9c8eb384d8b9a8efaa024"), + make_ctkey("a2421eae8bb256644b34feeab48c6086c2c9feb40d2643436dc45e303eee8ab2", "787823abffa988b56d4a7b4a834630f71520220fd82fad035955e616ec095788"), + make_ctkey("17d8d8dc1e1c25b7295f2eab44c4ccc08a629b8e8d781bbb6f9a51a9561bcd4c", "db1ea24be6947e03176a297160dba16d65f37751bb0ef2ba71a4590d12b61dfc"), + make_ctkey("2c39348a9ab04dbabe3b5249819b7845ed8aaebd0d8eddd98bda0bf40753a398", "4e6cd25fbd10e2e040be84e3bf8043c612daeef625e66a5e5bcff88c9c46e82c"), + make_ctkey("c4c97157f23b45c7084526aaa9958fe858bebe446a7efa22c491c439b74271b1", "e251db2c86193a11a5bffefffe48c20e3d92a8dc98cb3a2f41704e565bcd860a"), + make_ctkey("d342045525139a8551bcdfa7aa0117d2ac2327cb6cf449ca59420c300e4471a5", "789c11f72060ad80f4cda5d89b24d49f9435bf765598dea7a91776e99f05f87c"), + make_ctkey("9a972ccf2c74f648070b0be839749c98eca87166de401a6c1f59e64b938a46c1", "5444cbed5cec31fb6ed1612f815d292f2bf3d2ff584bbcd8e5201ec59670d414"), + make_ctkey("49ccb806ccf5cbd74bae8d9fb2da8918ab61d0774ee6a6c3a6ccd237db22a088", "0c5db942fb44f29f6ef956e24db91f98a6de6e7288b0b04d01b8f260453d1431"), + make_ctkey("74417e8d1483df2df6fe68c88fc9a72639c35d765b38351b838521addf45dadc", "a1a606d6c4762ef51c1759bcb8b5c88be1d323025400c41fe6885431064b64dc"), + make_ctkey("48c4c349adaf7b3be27656ea70d1c83b93e1511bb0aac987861a4da9689b0e95", "ad14ffd5edac199ea7c5437d558089b0f2f03aa74bde43611322d769968b5a1c"), + make_ctkey("2d2ffade0f85ddd83a036469e49542e93cad94f9bea535f0ea2eb2f56304517e", "bcc48d00bd06dc5439200e749d0caf8a062b072d0c0eb1f78f6a4d8f2373e5f4"), + make_ctkey("4ee857d0ce17f66eca9c81eb326e404ceb50c8198248f2f827c440ee7aa0c0d7", "a8a9d61d4abbfb123630ffd214c834cc45113eaa51dd2f904cc6ae0c3c5d70e3") +}}; +} // anonymous namespace + +TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, tx1_preconditions) +{ + // If this unit test fails, something changed about transaction deserialization / expansion or + // something changed about RingCT signature verification. + + cryptonote::rct_ver_cache_t rct_ver_cache; + + cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys + (tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys); + const rct::rctSig& rs = tx.rct_signatures; + + const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx); + + EXPECT_EQ(1, tx.vin.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(2, tx.vout.size()); + const rct::key expected_sig_msg = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash); + EXPECT_EQ(expected_sig_msg, rs.message); + EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.mixRing.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(16, rs.mixRing[0].size()); + EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.pseudoOuts.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.rangeSigs.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.bulletproofs.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(2, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(7, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(7, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.MGs.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.CLSAGs.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(16, rs.p.CLSAGs[0].s.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.pseudoOuts.size()); + EXPECT_EQ(tx1_input_pubkeys, rs.mixRing); + EXPECT_EQ(2, rs.outPk.size()); + + EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rs)); + EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rs)); + EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(rs)); + EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, tx1_input_pubkeys, rct_ver_cache, rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)); + EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, tx1_input_pubkeys, rct_ver_cache, rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)); +} + +#define SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \ + do { \ + const auto sig_modifier_func = [](rct::rctSig& rs) { rs.fieldmodifyclause; }; \ + EXPECT_TRUE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_sig, sig_modifier_func, true)); \ + } while (0); \ + +TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, serializable_sig_changes) +{ + // Hello, future visitors. If this unit test fails, then fields of rctSig have been dropped from + // serialization. + + const cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys + (tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys); + const rct::rctSig& original_sig = tx.rct_signatures; + + // These are the subtests most likely to fail. Fields 'message' and 'mixRing' are not serialized + // when sent over the wire, since they can be reconstructed from transaction data. However, they + // are serialized by ::do_serialize(rctSig). + // How signatures are serialized for the blockchain can be found in the methods + // rct::rctSigBase::serialize_rctsig_base and rct::rctSigPrunable::serialize_rctsig_prunable. + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(message.bytes[31]++) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0].push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0][8].dest[10]--) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0][15].mask[3]--) + + // rctSigBase changes. These subtests are less likely to break + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(type ^= 23) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(pseudoOuts.