verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached: fix fragility

This commit is contained in:
Jeffrey Ryan 2023-01-13 20:53:25 -06:00 committed by jeffro256
parent 99be9a044f
commit c59e0096b6
12 changed files with 715 additions and 111 deletions

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@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ namespace config
const unsigned char HASH_KEY_MM_SLOT = 'm'; const unsigned char HASH_KEY_MM_SLOT = 'm';
const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS_SEED[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys_seed"; const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS_SEED[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys_seed";
const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys"; const constexpr char HASH_KEY_MULTISIG_TX_PRIVKEYS[] = "multisig_tx_privkeys";
const constexpr char HASH_KEY_TXHASH_AND_MIXRING[] = "txhash_and_mixring";
// Multisig // Multisig
const uint32_t MULTISIG_MAX_SIGNERS{16}; const uint32_t MULTISIG_MAX_SIGNERS{16};

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@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ set(cryptonote_core_sources
cryptonote_core.cpp cryptonote_core.cpp
tx_pool.cpp tx_pool.cpp
tx_sanity_check.cpp tx_sanity_check.cpp
cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp) cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp
tx_verification_utils.cpp
)
set(cryptonote_core_headers) set(cryptonote_core_headers)

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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "common/notify.h" #include "common/notify.h"
#include "common/varint.h" #include "common/varint.h"
#include "common/pruning.h" #include "common/pruning.h"
#include "common/data_cache.h"
#include "time_helper.h" #include "time_helper.h"
#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY #undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ Blockchain::Blockchain(tx_memory_pool& tx_pool) :
m_difficulty_for_next_block(1), m_difficulty_for_next_block(1),
m_btc_valid(false), m_btc_valid(false),
m_batch_success(true), m_batch_success(true),
m_prepare_height(0) m_prepare_height(0),
m_rct_ver_cache()
{ {
LOG_PRINT_L3("Blockchain::" << __func__); LOG_PRINT_L3("Blockchain::" << __func__);
} }
@ -3211,7 +3213,7 @@ bool Blockchain::have_tx_keyimges_as_spent(const transaction &tx) const
} }
return false; return false;
} }
bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector<std::vector<rct::ctkey>> &pubkeys) const bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector<std::vector<rct::ctkey>> &pubkeys)
{ {
PERF_TIMER(expand_transaction_2); PERF_TIMER(expand_transaction_2);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.version == 2, false, "Transaction version is not 2"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.version == 2, false, "Transaction version is not 2");
@ -3534,6 +3536,13 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
false, "Transaction spends at least one output which is too young"); false, "Transaction spends at least one output which is too young");
} }
// Warn that new RCT types are present, and thus the cache is not being used effectively
static constexpr const std::uint8_t RCT_CACHE_TYPE = rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus;
if (tx.rct_signatures.type > RCT_CACHE_TYPE)
{
MWARNING("RCT cache is not caching new verification results. Please update RCT_CACHE_TYPE!");
}
if (tx.version == 1) if (tx.version == 1)
{ {
if (threads > 1) if (threads > 1)
@ -3555,12 +3564,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
} }
else else
{ {
if (!expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, pubkeys))
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to expand rct signatures!");
return false;
}
// from version 2, check ringct signatures // from version 2, check ringct signatures
// obviously, the original and simple rct APIs use a mixRing that's indexes // obviously, the original and simple rct APIs use a mixRing that's indexes
// in opposite orders, because it'd be too simple otherwise... // in opposite orders, because it'd be too simple otherwise...
