Merge pull request #2435
74a465c8 Repo: remove in-tree VRP, link to single-policy VRP (anonimal)This commit is contained in:
Riccardo Spagni
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76312e04b9
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@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ Portions Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Cryptonote developers
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- GitHub: [https://github.com/monero-project/monero](https://github.com/monero-project/monero)
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- GitHub: [https://github.com/monero-project/monero](https://github.com/monero-project/monero)
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- IRC: [#monero-dev on Freenode](http://webchat.freenode.net/?randomnick=1&channels=%23monero-dev&prompt=1&uio=d4)
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- IRC: [#monero-dev on Freenode](http://webchat.freenode.net/?randomnick=1&channels=%23monero-dev&prompt=1&uio=d4)
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## Vulnerability Response
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- Our [Vulnerability Response Process](https://github.com/monero-project/meta/blob/master/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md) encourages responsible disclosure
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- We are also available via [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
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## Build
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## Build
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| Operating System | Processor | Status |
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| Operating System | Processor | Status |
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@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
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# Monero Vulnerability Response Process
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## Preamble
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Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following:
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- Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the network
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- Social Engineering of Monero staff or contractors
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- Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero community property and/or data centers
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## I. Point of Contacts for Security Issues
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```
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ric@getmonero.org
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BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9 759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9
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luigi1111@getmonero.org
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8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2 F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010
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moneromooo.monero@gmail.com
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48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3
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```
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## II. Security Response Team
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- fluffypony
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- luigi1111
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- moneromooo
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## III. Incident Response
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1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods:
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- a. Email
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- b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
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2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set
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3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels
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4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability
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- a. If submission proves to be vulnerable, proceed to next step
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- b. If not vulnerable:
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- i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability
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- ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary
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5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission
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6. Establish severity of vulnerability:
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- a. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe
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- b. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, wallets, or must be carefully exploited
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- c. LOW: is not easily exploitable
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7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability:
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- a. HIGH severities must be notified on website and reddit /r/Monero within 3 working days of classification
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- i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any
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- ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path
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- iii. The latter takes precedence over the former
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- b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release
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- c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release
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8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es)
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- a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in
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- b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher
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- c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits
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- d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted
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- i. Include the severity of the vulnerability
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- ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code
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- iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied
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- e. Release date is discussed
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9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update:
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- a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk
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- b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes
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- c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release
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## IV. Post-release Disclosure Process
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1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III
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2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed:
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- a. Response Manager contacts researcher and asks if researcher wishes for credit
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- b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following:
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- i. Project name and URL
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- ii. Versions known to be affected
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- iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected)
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- iv. Versions not checked
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- v. Type of vulnerability and its impact
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- vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID
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- vii. The planned, coordinated release date
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- viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations)
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- ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability)
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- x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter
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- c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on website and reddit /r/Monero
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- d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists:
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- i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com
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- ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com
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- e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID
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- i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID
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3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed:
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- a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future
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- b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V
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- c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus
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- d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public
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## V. Incident Analysis
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1. Isolate codebase
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- a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
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- i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc.
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- ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc.
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- iii. Operator/config error, etc.
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2. Auditing
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- a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
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- i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1
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- ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference
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- iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub
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3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V
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## VI. Resolutions
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Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following:
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- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
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- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
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- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/)
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- IRC
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- Email
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## VII. Continuous Improvement
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1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents
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2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including:
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- a. Areas of Monero affected by the incidents
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- b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents
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- c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any)
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- d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents
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3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss:
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- a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents
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- b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses
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