keccak: guard against misaligned memory accesses on ARM
The code generated is exactly the same as the direct access one on x86_64
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@ -105,9 +105,12 @@ void keccak(const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen, uint8_t *md, int mdlen)
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memset(st, 0, sizeof(st));
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for ( ; inlen >= rsiz; inlen -= rsiz, in += rsiz) {
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for (i = 0; i < rsizw; i++)
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st[i] ^= swap64le(((uint64_t *) in)[i]);
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keccakf(st, KECCAK_ROUNDS);
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for (i = 0; i < rsizw; i++) {
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uint64_t ina;
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memcpy(&ina, in + i * 8, 8);
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st[i] ^= swap64le(ina);
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}
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keccakf(st, KECCAK_ROUNDS);
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}
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// last block and padding
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@ -148,3 +148,20 @@ TEST(keccak, 137_and_1_136)
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TEST_KECCAK(137, chunks);
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}
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TEST(keccak, alignment)
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{
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uint8_t data[6064];
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__attribute__ ((aligned(16))) char adata[6000];
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(data) / sizeof(data[0]); ++i)
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data[i] = i & 1;
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uint8_t md[32], amd[32];
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for (int offset = 0; offset < 64; ++offset)
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{
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memcpy(adata, data + offset, 6000);
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keccak((const uint8_t*)&data[offset], 6000, md, 32);
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keccak((const uint8_t*)adata, 6000, amd, 32);
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ASSERT_TRUE(!memcmp(md, amd, 32));
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}
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}
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