@ -3578,61 +3581,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
case rct::RCTTypeCLSAG: case rct::RCTTypeCLSAG:
case rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus: case rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus:
{ {
// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not if (!ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, pubkeys, m_rct_ver_cache, RCT_CACHE_TYPE))
{
if (pubkeys.size() != rv.mixRing.size())
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size");
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < pubkeys.size(); ++i)
{
if (pubkeys[i].size() != rv.mixRing[i].size())
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size");
return false;
}
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < pubkeys.size(); ++n)
{
for (size_t m = 0; m < pubkeys[n].size(); ++m)
{
if (pubkeys[n][m].dest != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].dest))
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkey at vin " << n << ", index " << m);
return false;
}
if (pubkeys[n][m].mask != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].mask))
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched commitment at vin " << n << ", index " << m);
return false;
}
}
}
}
const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size();
if (n_sigs != tx.vin.size())
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MGs/vin sizes");
return false;
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
{
bool error;
if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
error = memcmp(&boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32);
else
error = rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty() || memcmp(&boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32);
if (error)
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched key image");
return false;
}
}
if (!rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(rv))
{ {
MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures!"); MERROR_VER("Failed to check ringct signatures!");
return false; return false;
@ -3641,6 +3590,12 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
} }
case rct::RCTTypeFull: case rct::RCTTypeFull:
{ {
if (!expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, pubkeys))
{
MERROR_VER("Failed to expand rct signatures!");
return false;
}
// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
{ {
bool size_matches = true; bool size_matches = true;

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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "rpc/core_rpc_server_commands_defs.h" #include "rpc/core_rpc_server_commands_defs.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/difficulty.h" #include "cryptonote_basic/difficulty.h"
#include "cryptonote_tx_utils.h" #include "cryptonote_tx_utils.h"
#include "tx_verification_utils.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/verification_context.h" #include "cryptonote_basic/verification_context.h"
#include "crypto/hash.h" #include "crypto/hash.h"
#include "checkpoints/checkpoints.h" #include "checkpoints/checkpoints.h"
@ -596,6 +597,15 @@ namespace cryptonote
*/ */
bool store_blockchain(); bool store_blockchain();
/**
* @brief expands v2 transaction data from blockchain
*
* RingCT transactions do not transmit some of their data if it
* can be reconstituted by the receiver. This function expands
* that implicit data.
*/
static bool expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector<std::vector<rct::ctkey>> &pubkeys);
/** /**
* @brief validates a transaction's inputs * @brief validates a transaction's inputs
* *
@ -1222,6 +1232,9 @@ namespace cryptonote
uint64_t m_prepare_nblocks; uint64_t m_prepare_nblocks;
std::vector<block> *m_prepare_blocks; std::vector<block> *m_prepare_blocks;
// cache for verifying transaction RCT non semantics
mutable rct_ver_cache_t m_rct_ver_cache;
/** /**
* @brief collects the keys for all outputs being "spent" as an input * @brief collects the keys for all outputs being "spent" as an input
* *
@ -1574,15 +1587,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
*/ */
void load_compiled_in_block_hashes(const GetCheckpointsCallback& get_checkpoints); void load_compiled_in_block_hashes(const GetCheckpointsCallback& get_checkpoints);
/**
* @brief expands v2 transaction data from blockchain
*
* RingCT transactions do not transmit some of their data if it
* can be reconstituted by the receiver. This function expands
* that implicit data.
*/
bool expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_prefix_hash, const std::vector<std::vector<rct::ctkey>> &pubkeys) const;
/** /**
* @brief invalidates any cached block template * @brief invalidates any cached block template
*/ */

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@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#include "cryptonote_core/blockchain.h"
#include "cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h"
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "blockchain"
#define VER_ASSERT(cond, msgexpr) CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cond, false, msgexpr)
using namespace cryptonote;
// Do RCT expansion, then do post-expansion sanity checks, then do full non-semantics verification.