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(ecdhInfo.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[0].dest[14]--) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[1].dest[14]--) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[0].mask[14]--) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[1].mask[14]--) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(txnFee *= 2023) + + // rctSigPrunable changes + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.rangeSigs.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].A[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].A1[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].B[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].r1[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].s1[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].d1[13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L[2][13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R[2][13] -= 7) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.MGs.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].s.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].s[15][31] ^= 69) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].c1[0] /= 3) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].D[0] /= 3) + SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.pseudoOuts.push_back({})) + + // Uncomment line below to sanity check SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST + // SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(message) // should fail +} + +#define UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \ + do { \ + const auto sig_modifier_func = [](rct::rctSig& rs) { rs.fieldmodifyclause; }; \ + EXPECT_FALSE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_sig, sig_modifier_func, false)); \ + } while (0); \ + +TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, unserializable_sig_changes) +{ + // Hello, future visitors. If this unit test fails, then congrats! ::do_serialize(rctSig) became + // better at uniquely representing rctSig. + const cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys + (tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys); + const rct::rctSig& original_sig = tx.rct_signatures; + + UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].I[14]++) + UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V.push_back({})) + UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V[1][31]--) + + // Uncomment line below to sanity check UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST_SHORTCUT + // UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST_SHORTCUT(message[2]++) // should fail +} + +#define SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \ + do { \ + using mr_mod_func_t = std::function; \ + const mr_mod_func_t mr_modifier_func = [&](rct::ctkeyM& mr) { mr fieldmodifyclause; }; \ + EXPECT_TRUE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_mixring, mr_modifier_func, true)); \ + } while (0); \ + +TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, serializable_mixring_changes) +{ + // Hello, future Monero devs! If this unit test fails, a huge concensus-related assumption has + // been broken and verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached needs to be reevalulated for validity. If it + // is not, there may be an exploit which allows for double-spending. See the implementation for + // more comments on the uniqueness of the internal cache hash. + + const rct::ctkeyM original_mixring = tx1_input_pubkeys; + + const size_t mlen = tx1_input_pubkeys.size(); + ASSERT_EQ(1, mlen); + const size_t nlen = tx1_input_pubkeys[0].size(); + ASSERT_EQ(16, nlen); + + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(.clear()) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(.push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0].clear()) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0].push_back({})) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0][0].dest[4]--) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0][15].mask[31]--) + + // Loop through all bytes of the mixRing and check for serialiable changes + for (size_t i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) + { + for (size_t j = 0; j < nlen; ++j) + { + static_assert(sizeof(rct::key) == 32, "rct::key size wrong"); + for (size_t k = 0; k < sizeof(rct::key); ++k) + { + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([i][j].dest[k]++) + SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([i][j].mask[k]++) + } + } + } +} + +#define EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \ + do { \ + cryptonote::transaction test_tx = original_tx; \ + test_tx.fieldmodifyclause; \ + test_tx.invalidate_hashes(); \ + EXPECT_FALSE(check_tx_is_expanded(test_tx, original_mixring)); \ + } while (0); \ + +TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, expand_transaction_2_failures) +{ + cryptonote::transaction original_tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys + (tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys); + rct::ctkeyM original_mixring = tx1_input_pubkeys; + + EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.p.CLSAGs[0].I[0]++) + EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.mixRing[0][15].dest[31]++) + EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.mixRing[0][15].mask[31]++) +}