static bool expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring)
{
// Pruned transactions can not be expanded and verified because they are missing RCT data
VER_ASSERT(!tx.pruned, "Pruned transaction will not pass verRctNonSemanticsSimple");
// Calculate prefix hash
const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx);
// Expand mixring, tx inputs, tx key images, prefix hash message, etc into the RCT sig
const bool exp_res = Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, mix_ring);
VER_ASSERT(exp_res, "Failed to expand rct signatures!");
const rct::rctSig& rv = tx.rct_signatures;
// Check that expanded RCT mixring == input mixring
VER_ASSERT(rv.mixRing == mix_ring, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing");
// Check CLSAG/MLSAG size against transaction input
const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size();
VER_ASSERT(n_sigs == tx.vin.size(), "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched input sigs/vin sizes");
// For each input, check that the key images were copied into the expanded RCT sig correctly
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sigs; ++n)
{
const crypto::key_image& nth_vin_image = boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image;
if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
{
const bool ki_match = 0 == memcmp(&nth_vin_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32);
VER_ASSERT(ki_match, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched CLSAG key image");
}
else
{
const bool mg_nonempty = !rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty();
VER_ASSERT(mg_nonempty, "Failed to check ringct signatures: missing MLSAG key image");
const bool ki_match = 0 == memcmp(&nth_vin_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32);
VER_ASSERT(ki_match, "Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MLSAG key image");
}
}
// Mix ring data is now known to be correctly incorporated into the RCT sig inside tx.
return rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv);
}
// Create a unique identifier for pair of tx blob + mix ring
static crypto::hash calc_tx_mixring_hash(const transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring)
{
std::stringstream ss;
// Start with domain seperation
ss << config::HASH_KEY_TXHASH_AND_MIXRING;
// Then add TX hash
const crypto::hash tx_hash = get_transaction_hash(tx);
ss.write(tx_hash.data, sizeof(crypto::hash));
// Then serialize mix ring
binary_archive<true> ar(ss);
::do_serialize(ar, const_cast<rct::ctkeyM&>(mix_ring));
// Calculate hash of TX hash and mix ring blob
crypto::hash tx_and_mixring_hash;
get_blob_hash(ss.str(), tx_and_mixring_hash);
return tx_and_mixring_hash;
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
namespace cryptonote
{
bool ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached
(
transaction& tx,
const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring,
rct_ver_cache_t& cache,
const std::uint8_t rct_type_to_cache
)
{
// Hello future Monero dev! If you got this assert, read the following carefully:
//
// For this version of RCT, the way we guaranteed that verification caches do not generate false
// positives (and thus possibly enabling double spends) is we take a hash of two things. One,
// we use get_transaction_hash() which gives us a (cryptographically secure) unique
// representation of all "knobs" controlled by the possibly malicious constructor of the
// transaction. Two, we take a hash of all *previously validated* blockchain data referenced by
// this transaction which is required to validate the ring signature. In our case, this is the
// mixring. Future versions of the protocol may differ in this regard, but if this assumptions
// holds true in the future, enable the verification hash by modifying the `untested_tx`
// condition below.
const bool untested_tx = tx.version > 2 || tx.rct_signatures.type > rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus;
VER_ASSERT(!untested_tx, "Unknown TX type. Make sure RCT cache works correctly with this type and then enable it in the code here.");
// Don't cache older (or newer) rctSig types
// This cache only makes sense when it caches data from mempool first,
// so only "current fork version-enabled" RCT types need to be cached
if (tx.rct_signatures.type != rct_type_to_cache)
{
MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " skipped");
return expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(tx, mix_ring);
}
// Generate unique hash for tx+mix_ring pair
const crypto::hash tx_mixring_hash = calc_tx_mixring_hash(tx, mix_ring);
// Search cache for successful verification of same TX + mix ring combination
if (cache.has(tx_mixring_hash))
{
MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " hit");
return true;
}
// We had a cache miss, so now we must expand the mix ring and do full verification
MDEBUG("RCT cache: tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx) << " missed");
if (!expand_tx_and_ver_rct_non_sem(tx, mix_ring))
{
return false;
}
// At this point, the TX RCT verified successfully, so add it to the cache and return true
cache.add(tx_mixring_hash);
return true;
}
} // namespace cryptonote

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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#pragma once
#include "common/data_cache.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_basic.h"
namespace cryptonote
{
// Modifying this value should not affect consensus. You can adjust it for performance needs
static constexpr const size_t RCT_VER_CACHE_SIZE = 8192;
using rct_ver_cache_t = ::tools::data_cache<::crypto::hash, RCT_VER_CACHE_SIZE>;
/**
* @brief Cached version of rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple
*
* This function will not affect how the transaction is serialized and it will never modify the
* transaction prefix.
*
* The reference to tx is mutable since the transaction's ring signatures may be expanded by
* Blockchain::expand_transaction_2. However, on cache hits, the transaction will not be
* expanded. This means that the caller does not need to call expand_transaction_2 on this
* transaction before passing it; the transaction will not successfully verify with "old" RCT data
* if the transaction has been otherwise modified since the last verification.
*
* But, if cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx) returns a "stale" hash, this function is not
* guaranteed to work. So make sure that the cryptonote::transaction passed has not had
* modifications to it since the last time its hash was fetched without properly invalidating the
* hashes.
*
* rct_type_to_cache can be any RCT version value as long as rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple works for
* this RCT version, but for most applications, it doesn't make sense to not make this version
* the "current" RCT version (i.e. the version that transactions in the mempool are).
*
* @param tx transaction which contains RCT signature to verify
* @param mix_ring mixring referenced by this tx. THIS DATA MUST BE PREVIOUSLY VALIDATED
* @param cache saves tx+mixring hashes used to cache calls
* @param rct_type_to_cache Only RCT sigs with version (e.g. RCTTypeBulletproofPlus) will be cached
* @return true when verRctNonSemanticsSimple() w/ expanded tx.rct_signatures would return true
* @return false when verRctNonSemanticsSimple() w/ expanded tx.rct_signatures would return false
*/
bool ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached
(
transaction& tx,
const rct::ctkeyM& mix_ring,
rct_ver_cache_t& cache,
std::uint8_t rct_type_to_cache
);
} // namespace cryptonote

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@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include "misc_log_ex.h" #include "misc_log_ex.h"
#include "misc_language.h" #include "misc_language.h"
#include "common/data_cache.h"
#include "common/perf_timer.h" #include "common/perf_timer.h"
#include "common/threadpool.h" #include "common/threadpool.h"
#include "common/util.h" #include "common/util.h"
@ -1579,42 +1578,6 @@ namespace rct {
} }
} }
bool verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(const rctSig & rv)
{
// Hello future Monero dev! If you got this assert, read the following carefully:
//
// RCT cache assumes that this function will serialize and hash all rv's fields used for RingCT verification
// If you're about to add a new RCTType here, first you must check that binary_archive serialization writes all rv's fields to the binary blob
// If it's not the case, rewrite this function to serialize everything, even some "temporary" fields which are not serialized normally
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(rv.type <= RCTTypeBulletproofPlus, false, "Unknown RCT type. Make sure RCT cache works correctly with this type and then enable it in the code here.");
// Don't cache older (or newer) rctSig types
// This cache only makes sense when it caches data from mempool first,
// so only "current fork version-enabled" RCT types need to be cached
if (rv.type != RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
return verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv);
// Get the hash of rv
std::stringstream ss;
binary_archive<true> ar(ss);
::do_serialize(ar, const_cast<rctSig&>(rv));
crypto::hash h;
cryptonote::get_blob_hash(ss.str(), h);
static tools::data_cache<crypto::hash, 8192> cache;
if (cache.has(h))
return true;
const bool res = verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv);
if (res)
cache.add(h);
return res;
}
//RingCT protocol //RingCT protocol
//genRct: //genRct:
// creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the // creates an rctSig with all data necessary to verify the rangeProofs and that the signer owns one of the

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@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ namespace rct {
bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv); bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv);
bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector<const rctSig*> & rv); bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector<const rctSig*> & rv);
bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv); bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv);
bool verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached(const rctSig & rv);
static inline bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv) { return verRctSemanticsSimple(rv) && verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); } static inline bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv) { return verRctSemanticsSimple(rv) && verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); }
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev); xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev);
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, hw::device &hwdev); xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, hw::device &hwdev);

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@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ namespace rct {
struct ctkey { struct ctkey {
key dest; key dest;
key mask; //C here if public key mask; //C here if public
bool operator==(const ctkey &other) const {
return (dest == other.dest) && (mask == other.mask);
}
bool operator!=(const ctkey &other) const {
return !(*this == other);
}
}; };
typedef std::vector<ctkey> ctkeyV; typedef std::vector<ctkey> ctkeyV;
typedef std::vector<ctkeyV> ctkeyM; typedef std::vector<ctkeyV> ctkeyM;

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@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ set(unit_tests_sources
unbound.cpp unbound.cpp
uri.cpp uri.cpp
varint.cpp varint.cpp
ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached.cpp
ringct.cpp ringct.cpp
output_selection.cpp output_selection.cpp
vercmp.cpp vercmp.cpp

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@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
// Copyright (c) 2023, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#include <sstream>
#define IN_UNIT_TESTS // To access Blockchain::{expand_transaction_2, verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached}
#include "gtest/gtest.h"
#include "unit_tests_utils.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
#include "cryptonote_core/blockchain.h"
#include "file_io_utils.h"
#include "misc_log_ex.h"
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
namespace cryptonote
{
// declaration not provided in cryptonote_format_utils.h, but definition is not static ;)
bool expand_transaction_1(transaction &tx, bool base_only);
}
namespace
{
/**
* @brief Make rct::ctkey from hex string representation of destionation and mask
*
* @param dest_hex
* @param mask_hex
* @return rct::ctkey
*/
static rct::ctkey make_ctkey(const char* dest_hex, const char* mask_hex)
{
rct::key dest;
rct::key mask;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(dest), dest_hex), "dest bad hex: " << dest_hex);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(mask), mask_hex), "mask bad hex: " << mask_hex);
return {dest, mask};
}
template <typename T>
static std::string stringify_with_do_serialize(const T& t)
{
std::stringstream ss;
binary_archive<true> ar(ss);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ar.good(), "Archiver is not in a good state. This shouldn't happen!");
::do_serialize(ar, const_cast<T&>(t));
return ss.str();
}
static bool check_tx_is_expanded(const cryptonote::transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& pubkeys)
{
// Ripped from cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp
const rct::rctSig& rv = tx.rct_signatures;
if (pubkeys.size() != rv.mixRing.size())
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size");
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < pubkeys.size(); ++i)
{
if (pubkeys[i].size() != rv.mixRing[i].size())
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkeys/mixRing size");
return false;
}
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < pubkeys.size(); ++n)
{
for (size_t m = 0; m < pubkeys[n].size(); ++m)
{
if (pubkeys[n][m].dest != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].dest))
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched pubkey at vin " << n << ", index " << m);
return false;
}
if (pubkeys[n][m].mask != rct::rct2pk(rv.mixRing[n][m].mask))
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched commitment at vin " << n << ", index " << m);
return false;
}
}
}
const size_t n_sigs = rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? rv.p.CLSAGs.size() : rv.p.MGs.size();
if (n_sigs != tx.vin.size())
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched MGs/vin sizes");
return false;
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
{
bool error;
if (rct::is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
error = memcmp(&boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.CLSAGs[n].I, 32);
else
error = rv.p.MGs[n].II.empty() || memcmp(&boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image, &rv.p.MGs[n].II[0], 32);
if (error)
{
MERROR("Failed to check ringct signatures: mismatched key image");
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* @brief Perform expand_transaction_1 and Blockchain::expand_transaction_2 on a certain transaction
*/
static void expand_transaction_fully(cryptonote::transaction& tx, const rct::ctkeyM& input_pubkeys)
{
const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(cryptonote::expand_transaction_1(tx, false), "expand 1 failed");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES
(
cryptonote::Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(tx, tx_prefix_hash, input_pubkeys),
"expand 2 failed"
);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!memcmp(&tx_prefix_hash, &tx.rct_signatures.message, 32), "message check failed");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(input_pubkeys == tx.rct_signatures.mixRing, "mixring check failed");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(check_tx_is_expanded(tx, input_pubkeys), "tx expansion check 2 failed");
}
/**
* @brief Mostly construct transaction from binary file and provided mix ring pubkeys
*
* Most important to us, this should populate the .rct_signatures.message and
* .rct_signatures.mixRings fields of the transaction.
*
* @param file_name relative file path in unit test data directory
* @param input_pubkeys manually retrived input pubkey destination / masks for each ring
* @return cryptonote::transaction the expanded transaction
*/
static cryptonote::transaction expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys
(
const char* file_name,
const rct::ctkeyM& input_pubkeys
)
{
cryptonote::transaction transaction;
const boost::filesystem::path tx_json_path = unit_test::data_dir / file_name;
std::string tx_blob;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES
(
epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(tx_json_path.string(), tx_blob),
"loading file to string failed"
);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES
(
cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_blob, transaction),
"TX blob could not be parsed"
);
expand_transaction_fully(transaction, input_pubkeys);
return transaction;
}
/**
* @brief Return whether a modification changes blob resulting from do_serialize()
*/
template <typename T, class TModifier>
static bool modification_changes_do_serialize
(
const T& og_obj,
TModifier& obj_modifier_func,
bool expected_change
)
{
T modded_obj = og_obj;
obj_modifier_func(modded_obj);
const std::string og_blob = stringify_with_do_serialize(og_obj);
const std::string modded_blob = stringify_with_do_serialize(modded_obj);
const bool did_change = modded_blob != og_blob;
if (did_change != expected_change)
{
const std::string og_hex = epee::to_hex::string(epee::strspan<uint8_t>(og_blob));
const std::string modded_hex = epee::to_hex::string(epee::strspan<uint8_t>(modded_blob));
MERROR("unexpected: modded_blob '" << modded_hex << "' vs og_blob ' << " << og_hex << "'");
}
return did_change;
}
// Contains binary representation of mainnet transaction (height 2777777):
// e89415b95564aa7e3587c91422756ba5303e727996e19c677630309a0d52a7ca
static constexpr const char* tx1_file_name = "txs/bpp_tx_e89415.bin";
// This contains destination key / mask pairs for each output in the input ring of the above tx
static const rct::ctkeyM tx1_input_pubkeys =
{{
make_ctkey("e50f476129d40af31e0938743f7f2d60e867aab31294f7acaf6e38f0976f0228", "51e788ddf5c95c124a7314d45a91b52d60db25a0572de9c2b4ec515aca3d4481"),
make_ctkey("804245d067fcfe6cd66376db0571869989bc68b3e22a0f902109c7530df47a59", "c3cc65d3b3a05defaa05213dc3b0496f9b86dbeeefbff28db34b134b6ee3230b"),
make_ctkey("527563a03b498e47732b815f5f0c5875a70e0fb71a37c88123f0f8686349fae4", "04417c03b397cd11e403275ec89cb0ab5b8476bb88470e9ae7208ea63dacf073"),
make_ctkey("bffca8b5c7fe4235ba7136d6b5325f63df343dc147940b677f50217f8953bca6", "5cd8c5e54e07275422c9c5a9f4a7268d26c494ffba419e878b7e873a02ae2e76"),
make_ctkey("1f73385ea74308aa78b5abf585faac14a5e78a6e23f0f68c9c14681108b28ef0", "5c02b3156daaa8ec476d3244439d90efa266f3e51cb9c8eb384d8b9a8efaa024"),
make_ctkey("a2421eae8bb256644b34feeab48c6086c2c9feb40d2643436dc45e303eee8ab2", "787823abffa988b56d4a7b4a834630f71520220fd82fad035955e616ec095788"),
make_ctkey("17d8d8dc1e1c25b7295f2eab44c4ccc08a629b8e8d781bbb6f9a51a9561bcd4c", "db1ea24be6947e03176a297160dba16d65f37751bb0ef2ba71a4590d12b61dfc"),
make_ctkey("2c39348a9ab04dbabe3b5249819b7845ed8aaebd0d8eddd98bda0bf40753a398", "4e6cd25fbd10e2e040be84e3bf8043c612daeef625e66a5e5bcff88c9c46e82c"),
make_ctkey("c4c97157f23b45c7084526aaa9958fe858bebe446a7efa22c491c439b74271b1", "e251db2c86193a11a5bffefffe48c20e3d92a8dc98cb3a2f41704e565bcd860a"),
make_ctkey("d342045525139a8551bcdfa7aa0117d2ac2327cb6cf449ca59420c300e4471a5", "789c11f72060ad80f4cda5d89b24d49f9435bf765598dea7a91776e99f05f87c"),
make_ctkey("9a972ccf2c74f648070b0be839749c98eca87166de401a6c1f59e64b938a46c1", "5444cbed5cec31fb6ed1612f815d292f2bf3d2ff584bbcd8e5201ec59670d414"),
make_ctkey("49ccb806ccf5cbd74bae8d9fb2da8918ab61d0774ee6a6c3a6ccd237db22a088", "0c5db942fb44f29f6ef956e24db91f98a6de6e7288b0b04d01b8f260453d1431"),
make_ctkey("74417e8d1483df2df6fe68c88fc9a72639c35d765b38351b838521addf45dadc", "a1a606d6c4762ef51c1759bcb8b5c88be1d323025400c41fe6885431064b64dc"),
make_ctkey("48c4c349adaf7b3be27656ea70d1c83b93e1511bb0aac987861a4da9689b0e95", "ad14ffd5edac199ea7c5437d558089b0f2f03aa74bde43611322d769968b5a1c"),
make_ctkey("2d2ffade0f85ddd83a036469e49542e93cad94f9bea535f0ea2eb2f56304517e", "bcc48d00bd06dc5439200e749d0caf8a062b072d0c0eb1f78f6a4d8f2373e5f4"),
make_ctkey("4ee857d0ce17f66eca9c81eb326e404ceb50c8198248f2f827c440ee7aa0c0d7", "a8a9d61d4abbfb123630ffd214c834cc45113eaa51dd2f904cc6ae0c3c5d70e3")
}};
} // anonymous namespace
TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, tx1_preconditions)
{
// If this unit test fails, something changed about transaction deserialization / expansion or
// something changed about RingCT signature verification.
cryptonote::rct_ver_cache_t rct_ver_cache;
cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys
(tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys);
const rct::rctSig& rs = tx.rct_signatures;
const crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx);
EXPECT_EQ(1, tx.vin.size());
EXPECT_EQ(2, tx.vout.size());
const rct::key expected_sig_msg = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_sig_msg, rs.message);
EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.mixRing.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16, rs.mixRing[0].size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.pseudoOuts.size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.rangeSigs.size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.bulletproofs.size());
EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus.size());
EXPECT_EQ(2, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V.size());
EXPECT_EQ(7, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L.size());
EXPECT_EQ(7, rs.p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R.size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, rs.p.MGs.size());
EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.CLSAGs.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16, rs.p.CLSAGs[0].s.size());
EXPECT_EQ(1, rs.p.pseudoOuts.size());
EXPECT_EQ(tx1_input_pubkeys, rs.mixRing);
EXPECT_EQ(2, rs.outPk.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rs));
EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rs));
EXPECT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(rs));
EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, tx1_input_pubkeys, rct_ver_cache, rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus));
EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached(tx, tx1_input_pubkeys, rct_ver_cache, rct::RCTTypeBulletproofPlus));
}
#define SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \
do { \
const auto sig_modifier_func = [](rct::rctSig& rs) { rs.fieldmodifyclause; }; \
EXPECT_TRUE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_sig, sig_modifier_func, true)); \
} while (0); \
TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, serializable_sig_changes)
{
// Hello, future visitors. If this unit test fails, then fields of rctSig have been dropped from
// serialization.
const cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys
(tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys);
const rct::rctSig& original_sig = tx.rct_signatures;
// These are the subtests most likely to fail. Fields 'message' and 'mixRing' are not serialized
// when sent over the wire, since they can be reconstructed from transaction data. However, they
// are serialized by ::do_serialize(rctSig).
// How signatures are serialized for the blockchain can be found in the methods
// rct::rctSigBase::serialize_rctsig_base and rct::rctSigPrunable::serialize_rctsig_prunable.
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(message.bytes[31]++)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0].push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0][8].dest[10]--)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(mixRing[0][15].mask[3]--)
// rctSigBase changes. These subtests are less likely to break
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(type ^= 23)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(pseudoOuts.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(ecdhInfo.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[0].dest[14]--)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[1].dest[14]--)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[0].mask[14]--)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(outPk[1].mask[14]--)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(txnFee *= 2023)
// rctSigPrunable changes
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.rangeSigs.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].A[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].A1[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].B[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].r1[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].s1[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].d1[13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].L[2][13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].R[2][13] -= 7)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.MGs.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].s.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].s[15][31] ^= 69)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].c1[0] /= 3)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].D[0] /= 3)
SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.pseudoOuts.push_back({}))
// Uncomment line below to sanity check SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST
// SERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(message) // should fail
}
#define UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \
do { \
const auto sig_modifier_func = [](rct::rctSig& rs) { rs.fieldmodifyclause; }; \
EXPECT_FALSE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_sig, sig_modifier_func, false)); \
} while (0); \
TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, unserializable_sig_changes)
{
// Hello, future visitors. If this unit test fails, then congrats! ::do_serialize(rctSig) became
// better at uniquely representing rctSig.
const cryptonote::transaction tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys
(tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys);
const rct::rctSig& original_sig = tx.rct_signatures;
UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.CLSAGs[0].I[14]++)
UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V.push_back({}))
UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST(p.bulletproofs_plus[0].V[1][31]--)
// Uncomment line below to sanity check UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST_SHORTCUT
// UNSERIALIZABLE_SIG_CHANGES_SUBTEST_SHORTCUT(message[2]++) // should fail
}
#define SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \
do { \
using mr_mod_func_t = std::function<void(rct::ctkeyM&)>; \
const mr_mod_func_t mr_modifier_func = [&](rct::ctkeyM& mr) { mr fieldmodifyclause; }; \
EXPECT_TRUE(modification_changes_do_serialize(original_mixring, mr_modifier_func, true)); \
} while (0); \
TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, serializable_mixring_changes)
{
// Hello, future Monero devs! If this unit test fails, a huge concensus-related assumption has
// been broken and verRctNonSemanticsSimpleCached needs to be reevalulated for validity. If it
// is not, there may be an exploit which allows for double-spending. See the implementation for
// more comments on the uniqueness of the internal cache hash.
const rct::ctkeyM original_mixring = tx1_input_pubkeys;
const size_t mlen = tx1_input_pubkeys.size();
ASSERT_EQ(1, mlen);
const size_t nlen = tx1_input_pubkeys[0].size();
ASSERT_EQ(16, nlen);
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(.clear())
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST(.push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0].clear())
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0].push_back({}))
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0][0].dest[4]--)
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([0][15].mask[31]--)
// Loop through all bytes of the mixRing and check for serialiable changes
for (size_t i = 0; i < mlen; ++i)
{
for (size_t j = 0; j < nlen; ++j)
{
static_assert(sizeof(rct::key) == 32, "rct::key size wrong");
for (size_t k = 0; k < sizeof(rct::key); ++k)
{
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([i][j].dest[k]++)
SERIALIZABLE_MIXRING_CHANGES_SUBTEST([i][j].mask[k]++)
}
}
}
}
#define EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(fieldmodifyclause) \
do { \
cryptonote::transaction test_tx = original_tx; \
test_tx.fieldmodifyclause; \
test_tx.invalidate_hashes(); \
EXPECT_FALSE(check_tx_is_expanded(test_tx, original_mixring)); \
} while (0); \
TEST(verRctNonSemanticsSimple, expand_transaction_2_failures)
{
cryptonote::transaction original_tx = expand_transaction_from_bin_file_and_pubkeys
(tx1_file_name, tx1_input_pubkeys);
rct::ctkeyM original_mixring = tx1_input_pubkeys;
EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.p.CLSAGs[0].I[0]++)
EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.mixRing[0][15].dest[31]++)
EXPAND_TRANSACTION_2_FAILURES_SUBTEST(rct_signatures.mixRing[0][15].mask[31]++)
}